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The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.
Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.
The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.
In this book, Walton and McKersie attempt to describe a comprehensive theory of labor negotiation. The authors abstract and analyze four sets of systems of activities which they believe account for much of the behavior found in labor negotiations. The first system of activities, termed "distributive bargaining," comprises competitive behaviors that are intended to influence the division of limited resources. The second system is made up of activities that increase the joint gain available to the negotiating parties, referred to as "integrative bargaining." They are problem-solving behaviors and other activities which identify, enlarge and act upon the common interests of the parties. The third system includes activities that influence the attitudes of the parties toward each other and affect the basic relationship bonds between the social units involved. This process is referred to as "attitudinal structuring." The fourth system of activities, which occurs as an integral aspect of the inter-party negotiations, comprises the behaviors of a negotiator that are meant to achieve consensus within one's own organizations. This fourth process is called "intra-organizational bargaining." Each sub process has its own set of instrumental acts or tactics. Therefore, each of the four model chapters is followed by a chapter on the tactics which implement the process. These chapters translate the model into tactical assignments and include an abundance of supporting illustrations from actual negotiations. This study should be of interest to several audiences, including students and teachers of industrial relations, social scientists interested in the general field of conflict resolution, as well as practitioners of collective bargaining and other individuals directly involved in international negotiations. The overall theoretical framework has been derived by a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning. Extensive fieldwork and several dozen printed case studies have provided the bulk of the empirical data. In terms of meaning, the study has three touchstones: the field of collective bargaining; the field of conflict resolutions; and the underlying disciplines of economics, psychology, and sociology.
Household and Economy: Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility deals with welfare economics and the socially optimal population size, as well as the social consequences of individual choice with respect to family size within each generation. The general equilibrium implications of endogenous fertility for a number of issues of population policy are discussed. In addition to their own consumption, the number of children and the utility of each child is assumed to enter the utility function of the parents. Comprised of 10 chapters, this volume begins with a review of social welfare criteria for optimal population size and the static theory of optimal population size, optimal population growth with exogenous fertility, and the theory of endogenous fertility. The reader is then introduced to the basic principles of welfare economics and the economics of externalities, followed by a summary of the traditional theory of household behavior. Subsequent chapters focus on optimal population size according to various social welfare criteria; real and potential externalities generated by the endogeneity of fertility; and the principal alternative reason for having children: to transfer resources from the present to support the future consumption of parents in old age. The book concludes by assessing the implications of endogenous fertility for within-generation income distribution policies and reflecting on the directions in which future research may be fruitful. This monograph will be of value to economists, social scientists, students of welfare economics, and those who wish to understand the contribution of economic analysis to an improved understanding of population policy.
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
This modern, still relevant text is suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and professionals in mathematics, operational research, economics, sociology; and psychology, defence and strategic studies, and war games. Engagingly written with agreeable humor, the book can also be understood by non-mathematicians. It shows basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies, the minimax theorem, non-cooperative and co-operative games, and a ''first class'' account of linear programming, theory and practice. The text is self-contained with comprehensive source references. Based on a series of lectures given by the author in the theory of games at Royal Holloway College, it gives unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of co-operative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skilfully guided tour through the Shapely and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies.
Describes a method of negotiation that isolates problems, focuses on interests, creates new options, and uses objective criteria to help two parties reach an agreement.
Publication of the Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation marks a milestone in the evolution of the group decision and negotiation (GDN) eld. On this occasion, editors Colin Eden and Marc Kilgour asked me to write a brief history of the eld to provide background and context for the volume. They said that I am in a good position to do so: Actively involved in creating the GDN Section and serving as its chair; founding and leading the GDN journal, Group Decision and Negotiation as editor-in-chief, and the book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” as editor; and serving as general chair of the GDN annual meetings. I accepted their invitation to write a brief history. In 1989 what is now the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) established its Section on Group Decision and Negotiation. The journal Group Decision and Negotiation was founded in 1992, published by Springer in cooperation with INFORMS and the GDN Section. In 2003, as an ext- sion of the journal, the Springer book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” was inaugurated.
The purchase of this ebook edition does not entitle you to receive access to the Connected eBook on CasebookConnect. You will need to purchase a new print book to get access to the full experience including: lifetime access to the online ebook with highlight, annotation, and search capabilities, plus an outline tool and other helpful resources. Designed to prepare law students to negotiate knowledgably and successfully as lawyers representing clients, Lawyer Negotiation: Theory, Practice, and Law, Fourth Edition features an integrated approach that combines theory, skills, negotiation strategy, ethics, and law. A sleek, readable, and lively text for any law school Negotiation course, this book reflects the authors’ experience as negotiators, mediators, ADR teachers, and trainers. Interesting notes, thoughtful problems, provocative questions, and new video resources throughout the text raise practical negotiation challenges and policy issues. The focus is on negotiating legal claims and issues on behalf of clients. Previous editions have proven popular because of the very readable and lively text, interesting notes, thoughtful problems, and provocative questions that raise practical negotiation challenges and issues, which are updated in this new edition. Carefully curated excerpts from other leading authors are included, allowing for diverse ideas to be presented on negotiation techniques and eliminating the need for supplemental material. Vivid examples are included from real cases and literature, which bring negotiation concepts and applications to life. The book is designed for experiential, interactive teaching utilizing provided role-plays, exercises, problems, and streaming video examples. In addition to direct negotiation, how to advantageously use assisted negotiation in the form of mediation advocacy is included. New to the Fourth Edition: Fresh material and perspective benefiting from a new co-author Each chapter has been updated with new insights and examples More video-based examples, problems, and resources—linked video excerpts can now be streamed showing different negotiation styles and techniques Streamlined presentation of outside excerpts Greater coverage of distance negotiation, including email and remote contexts Increased focus on #MeToo, gender, social activism, historical inequities, anti-racism, cultural and style differences, online negotiation, technological advances, and other crucial issues affecting negotiation and dispute resolution today Excerpts have been condensed or summarized to shorten reading assignments, allowing more time for experiential learning Professors and student will benefit from: Step-by-step organization and readings designed to be used as part of an active experiential class without sacrificing the deep knowledge expected in a law school course Informal writing style, interesting examples, practical advice, and thought-provoking questions, all written specifically for law students who will soon represent clients as negotiators Practice-based approach which helps students apply the concepts Exercises and accompanying role-plays that facilitate classroom discussion Assessment tools to aid in student learning and understanding Videos that show experienced lawyers, negotiators, and mediators performing role plays