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This book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effort—and some confidence—be converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and ‘experimental’ data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging ‘Clausewitz Landscapes’.
From the ‘punctuated equilibrium' of Eldrege and Gould, through Lewontin's ‘triple helix' and the various visions and revisions of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) of Laland and others, both data and theory have demanded an opening-up of the 1950's Evolutionary Synthesis that so firmly wedded evolutionary theory to the mathematics of gene frequency analysis. It can, however, be argued that a single deep and comprehensive mathematical theory may simply not be possible for the almost infinite varieties of evolutionary process active at and across the full range of scales of biological, social, institutional, and cultural phenomena. Indeed, the case history of 'meme theory' should have raised a red flag that narrow gene-centered models of evolutionary process may indeed have serious limitations. What is attempted here is less grand, but still broader than a gene-centered analysis. Following the instruction of Maturana and Varela that all living systems are cognitive, in a certain sense, and that living as a process is a process of cognition, the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories that bound all cognition provide a basis for constructing an only modestly deep but wider-ranging series of probability models that might be converted into useful statistical tools for the analysis of observational and experimental data related to evolutionary process. The line of argument in this series of interrelated essays proves to be surprisingly direct.
Revised and updated for the third edition, this volume provides a systematic approach to the management of organizational conflict. It suggests that such conflict need not be minimized or avoided in all cases, but rather some conflicts are functional and others dysfunctional.
In this book, we learn about organizational conflict, highlighting different perspectives of conflict resolution and conflict management in different settings and areas, as well as different theoretical views on this subject. The authors from Norway, Estonia, Nigeria, Israel, USA, Slovakia, Turkey, Finland, Uruguay, and Italy bring ideas, studies, findings, and experiences to enhance our knowledge in the field of organizational conflict. The book is divided into two sections, and their respective chapters refer to two different perspectives of study. The first section covers Conceptual Frameworks on Organizational Conflict, considering management and conflict resolution, conflict in organizations as an indicator for organizational values, organizational trust as a conflict management tool, conflicts and social capital, and team conflict in complex adaptive systems. The second section deals with Empirical Studies on Organizational Conflict, emphasizing research on conflict resolution from the perspective of managers and project teams, resistance to change and conflict of interest, conflicts as a springboard for Metallica's success, drivers of innovation deployment affecting marketing relationships, and impacts of national culture on the use of bonuses for teamwork. Thus, we consider this book will be of interest to readers with a diverse group of interests in different specialties such as management, social psychology, education, law, and sociology.
This monograph investigates the historical use of cavalry in low intensity conflict (LIC). This investigation is to determine the possible strengths and weaknesses of our current light infantry division’s reconnaissance squadron in terms of organization, equipment, doctrine, and techniques for employment in LIC. The intent of the paper is neither to produce a paradigm on the use of reconnaissance forces in LIC nor simply to conduct a historical study, but rather to see if our past actions impact on today’s cavalry. The structure of this monograph is to explain the nature of LIC and assess its impact on reconnaissance forces, describe a comparison methodology, conduct historical analysis, analyze the results of the comparison, and then to make conclusions and offer recommendations. The information collection effort was focused on primary source reports from the Army, Marine, and British Army commanders involved, directed research analysis, and personal interviews. LIC is not new to the American Army. Our Army has been involved in insurgencies both in and out of country from its creation. The Army has fought in numerous insurgencies, however, its involvements in the Philippines, Mexico, Dominican Republic, and Grenada are studied as are the U.S. Marine Corps interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti and the British Army’s actions in Malaya and Kenya. These insurgencies were fought in different environmental settings, against different types of insurgents, by different intervening nations. These examples are too few to provide an accurate data base for statistical analysis; however, they provide enough diverse information for comparative analysis by comparing the missions that were assigned to the reconnaissance units involved.
A research team from the United States has completed an examination of citizen participation experiments in seven European countries. The team included Donald Appleyard, Marc Draisen, David Godschalk, Chester Hartman, Janice Perlman, Hans Spiegel, John Zeisel, and ourselves. This book is a product of our joint efforts. Our studies are aimed at summarizing and sharing what can be learned from recent European efforts to enhance the effectiveness of local government through increased public involvement in the organization and management of public services and urban redevelopment. Almost a year was spent assembling the team, developing a shared framework for analysis and identifying appropriate case study cities. European and American public officials and citizen activists helped us assess the potential impact of such a study on current practice. A second year was spent visiting the European cities and preparing the case-study drafts. Finally, team members gathered in Washington, D. C. , with fifty American and European public officials, citizen activists, and scholars. A two-day symposium provided an exciting opportunity to present preliminary research findings and encourage an exchange of ideas between researchers, activists, and policymakers. The final versions of the case studies that appear in this book, along with several commentaries by symposium participants, are written especially for city officials and citizen activists. We have tried to translate the results of our scholarly inquiry into pragmatic suggestions for officials and activists.
This book covers the full spectrum of essential competencies required to manage public health organizations, from communication and cultural proficieny to leadership, relationship building, ethics, and program planning. --Book Jacket.
Germany fought three major colonial wars from 1900 to 1908: the Boxer War in China, the Herero and Nama War in Southwest Africa, and the Maji Maji War in East Africa. Recently, historians have emphasized the role of German military culture in shaping the horrific violence of these conflicts, tracing a line from German atrocities in the colonial sphere to those committed by the Nazis during World War II. Susanne Kuss dismantles such claims in a close examination of Germany’s early twentieth-century colonial experience. Despite acts of unquestionable brutality committed by the Kaiser’s soldiers, she finds no direct path from Windhoek, site of the infamous massacre of the Herero people, to Auschwitz. In German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence Kuss rejects the notion that a distinctive military culture or ethos determined how German forces acted overseas. Unlike rival powers France and Great Britain, Germany did not possess a professional colonial army. The forces it deployed in Africa and China were a motley mix of volunteers, sailors, mercenaries, and native recruits—all accorded different training and motivated by different factors. Germany’s colonial troops embodied no esprit de corps that the Nazis could subsequently adopt. Belying its reputation for Teutonic efficiency, the German military’s conduct of operations in Africa and China was improvisational and often haphazard. Local conditions—geography, climate, the size and capabilities of opposing native populations—determined the nature and extent of the violence German soldiers employed. A deliberate policy of genocide did not guide their actions.
America's thirty million young adults are fascinated by ancient secrets, martial arts, war and using strategy to outwith their opponents.