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This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies termed 'deregulatory takings' that threaten private property in network industries without compensation.
Regulation and Markets provides the up to date, integrated analysis of regulatory policies and the administrative process that is needed in today's field of regulation economics. The book takes a modern perspective, using the tools of industrial organization and game theory. It is the only unified treatment of the field and combines theoretical models with consideration of public policy issues in the areas of antitrust, price regulation, environmental regulation, product quality, and workplace safety. The discussion considers both the welfare effects of regulation and the institutional aspects of the administrative regulatory process. Developments in the fields of law and political science have been integrated in a rigorous manner into the economic framework.Sections of the book address administrative process and market allocation, competition and pricing under increasing returns to scale, administrative regulation of markets, and antitrust enforcement. The conclusion evaluates regulatory policy and deregulation. Extensive literature citations throughout enhance the books value as a reference.
This text explores the implications of a bargaining perspective for institutional governance and public law in deregulated industries such as electric power and telecommunications. Leading media accounts blame deregulated markets for failures in competitive restructuring policies. However, the author argues that governmental institutions, often influenced by private stakeholders, share blame for the defects in deregulated markets. The first part of the book explores the minimal role that judicial intervention played for much of the twentieth century in public utility industries and how deregulation presents fresh opportunities and challenges for public law. The second part of the book explores the role of public law in a deregulatory environment, focusing on the positive and negative incentives it creates for the behavior of private stakeholders and public institutions in a bargaining-focused political process.
This book argues that many of the basic concepts that we use to describe and analyze our governmental system are out of date. Developed in large part during the Middle Ages, they fail to confront the administrative character of modern government. These concepts, which include power, discretion, democracy, legitimacy, law, rights, and property, bear the indelible imprint of this bygone era's attitudes, and Arthurian fantasies, about governance. As a result, they fail to provide us with the tools we need to understand, critique, and improve the government we actually possess. Beyond Camelot explains the causes and character of this failure, and then proposes a new conceptual framework, drawn from management science and engineering, which describes our administrative government more accurately, and identifies its weaknesses instead of merely bemoaning its modernity. This book's proposed framework envisions government as a network of connected units that are authorized by superior units and that supervise subordinate ones. Instead of using inherited, emotion-laden concepts like democracy and legitimacy to describe the relationship between these units and private citizens, it directs attention to the particular interactions between these units and the citizenry, and to the mechanisms by which government obtains its citizens' compliance. Instead of speaking about law and legal rights, it proposes that we address the way that the modern state formulates policy and secures its implementation. Instead of perpetuating outdated ideas that we no longer really believe about the sanctity of private property, it suggests that we focus on the way that resources are allocated in order to establish markets as our means of regulation. Highly readable, Beyond Camelot offers an insightful and provocative discussion of how we must transform our understanding of government to keep pace with the transformation that government itself has undergone.
After 25 years of industry restructuring, regulatory reform and deregulation across many industrial sectors in many countries, it is an appropriate time to take stock of the impacts of these reforms on consumers, producers and overall economic performance. This book contains the latest thinking on these issues by a distinguished international group of scholars. It s a collection of essays for our time that is well worth reading. Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US The most exciting development in the study of regulation in the past quarter century is research on the incentives that are created by the details of the procedures for creating and enforcing regulatory rules. This book brings together a rich collection of studies that collectively advance our understanding of the effect of regulatory governance on the performance of regulated firms, with important lessons about how to design more effective regulatory instruments and processes. Roger G. Noll, Stanford University, US Cycles of poorly-designed or weakly-enforced regulation, disappointing performance and political over-reaction are now familiar to students of regulated industries. Nourished by recent developments in the economics of incentives, including their transaction costs and property rights dimensions, and written by renowned experts in the field, Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation is a must-read for all those interested in the economics and politics of regulation. A timely book, the publication of which coincides with the designing of a post-subprime regulatory framework for the financial industry. Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics, France Building on Oliver Williamson s original analysis, the contributors introduce new ideas, different perspectives and provide tools for better understanding changes in the approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance. They draw largely upon a transaction cost approach, highlighting the challenges faced by major economic sectors and identifying critical flaws in prevailing views on regulation. Deeply rooted in sector analysis, the book conveys a central message of new institutional economics: that theory should be continuously confronted by facts, and reformed or revolutionized accordingly. With its emphasis on the institutional embeddedness of regulatory issues and the problems generated by the benign neglect of institutional factors in the reform of major public utilities, this book will provide a wide-ranging audience with challenging views on the dynamics of regulatory approaches. Economists, political scientists, postgraduate students, researchers and policymakers with an interest in institutional economics and economic organization will find the book to be a stimulating and enlightening read.
