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Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. During our review we identified seven Army and Air Force weapon system programs where these military services encountered limitations in implementing revisions to sustainment plans C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J aircraft, Up-armored High- Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Stryker family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and M4 carbine. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a result of the limitations encountered due to the lack of technical data rights, the services had to alter their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, new sources of supply to increase production, or competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. For example, the Air Force identified a need to develop a capability to perform maintenance on the C-17 at government depots but lacked the requisite technical data rights. Consequently, the Air Force is seeking to form partnerships with C-17 subvendors to develop its depot maintenance capability. Its efforts to form these partnerships have had mixed results, according to Air Force officials, because some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical data.
HR-93-7, Defense Weapons Systems Acquisition
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) weapons system acquisition process, focusing on the internal control weaknesses that inhibit the development of major weapons requirements. GAO found that: (1) although the overall defense budget has declined, wasteful practices that inflate defense acquisition costs remain; (2) DOD continues to establish questionable requirements for its weapon systems, project unrealistic cost and performance estimates, develop duplicative weapons systems, and prematurely commit to production before completing testing; (3) DOD has supported efforts to eliminate overlapping and redundant weapon requirements and reduce high-risk acquisition strategies; (4) DOD has begun to reassess many of its most expense weapon programs to determine which systems should be terminated, reduced, or delayed; (5) Congress has established an independent commission to reevaluate the military services' roles and missions and examine whether the DOD acquisition structure is too complex; (6) DOD initiatives to improve its weapons acquisition process cannot be assessed because they are in various stages of implementation; and (7) DOD believes that substantive reforms in its acquisition process can be achieved due to fiscal constraints, reduced threats, dwindling forces, congressional support, and DOD commitment to reform.
Includes observations on the performance of DoD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, the auditor analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DoD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. He also compiled assessments of 71 weapon programs. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
Military and defense organizations are a vital component to any nation. In order to maintain the standards of these sectors, new procedures and practices must be implemented. Emerging Strategies in Defense Acquisitions and Military Procurement is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly research on the present state of defense organizations, examining reforms and solutions necessary to overcome current limitations and make vast improvements to their infrastructure. Highlighting methodologies and theoretical foundations that promote more effective practices in defense acquisition, this book is ideally designed for academicians, practitioners, researchers, upper-level students, and professionals engaged in defense industries.
Since FY 2000, the DoD has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. In most cases, the programs failed to deliver capabilities when promised -- often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DoD¿s acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DoD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DoD need to take to improve the future performance of DoD¿s major weapon programs. Illustrations.
A broad historical overview of changing institutional patterns of technological innovation with the Defense Department's major weapons laboratories.