Published: 2006
Total Pages: 14
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Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual-office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches are discussed in this report. One approach, reportedly approved but not yet initiated, would merge DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE's CI office under the control of a new DOE intelligence agency. As part of an anticipated second phase, NNSA's CI office would be consolidated under the DOE's intelligence agency. Proponents assert that such a consolidation would improve command, control, and communications. Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the control of the NNSA administrator. Proponents argue that a semi-autonomous agency such as NNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able to implement CI measures than is DOE. Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence programs. A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the current structure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention at DOE's weapons labs.