There is a wealth of material that shapes the law of State responsibility for breaches of investment contracts. First impressions of an unsettled or uncertain law have thus far gone unchallenged. But unchallenged first impressions point to the need for a detailed study that investigates and analyses the sources, the content, the characteristics, and the evolution of this law. The argument at the heart of this monograph is that the law of state responsibility for breaches of investment contracts has carved a unique and distinct trajectory from the traditional route for the creation of international law, developing principally from arbitral awards, and mimicking, to a considerable extent, the general international law on the protection of aliens and alien property. This book unveils the remarkable journey of the law of state responsibility for breaches of investment contracts, from its origins, to its formation, to its arrival at the cusp of maturity.
This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.
In this sprawling and ambitious book John Braithwaite successfully manages to link the contemporary dynamics of macro political economy to the dynamics of citizen engagement and organisational activism at the micro intestacies of governance practices. This is no mean feat and the logic works. . . Stephen Bell, The Australian Journal of Public Administration Everyone who is puzzled by modern regulocracy should read this book. Short and incisive, it represents the culmination of over twenty years work on the subject. It offers us a perceptive and wide-ranging perspective on the global development of regulatory capitalism and an important analysis of points of leverage for democrats and reformers. Christopher Hood, All Souls College, Oxford, UK It takes a great mind to produce a book that is indispensable for beginners and experts, theorists and policymakers alike. With characteristic clarity, admirable brevity, and his inimitable mix of description and prescription, John Braithwaite explains how corporations and states regulate each other in the complex global system dubbed regulatory capitalism. For Braithwaite aficionados, Regulatory Capitalism brings into focus the big picture created from years of meticulous research. For Braithwaite novices, it is a reading guide that cannot fail to inspire them to learn more. Carol A. Heimer, Northwestern University, US Reading Regulatory Capitalism is like opening your eyes. John Braithwaite brings together law, politics, and economics to give us a map and a vocabulary for the world we actually see all around us. He weaves together elements of over a decade of scholarship on the nature of the state, regulation, industrial organization, and intellectual property in an elegant, readable, and indispensable volume. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University, US Encyclopedic in scope, chock full of provocative even jarring claims, Regulatory Capitalism shows John Braithwaite at his transcendental best. Ian Ayres, Yale Law School, Yale University, US Contemporary societies have more vibrant markets than past ones. Yet they are more heavily populated by private and public regulators. This book explores the features of such a regulatory capitalism, its tendencies to be cyclically crisis-ridden, ritualistic and governed through networks. New ways of thinking about resultant policy challenges are developed. At the heart of this latest work by John Braithwaite lies the insight by David Levi-Faur and Jacint Jordana that the welfare state was succeeded in the 1970s by regulatory capitalism. The book argues that this has produced stronger markets, public regulation, private regulation and hybrid private/public regulation as well as new challenges such as a more cyclical quality to crises of market and governance failure, regulatory ritualism and markets in vice. However, regulatory capitalism also creates opportunities for better design of markets in virtue such as markets in continuous improvement, privatized enforcement of regulation, open source business models, regulatory pyramids with networked escalation and meta-governance of justice. Regulatory Capitalism will be warmly welcomed by regulatory scholars in political science, sociology, history, economics, business schools and law schools as well as regulatory bureaucrats, policy thinkers in government and law and society scholars.
