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Erfaringer i bekæmpelse af oprør og guerillabevægelser i Malaysia og Vietnam.
The 1st vol. of the author's trilogy ; the 2d of which is No exit from Vietnam ; the 3d, Revolutionary war in world strategy, 1945-1969.
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
When Robert Thompson left Cambridge to join the Malayan Civil Service in 1938 the sun still shone on the British Empire for 24 hours a day. The outbreak of war in the Pacific found him in Hong Kong from which he was obliged to make a hurried and dramatic exit. From that point most of his working life was spent in military and political circles as one of the world's leading experts on counterinsurgency measures, on which subject he has written a number of highly regarded works. Now, with wit and modesty, he tells the story of his own eventful life, After the war, during which he served in both operations in Burma, he returned to Malaya and it was there, during the Emergency, that he gained the experience in anti-terrorist operations which was eventually to lead him, as special adviser, to Vietnam and on to Washington. En route he was privileged to meet many of the most influential and controversial figures of his time from Wingate and Templer to Kennedy, Nixon and Kissinger. His comments on these and many others, are candid and revealing. Make for the Hills is both a fascinating autobiography and an important addition to the history of the post-war world, especially that of South-East Asia.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
The Malayan Emergency lasted from 1948 to 1960. During these tumultuous years, following so soon after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War, the whole country was once more turned upside down and the lives of the people changed. The war against the Communist Party of Malaya's determined efforts to overthrow the Malayan government involved the whole population in one form or another. Dr Comber analyses the pivotal role of the Malayan Police's Special Branch, the government's supreme intelligence agency, in defeating the communist uprising and safeguarding the security of the country. He shows for the first time how the Special Branch was organised and how it worked in providing the security forces with political and operational intelligence. His book represents a major contribution to our understanding of the Emergency and will be of great interest to all students of Malay(si)a's recent history as well as counter-guerrilla operations. It can profitably be mined, too, to see what lessons can be learned for counterinsurgency operations in other parts of the world.
In Killing Hope, William Blum, author of the bestselling Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower, provides a devastating and comprehensive account of America's covert and overt military actions in the world, all the way from China in the 1940s to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and - in this updated edition - beyond. Is the United States, as it likes to claim, a global force for democracy? Killing Hope shows the answer to this question to be a resounding 'no'.