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Abstract: April 1999 - Considering the positive impact decentralization has had on regional economic performance and expenditure structure, Russia's federal government should: Decisively protect local self-governance and budget autonomy; Make intergovernmental fiscal relations more transparent; Develop universal models of interactions between regional and municipal governments; Impose stricter limits on total debt and budget deficits of subnational governments. To shed light on decentralization in Russia, Freinkman and Yossifov examine intergovernmental fiscal relations within regions. To analyze trends, they review channels of fiscal allocation within regions-tax sharing and local transfer schemes. To evaluate the potential impact of various fiscal decentralization patterns on regional economic performance (including growth and the budget deficit), they study data on the structure of 89 Russian consolidated regional budgets for 1992-96. They find that local governments' relative share of Russia's consolidated budget, although substantive (roughly a quarter of the total budget), did not expand after 1994. The federal government's relative role in financing public goods and services declined as the relative role of local governments increased substantially. Local governments collected more revenues in 1996 (6.4 percent of GDP) and spent more than regional governments. They also substantially increased social financing (including health, education, and social protection). Russia made no progress toward a more transparent system for tax assignments. The average level of expenditure decentralization is similar for ethnically Russian regions and national republics and okrugs but revenue arrangements differ greatly. True decentralization has taken place in oblasts and krais, where local authorities are provided with a bigger share of subnational tax revenues. A redistribution model applies in republics and autonomous okrugs, where greater local outlays have been financed through larger transfers from regional governments. Regions near each other tend to have similar budget arrangements-the result of intensive interactions between neighbors and probably supported by the activities of regional associations. The size of a region's territory does not influence decentralization outcomes. Fiscal decentralization seems positively related to the share of education spending in regional budgets. And regions with more decentralized finances tend to experience less economic decline. But budget control is weaker in more decentralized regions. Instability and lack of transparency in intergovernmental fiscal relations provide subnational governments little incentive for responsible fiscal policy. Further decentralization without greater transparency could bring greater debt and deficits. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the unit to study fiscal decentralization in transition economies. Lev Freinkman may be contacted at [email protected].
This paper examines how regional disparities have evolved in Russia and how Russia’s system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is managing these disparities. Regional disparities have fallen over the past two decades but remain relatively high. Socioeconomic outcomes remain worse in lagging regions despite faster growth and convergence in income levels. The twin shocks of COVID-19 and lower oil prices appear to have impacted richer regions disproportionately. Compared to other large countries with federal systems of government, Russia stands out with its high reliance on direct taxes as a revenue source for its regions. Transfers from the federal budget to the regions provide some redistribution by reducing the dispersion in real per capita fiscal spending, but also tend to be associated with lower growth. The Russian fiscal system offers degrees of redistribution and risk sharing of around 26 and 18 percent, respectively—with in-kind social transfers contributing the most. Finally, federal transfers in the aggregate tend to be procyclical and are also fairly unresponsive to shocks to regions’ own revenues.
This study is a comprehensive review of fiscal federalism in the Russian Federation. It presents a strong case for greater decentralization. By succinctly surveying the literature on fiscal decentralization and clearly spelling out the main concepts, the volume sets the stage for the subsequent description of the fiscal system in Russia and its evolution through a succession of reforms guided by a desire on the part of Russian policymakers to craft a workable system of fiscal federalism. The authors not only describe the state of fiscal federalism in Russia at its key turning points, but they also provide insightful critical assessments of the reforms introduced at each stage. The book is rich with examples, which makes it an easy and exciting reading. The book's analysis of the history gives perspective to the authors' assessment of the current state of Russia's federalism. The authors make a strong case for greater decentralization in Russia based not only on the traditional economic benefits of fiscal federalism but also on the political benefits from local government competition. The richness of detail and the careful tracing of the reforms over the past nearly two decades also mean that this study will be an invaluable guide to both current observers with academic and policy interest in the recent fiscal federalism reforms as well as Russia's fiscal evolution since the early 1990s and its current fiscal challenges.
The paper looks at the transformation of intergovernment fiscal relations from the point of view of a regional administration in Russia. It also describes changes in local fiscal management. The Yaroslavl region faces a set of budgetary problems typical for Russian regions in the transition, ranging from budget preparation and managements, scale of extrabudgetary financing and expenditure verification. The paper shows what the actual priorities of regional government policy are, how these priorities are determined and through which channels and mechanisms they are implemented. Between 1990 and 1993, the manner in which the oblast's budget was prepared, approved, and implemented changed considerably, as did the relationship between the oblast and the federal authorities. However, many vestiges of the former system remain. The central government still exerts control over some aspects of the regional budgets, and oblast, city and rayon budgets are not fully separated. But decentralization is proceeding at a brisk pace, faster than the federal authorities can codify the rules for the game. The resulting uncertainty sets the stage for bargaining with the central government and rent-seeking behavior on the part of the region. The allocation of expenditures between federal and regional governments continues to be a very murky process, particularly with respect to the so-called 'national economy' expenditure terms, which include expenditures on industry, agriculture, transport, and other infrastructure. The shift in expenditure responsibility in the social areas, however, has been consistent almost all such responsibilities have been devolved down to the regions, cities and rayons.
In the present Master Thesis, written at the University of Bonn, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth is studied for the case of the Russian Federation. A rich panel dataset of 78 Russian regions during 2005-2012 is gathered by the author. Using panel data analysis, it is shown that excessive expenditure decentralization within a region, which is not accompanied by revenue decentralization, can have harmful consequences for regional economic growth during the period of the economic crisis. On the contrary, federal government can stimulate recovery by efficiently assigning intergovernmental grants. Overall, the benefits of decentralization seem to be overweighed by its costs in Russia.
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level.