Liability and Environment analyzes the role of law, in particular civil liability, in controlling environmental pollution and risk. In modern environmental policy, liability has become a popular instrument. In this book, Prof. Bergkamp takes a fresh look at civil liability for environmental harm in an inter- and transnational context. Over the last decade, industry's liability exposure for environmental harm has expanded significantly. At the international, EC, and national level proposals for onerous strict environmental liability regimes are pending. The `polluter pays principle', which is an articulation of the `cost internalization' theory in the environmental area, is believed to justify such liability regimes. Applying an instrumental approach to legal instruments, Prof. Bergkamp aims to redefine the role of liability in the heavily regulated environmental area. He shows that liability for environmental harm is not justified by the polluter pays principle, is an uncertain and unreliable instrument for achieving prevention, results in an inefficient insurance scheme, and plays a dubious role in adjusting activity levels. Based on an analysis of the basic characteristics of alternative legal instruments, Prof. Bergkamp concludes that civil liability should play a more modest, limited role in an environmental law system dominated by public law. Where deterrence is not the objective, first party insurance, compensation funds, or other public law regimes should be preferred over liability rules. In addition to civil liability of private parties, Liability and Environment discusses State liability under international, EC, and national law. Under international law, breach of a primary obligation triggers a State's liability. Prof. Bergkamp argues that this rule should be applied also to liability of private parties. In the environmental area, a business' primary obligations are spelled out in detailed permit conditions, regulations, and statutes. According to Prof. Bergkamp, only if a primary obligation is breached, a private person should be liable for environmental harm. The system that Bergkamp advocates is an objective fault liability regime, in which public environmental law defines the standard of care for both government and industry. "In rebuilding our civil liability system, we should keep in mind that what is good for industry should be good for everyone (or it is not good for anyone), we should keep in mind that what is good for private parties should be good for the state (or it is not good for either). In rebuilding our civil liability system, the international law of State responsibility, which is unpolluted by risk spreading and activity level considerations, will guide us a long way." This book is aimed at advanced law students, academic scholars, and practitioners. In addition, it will be of interest to policy and legislative analysts, legislators, and government officials. Professor Bergkamp's book cannot be described as "solving" the problems of legal and regulatory control of environmental harm, whether within a nation or internationally. As suggested before, however, the very idea of a "solution" is illusory. All legal and regulatory regimes around the world are today and will remain for the future in a state of perpetually continuing development. The virtue of this fine book is that it moves the process of that development forward by a very substantial measure. from the Foreword by George L. Priest.
The thorough analyses presented in the book provide the reader with a good overview of the deregulation process in the respective industries. . . Competition Policy and Merger Analysis in Deregulated and Newly Competitive Industries is a valuable resource for researchers of law, economics, and political science. . . Volker Soyez, European Competition Law Review This comprehensive book contains case studies on the evolution of competition policy, with an emphasis on merger policy, for seven major US industries that have experienced substantial deregulation in the past forty years electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads, airlines, hospitals and banking. Also included is a comparison of the EU s experience in attempting to bring about competition in the energy, finance, and airline industries. The contributors to the volume, each a recognized expert on the industry examined, explore the positive and negative implications of the substitution of market-oriented processes for historic patterns of command and control regulation. The chapters reveal clear similarities in the economic, legal and public policy issues that have arisen following deregulation of these economic sectors. Together they provide a good basis to discern the consistency of the problems and the relative success of differing responses to these issues over a range of industries going through similar transformation. While taking a basically positive view of the movement away from direct regulation, the contributors identify a number of continuing problems with achieving workable competition in these industries. The thorough analyses presented here will be of great value to law, economics, and political science researchers interested in deregulation, economic consultants advising government agencies or private parties, attorneys who focus on deregulated industries, policy planners at the agencies overseeing these industries, and students in advanced seminars on economic regulation.