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Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges DoD and the Army must address as they proceed. The report on which it is based emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization. Illustrations.
Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities for the Army to Position Its Ground Force Modernization Efforts for Success
Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges DOD and the Army must address as they proceed. This testimony is based on GAO's report on the Army's Ground Force Modernization effort scheduled for release March 15, 2010. It emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization.
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
The global threat landscape is constantly evolving and remaining competitive and modernizing our digital environment for great power competition is imperative for the Department of Defense. We must act now to secure our future.This Digital Modernization Strategy is the cornerstone for advancing our digital environment to afford the Joint Force a competitive advantage in the modern battlespace.Our approach is simple. We will increase technological capabilities across the Department and strengthen overall adoption of enterprise systems to expand the competitive space in the digital arena. We will achieve this through four strategic initiatives: innovation for advantage, optimization, resilient cybersecurity, and cultivation of talent.The Digital Modernization Strategy provides a roadmap to support implementation of the National Defense Strategy lines of effort through the lens of cloud, artificial intelligence, command, control and communications and cybersecurity.This approach will enable increased lethality for the Joint warfighter, empower new partnerships that will drive mission success, and implement new reforms enacted to improve capabilities across the information enterprise.The strategy also highlights two important elements that will create an enduring and outcome driven strategy. First, it articulates an enterprise view of the future where more common foundational technology is delivered across the DoD Components. Secondly, the strategy calls for a Management System that drives outcomes through a metric driven approach, tied to new DoD CIO authorities granted by Congress for both technology budgets and standards.As we modernize our digital environment across the Department, we must recognize now more than ever the importance of collaboration with our industry and academic partners. I expect the senior leaders of our Department, the Services, and the Joint Warfighting community to take the intent and guidance in this strategy and drive implementation to achieve results in support of our mission to Defend the Nation.
Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state of China’s armed forces. The authors found that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving to correct them. Although it is only natural to focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments—is no less important.