Download Free Deflationary Truth Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Deflationary Truth and write the review.

Deflationism is a recent, but increasingly popular, theory of truth. Deflationists deny the existence of a substantive theory about truth -- an account of the property "truth" that enables all of the facts about truth to be explained. Deflationism rejects all of the existing traditional theories about truth: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist. Students of philosophy as well as deflationary theorists will appreciate the depth of the articles as well as the exhaustive annotated bibliography in this book.
This is a collection of essays written over the last 25 years which represent Paul Horwich's development of the deflationary perspective and demonstrate its considerable power and fertility. They concern a broad array of philosophical problems, from the nature of truth to the autonomy of art.
This volume explores the deflationary claim of the innocence of truth, taking into account recent results on axiomatic truth theories.
Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts.Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. The essays on truth, meaning, and the attitudes show a development from a form of correspondence theory of truth and meaning to a more deflationist perspective.The next set of papers argue that a place must be made in semantics for the idea that there are questions about which there is no fact of the matter, and address the difficulties involved in making sense of this, both within a correspondence theory of truth and meaning, and within a deflationary theory. Two papers argue that there are questions in mathematics about which there is no fact of the mattter, and draw out implications of this for the nature of mathematics. And the final paper arguesfor a view of epistemology in which it is not a purely fact-stating enterprise.This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: what is truth? To arrive at an answer, two further questions need to be addressed in this context: 1) Does truth possess any essence, any inner nature? and 2) If so, what does this nature consist of? The present discussion focuses on the antagonism between substantial or robust theories of truth, with correspondence theory taking the lead, and deflationist or minimalist views, which have been commanding an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Whereas substantial theories proceed from the premise that truth has an essence, and that therefore the objective is to discover this essence, the challenge presented by deflationism is to dispense with this very premise.
What is truth? What role does truth play in the connections between language and the world? What is the relationship between truth and being? The Metaphysics of Truth tackles these fundamental philosophical questions and develops a distinctive metaphysical worldview. Moreover, it does so in a climate where the traditionally central issue of the nature of truth has diminished in significance due to the rise of deflationary and primitivist views, which deny that there are interesting and informative things to say about truth. Douglas Edwards responds to these views, and demonstrates the importance of the metaphysics of truth with regard to both the study of truth itself, and metaphysical debates more generally. He also develops a detailed pluralist metaphysical approach, which starts with the diversity of different subject areas, and holds that there are different relationships between language and the world in different areas, or 'domains'. He develops a pluralist approach which explains what domains are; how different domains are individuated; which metaphysical frameworks apply in different domains; and how truth plays a key role in the picture. The picture is extended to incorporate ontological pluralism - the idea that there are different ways of being - which increases the explanatory power of the view. Edwards gives particular attention to important domains which have not yet received a great deal of attention in debates about truth, namely the institutional and social domains, and thus connects work on the metaphysics of truth and being to key issues in social construction.
Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition - for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates which have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades both within philosophy and the culture at large.
Demonstrates how truthmaking can be used to make progress all across philosophy, but without its usual theoretical baggage.
The author of this text explores the notion of truth and its role in our ordinary thought, as well as in logical philosophical and scientific theories.
On the one hand, the concept of truth is a major research subject in analytic philosophy. On the other hand, mathematical logicians have developed sophisticated logical theories of truth and the paradoxes. Recent developments in logical theories of the semantical paradoxes are highly relevant for philosophical research on the notion of truth. And conversely, philosophical guidance is necessary for the development of logical theories of truth and the paradoxes. From this perspective, this volume intends to reflect and promote deeper interaction and collaboration between philosophers and logicians investigating the concept of truth than has existed so far.Aside from an extended introductory overview of recent work in the theory of truth, the volume consists of articles by leading philosophers and logicians on subjects and debates that are situated on the interface between logical and philosophical theories of truth. The volume is intended for graduate students in philosophy and in logic who want an introduction to contemporary research in this area, as well as for professional philosophers and logicians