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Drawing on records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this work focuses on Britain's role in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, and British policy towards the Soviet Union and its satellites. British reactions to detente between the superpowers are charted.
"Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, History and Records Department" -- p [vi].
The Mediterranean sea has been a key geopolitical territory in the global international relations of the twentieth century; of crucial importance to the US, the Middle East and in the history of the EU. As Cold War documents become declassified and these archives become accessible to western historians, this volume reassesses the secret war waged over three decades for control of the Mediterranean Sea. An 'American lake' in the 1950s, a battlefield for influence in the Cold War of the 1960s, and an increasingly important political arena for the oil-rich Gulf States in the 1970s, the Mediterranean offers a focal point around which the major themes and narratives of Cold War history were constructed. "Detente in Cold War Europe" draws together detailed analyses of the major moments of post-WWII history through the prism of the Mediterranean - including the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Soviet role in the Yom Kippur war, the Cyprus emergency of 1974, US-Soviet detente and US-Israeli relations under President Nixon. This book is a vital work for historians of the twentieth century and for those seeking to understand the importance of the Mediterranean in the political history of the Cold War.
This book examines the dynamic evolution of Western détente policies which sought to transform Europe and overcome its Cold War division through more communication and engagement. Kieninger challenges the traditional Cold War narrative that détente prolonged the division of Europe and precipitated America’s decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Rather, he argues that policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western Europe envisaged the stability enabled by détente as a precondition for change, as Communist regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence over time. Kieninger identifies the Helsinki Accords, Lyndon Johnson’s bridge building, and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik as efforts aimed at constructive changes in Eastern Europe through a multiplication of contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal levels. This study also illuminates the longevity of America’s policy of peaceful change against the background of the nuclear stalemate and the military status quo.
This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. This is the first monograph-length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practised against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and re-evaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War. The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference. The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.
This volume presents a collection of diplomatic documents describing Britain’s relations with Eastern Europe from 1979 to 1982, with special focus on the crisis in Poland. After coming to power in 1979, the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher reaffirmed a policy of ‘differentiation’ between the Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe, and between individual countries; concurrently it encouraged states to exercise a limited amount of independence. This policy was soon put to the test when in 1980 Solidarność, the Solidarity trade union led by Lech Wałęsa, challenged the power of the Party state in Poland. Political demands, social unrest and economic crisis culminated in the imposition of martial law in December 1981, finally suspended in December 1982. The volume maps the UK response, in consultation with Western partners, to the unfolding crisis in Poland, the threat of Soviet intervention and the impact on other Communist states in Europe. The volume also provides a flavour of bilateral UK relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia; highlighting themes such as human rights and trade. This volume will be of great interest to students of British Politics, Eastern European Politics, Cold War History, Diplomacy Studies and International Relations in general.
In 1983, more than one million Germans joined together to protest NATO’s deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe. International media overflowed with images of marches, rallies, and human chains as protesters blockaded depots and agitated for disarmament. Though they failed to halt the deployment, the episode was a decisive one for German society, revealing deep divisions in the nation’s political culture while continuing to mobilize activists. This volume provides a comprehensive reference work on the “Euromissiles” crisis as experienced by its various protagonists, analyzing NATO’s diplomatic and military maneuvering and tracing the political, cultural, and moral discourses that surrounded the missiles’ deployment in East and West Germany.
This book examines the 'Know How Fund', Britain’s bilateral technical assistance programme in post-communist central and eastern Europe, devised in response to the end of the Cold War. The Know How Fund (KHF) was the technical assistance programme which Margaret Thatcher’s government launched in the spring of 1989 to encourage Poland’s transition from communism to democracy and free-market capitalism. It was subsequently extended to other countries of central and eastern Europe and might be considered a novel experiment in what the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, would later term ‘transformational diplomacy’. Drawing upon still-closed records of the Cabinet Office, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this book explores the political origins of the KHF. In particular, the author examines its influence upon the transitional process in the lands of the former Soviet bloc; its part in attenuating the potentially destabilising effects of revolutionary change in Europe; the interdepartmental cooperation and rivalry to which its administration gave rise in Whitehall; and the links forged between officials and the worlds of business, finance and academe in project design and implementation. The volume offers new insights into Britain’s reactions to the collapse of communism in central Europe and the Soviet Union; the role of aid in the making and conduct of British foreign policy; and the significance of New Labour’s establishment of DFID as a separate government department. This book will be of much interest to students of British Foreign Policy, Diplomacy Studies, European history, Post-Communist Transitions and IR in general.
This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue détente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking détente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards détente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of détente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.