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“Not only a just appraisal of the campaigns waged by Marines in World War II; it is a documentation of the Marine struggle to prove the feasibility of amphibious warfare....Relentlessly accurate and impartial.”—N.Y. Times Originally published in 1951, this book is a widely regarded classic on US Marine amphibious doctrine and operations employed in the Pacific during the Second World War. The authors describe in detail the development of the theoretical aspects of amphibious assault in the inter-war period, but devote the vast majority of the narrative to the various landings and their core strategies, using Japanese documents “to sketch in the background of military decisions made by the enemy.” A must for those who wish to understand the American war against Japan.
This collection of 51 essays provides a history of amphibious landings that include European, Asian, and American operations. It describes in detail some of history's most significant amphibious assaults, as well as planned attacks that were never carried out.
In this latest addition to his acclaimed U.S. warship design history series, Norman Friedman describes the ships and the craft of the U.S. amphibious force, from its inception in the 1920s through World War II to the present. He explains how and why the United States successfully created an entirely new kind of fleet to fight and win such World War II battles as D-Day and the island landings in the Pacific. To an extent not previously documented, his book lays out the differing views and contributions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines as well as the British, and how they affected the development of prewar and wartime amphibious forces. Current and future amphibious forces and tactics are explained, together with their implications for ships and craft, from 40,000-ton amphibious carriers down to tracked amphibious vehicles.As in earlier volumes in the series, this study uses previously unpublished sources to illustrate not only what was actually built but what was planned and never brought into service. For example, the book offers the first comprehensive and fully illustrated account of abortive attempts in the 1960s and beyond to build new fire support ships (LFS). With nearly two hundred photographs and specially commissioned line drawings and extensive appendixes, the work conveniently brings together details of the ships and their service histories found elsewhere only in scattered official references.
Sea mines have been important in naval warfare throughout history and continue to be so today. They have caused major damage to naval forces, slowed or stopped naval actions and commercial shipping, and forced the alteration of strategic and tactical plans. The threat posed by sea mines continues, and is increasing, in today's world of inexpensive advanced electronics, nanotechnology, and multiple potential enemies, some of which are difficult to identify. This report assesses the Department of the Navy's capabilities for conducting naval mining and countermining sea operations.
Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world.Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.
Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
The US armed forces were responsible for many tactical innovations during the years 1941–45, but in no field was US mastery more complete than amphibious warfare. In the vast, almost empty battlefield of the Pacific the US Navy and Marine Corps were obliged to develop every aspect of the amphibious assault landing in painstaking detail, from the design of many new types of vessel, down to the tactics of the rifle platoon hitting the beach, and the logistic system without which they could not have fought their way inland. This fascinating study offers a clear, succinct explanation of every phase of these operations as they evolved during the war years, illustrated with detailed color plates and photographs.
Few Marines have had more impact on the Corps's history than Pete Ellis, and none have been more controversial. This biography of the brilliant yet troubled Marine disputes many long-accepted but unsubstantiated accounts of his life and death. Ellis's legacy as the father of amphibious warfare is fully examined by the authors, who searched through family papers, fitness reports, Japanese sources, and interviewed eyewitnesses to solve the mysteries of Ellis's tragic life.
The Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant's strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant's Intent for the next four years. As Commandant Neller observed, "The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment." I concur with his diagnosis. Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and DPG, and further, prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts. Effecting that change will be my top priority as your 38th Commandant. This CPG outlines my five priority focus areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. I will use these focal areas as logical lines of effort to frame my thinking, planning, and decision-making at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), as well as to communicate to our civilian leadership. This document explains how we will translate those focus areas into action with measurable outcomes. The institutional changes that follow this CPG will be based on a long-term view and singular focus on where we want the Marine Corps to be in the next 5-15 years, well beyond the tenure of any one Commandant, Presidential administration, or Congress. We cannot afford to retain outdated policies, doctrine, organizations, or force development strategies. The coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change - just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. The Arab Spring, West African Ebola Outbreak, Scarborough Shoal standoff, Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and weaponization of social media are but a few recent examples illustrating the point. While we must accept an environment characterized by uncertainty, we cannot ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to designing and preparing the force for the future. What is abundantly clear is that the future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. Context and direction is clearly articulated in the NDS and DPG as well as testimony from our uniformed and civilian leadership. No further guidance is required; we are moving forward. The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. In crisis prevention and crisis response, the Fleet Marine Force - acting as an extension of the Fleet - will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so. The Marine Corps will be the "force of choice" for the President, Secretary, and Combatant Commander - "a certain force for an uncertain world" as noted by Commandant Krulak. No matter what the crisis, our civilian leaders should always have one shared thought - Send in the Marines.