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"Shadows on the Wall: Deterrence and Disarmament examines and contrasts the three alternative philosophical positions about the nature of the international system and patterns of human behavior that underlie three competing narratives seen in U.S. public debate regarding nuclear deterrence and disarmament. For over six decades, these three competing narratives, built on contrary philosophical traditions, have been the basis for contending positions regarding U.S. nuclear policy-ranging from advocacy for complete global nuclear disarmament to advocacy for the maintenance of robust U.S. nuclear capabilities for deterrence. Each of these three different narratives is based on different speculative expectations about developments in the international system and future patterns of human behavior. Given the inherent uncertainties about future developments in the international system and human behavior, none of these narratives can be deemed to objectively correct, or certainly wrong. They may, nevertheless, be judged to entail different levels of prudence for U.S. and allied security"--
“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.
In an era of great power competition, the role of alliances in managing escalation of conflict has acquired renewed importance. Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate means for deterrence and controlling escalation, and are central to US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, allies themselves need to better prepare for managing escalation in an increasingly challenging geostrategic and technological environment for the US and its allies. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This book brings together leading experts from Europe, Northeast Asia, the United States and Australia to focus on these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence and potential escalation pathways in America’s 21st century alliances. ‘Nuclear weapons play an important role in deterrence and preventing military conflict between great powers, while also posing an existential threat to humanity. It is vital that we have a nuanced understanding of this important challenge, so that such weapons are never used. This book offers many important perspectives and makes a significant contribution to the overall debate about these powerful weapons.’ — The Hon Julie Bishop, Chancellor, The Australian National University, Former Foreign Minister of Australia ‘This timely book identifies a wide range of challenges US alliances both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic face as they seek to ensure the value of US extended deterrence, particular the US nuclear umbrella, against China and Russia. This unique collection of chapters written by experts in US allies in both regions presents widely varying security perceptions and priorities. To understand such differences is the key to globally strengthen the US alliance systems, which are a significant advantage Washington enjoys over the two competitors.’ — Yukio Satoh, former President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) ‘This is a timely and thoughtful collection of essays that should serve to jumpstart public discussion and debate—the absence of which is widely noted and much bemoaned. Each contributor examines an aspect of the complicated, multifaceted nuclear debate by discussing the range of dilemmas from deterrence to disarmament. The various views set out here are more relevant than ever as Russia, China and the United States flex their nuclear muscles in new and sometimes dangerous ways. This book should be read by anyone interested in the preventing the use of nuclear weapons and understanding complexities of alliances in an increasingly dangerous world.’ — Madelyn Creedon, former Principal Deputy Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) sets out to challenge deterrence policies and military defence doctrines, taking a humanitarian approach intended to disrupt the nuclear status quo. States with nuclear weapons oppose its very existence, neither participating in its development nor adopting its final text. Civil society groups seem determined, however, to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons towards their abolition. This book analyzes how the Treaty influences the international security architecture, examining legal, institutional and diplomatic implications of the Treaty and exploring its real and potential impact for both states acceding to the Treaty and those opposing it. It concludes with practical recommendations for international lawyers and policymakers regarding non-proliferation and disarmament matters, ultimately noting that nuclear weapons threaten peace, and everyone should have the right to nuclear peace and freedom from nuclear fear.
Our Uncertain Nuclear Future : Navigating a Third Nuclear Age of Multipolar Competition -- Cold War Theory Redux : Recalling a Hardnosed Conception of Adversarial Arms Control -- From Theories to Treaties : Learning from the Cold War Negotiating Experience -- A New Arms Race : Transitioning from Post-Cold War Denuclearization to Great Power Nuclear Rivalry -- Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age : Adapting Old Ideas for New Times.
For decades, nuclear deterrence has been at the heart of the transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe. It underpins European security, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continuously commits to remaining a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. And yet, with a few important exceptions, transatlantic dialogue on nuclear issues largely declined with the end of the Cold War, particularly among non-governmental experts--and has only started to be revived in recent years. Rebuilding deterrence dialogue in response to a shifting strategic landscape is an important step in strengthening not only the transatlantic partnership, but also European security. This paper collection explores the evolving deterrence dialogue in Europe and identifies ways to inject new momentum into that dialogue. Renewed attention on the issue is particularly timely as European actors confront an adventurist Russia, rising China, and new technologies that will impact nuclear deterrence, U.S.-Europe relations, and institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
This book discusses the nuclear dilemma from various countries' points of view: from Japan, Korea, the Middle East, and others. The final chapter proposes a new solution for the nonproliferation treaty review.