Download Free Deployment Before Doctrine Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Deployment Before Doctrine and write the review.

This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS bases military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U.S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater. 1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean War 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965, the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam, forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement, and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine. This monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands particularly in terms of the concept of tailoring the deployment force at the Corps level. However, the doctrine focuses too much on the mechanics of moving the force and too little on the demanding planning aspects of deploying operational forces. Given a continued shortage of assets in the strategic mobility triad of sealift, airlift and prepositioning, doctrine falls short in establishing a critical imperative. This is that operational planners must consider the sequence and detailed composition of the deploying force, the role of the lodgement, and potential contributions of other services or allies in the context of the operational design. The success of a future power projection will probably not hinge significantly on hostile entry or will be given six months to build forces in theater. Deployment and employment may be seamless. Therefore, success will depend on the ability of planners to make operational deployment a fundamental building block of the campaign.
FM 3-35, “Army Deployment and Redeployment,” is the Army's authoritative doctrine for planning, organizing, executing, and supporting deployment and redeployment. This manual represents the culmination of our efforts to consolidate all deployment doctrine (FM 100-17, FM 100-17-3, FM 3-35.4, FM 100-17-5, and FM 4-01.011) into a single manual to align Army deployment doctrine with joint deployment doctrine. FM 3-35 has five chapters and 12 appendices. Chapter 1 presents an overview of force projection and the deployment process. Chapter 2 spells out activities units engage in prior to being alerted for deployment. Chapter 3 outlines the procedures involved in the movement of units from home station to the port of embarkation (POE) and from the POE to the port of debarkation (POD). Chapter 4 details the process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Chapter 5 explains redeployment. New appendices were developed in response to requests from the field. These appendices cover installation support, duties of the Mobility Officer, organization and operation of an arrival/departure airfield control group, unit movement officer (UMO), and unit movement plan, and the influence of senior commanders on deployment. Joint Publication 3-35 describes the joint process in terms of planning; pre-deployment; movement; and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). On the other hand, the Army process is defined by the phases of pre-deployment; movement (includes the fort to port and port to port segments); and RSOI. Planning occurs continuously throughout the entire process. In the current operating environment of persistent conflict, the rotation of Army forces is similar to the deployment process described in this manual.
This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS based military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U.S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-- theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater. 1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 Years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965-- the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam-forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine. The monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands.
Since the Cold War, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) armed services have undergone significant transformation in response to the radically altered threat environment, new operational demands, and reduced defense budgets. Central to this transformation in both states is an expanded role for private contractors in providing deployed support functions traditionally conducted by uniformed personnel. Despite the similar direction of military reform, the U.S. armed services' approach to battlefield outsourcing has undergone extensive public scrutiny and debate, whereas UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives have hitherto attracted comparatively little independent assessment. Close U.S.-UK military cooperation over recent years in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the likelihood that both states will remain close allies in future interventions, suggest that the UK MoD's approach to deployed contractor support is a salient issue for U.S. military planners. This monograph analyzes the MoD's outsourcing strategy and identifies those aspects of UK policy and doctrine that warrant consideration by the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. armed services. Evaluation of the performance of MoD outsourcing policy and doctrine against measures of cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness reveals two broad observations. The MoD has developed a number of novel command and control mechanisms that have succeeded in rationalizing and removing the risk in commercial battlefield support. But the data necessary to evaluate the real impact of deployed outsourcing have yet to enter the public domain. Similarly, questions remain about the relative cost-effectiveness of organic military provision and contractor alternatives. Comparative analysis indicates that there are no fundamental differences in overarching MoD and DoD outsourcing philosophy, but there are specific MoD initiatives that could enhance the U.S. armed services' ability to manage their deployed contractor support. 7.
The transformation of the Army was based on an environment characterized by a wider spectrum of potential contingencies, increased uncertainty, and a more complex range of operational conditions. The situation demanded swift action by the United States. The Army transformation plan focused on providing the joint force commander with expeditionary capability with forces organized and equipped to be modular, versatile, and rapidly deployable with institutions capable of supporting them. Understanding and applying the deployment process outlined in this manual is essential to achieving the desired expeditionary characteristics. FM 3-35 is the Army's authoritative doctrine for planning, organizing, executing, and supporting deployment and redeployment. This manual represents the culmination of our efforts to consolidate all deployment doctrine (FM 100-17, FM 100-17-3, FM 3-35.4, FM 100-17-5, and FM 4-01.011) into a single manual to align Army deployment doctrine with joint deployment doctrine.FM 3-35 has five chapters and 12 appendices.* Chapter 1 presents an overview of force projection and the deployment process.* Chapter 2 spells out activities units engage in prior to being alerted for deployment.* Chapter 3 outlines the procedures involved in the movement of units from home station to the port of embarkation (POE) and from the POE to the port of debarkation (POD).* Chapter 4 details the process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration(RSOI).* Chapter 5 explains redeployment.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.