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Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
The maintenance of a fair, competitive market among member states is critical to the functioning of the EU economy. In this book, the first comprehensive, unifying view of market definition, Miguel Ferro adeptly explores the different economic-legal issues that arise in EU competition law.
A dynamic and competitive environment, underpinned by competition law policy, is an essential characteristic of successful market economies. To satisfy the growing demand for information on current approaches and practices in competition law policy, the project "Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law-Policy" was initiated by the World Bank, with participation by OECD. This ensuing volume reflects the main issues that arise in design and implementation of competition law and policy in order to assist countries in developing an approach that suits their own needs and conditions. The views articulated in this publication suggest that the administration and enforcement of competition law policy should assign the greatest importance to fostering economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
Contributing to a convergence of legal and economic approaches, The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications integrates economic theory into current EU antitrust policy within the sector. The book addresses the role of competition and regulatory policies on a number of key issues in telecommunications, such as market definition, collective dominance, access to networks, and allocation of scarce resources.
This Handbook grapples conceptually and practically with what the sharing economy - which includes entities ranging from large for-profit firms like Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, Taskrabbit, and Upwork to smaller, non-profit collaborative initiatives - means for law, and how law, in turn, is shaping critical aspects of the sharing economy. Featuring a diverse set of contributors from many academic disciplines and countries, the book compiles the most important, up-to-date research on the regulation of the sharing economy. The first part surveys the nature of the sharing economy, explores the central challenge of balancing innovation and regulatory concerns, and examines the institutions confronting these regulatory challenges, and the second part turns to a series of specific regulatory domains, including labor and employment law, consumer protection, tax, and civil rights. This groundbreaking work should be read by anyone interested in the dynamic relationship between law and the sharing economy.
Competition Law and Policy in the EU --Article 101(1) --Article 101(3) --Market Definition --Cartels --Non-Covert Horizontal Cooperation --Vertical Agreements Affecting Distribution or Supply --Merger Control --Intellectual Property Rights --Article 102 --The Competition Rules and the Acts of Member States --Sectoral Regimes --Enforcement and Procedure --Fines for Substantive Infringements --The Enforcement of the Competition Rules by National Competition Authorities --Litigating Infringements in National Courts --State Aids.
The aim of this book is to explore the economic fundamentals of European competition law.
Succinct and concise, this textbook covers all the procedural and substantive aspects of EU competition law. It explores primary and secondary law through the prism of ECJ case law. Abuse of a dominant position and merger control are discussed and a separate chapter on cartels ensures the student receives the broadest possible perspective on the subject. In addition, the book's consistent structure aids understanding: section summaries underline key principles, questions reinforce learning and essay discussion topics encourage further exploration. By setting out the economic principles which underpin the subject, the author allows the student to engage with the complexity of competition law with confidence. Integrated examples and an uncluttered writing style make this required reading for all students of the subject.