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Forholdet mellem Tjekkoslovakiet og USSR fra omkring 2. Verdenskrig indtil 1968 og om Tjekkoslovakiets indenrigspolitiske forhold med vægt på Thomas Masaryk og Edvard Benes
The Czechoslovak crisis, as it became known, started in January 1968, when Alexander Dubcek was elevated to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), replacing moribund Antonin Novotny, who had served as First Secretary since 1957. Under Dubcek, the communist leadership embarked on a program of dramatic liberalization of the Czechoslovak political, economic, and social order, including the overhaul of the CPCz leadership, increased freedom of speech, surrender of authority to the Czech National Assembly by the Communist Party, real elections at local and national levels, and even the suggestion of legalizing non-communist political parties. All this alarmed Moscow and the leadership of the Warsaw Pact, but throughout the Prague Spring, Dubcek went out of his way to demonstrate his personal loyalty to Moscow and Prague's intention to remain firmly within the Warsaw Pact military alliance. How sincere he was in these remonstrations is difficult to say, but Dubcek and his allies clearly feared a repetition of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, brutally crushed by Soviet troops. These fears were mirrored in Washington and, to a certain extent, even in Moscow. The crisis lasted more than a year, with the first none months consisting of Czech reforms triggering Soviet statements of concern and eventually threats, buttressed by Warsaw Pact military buildups disguised as exercises. When the invasion occurred in the early morning hours of 21 August, the Czechoslovak leadership as not immediately removed, but remained largely intact through April 1969, when Dubcek was finally replaced as First Secretary by a more pro-Soviet Gustav Husak.
On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the 'Prague Spring' reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for 'socialism with a human face.' Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that 'the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries' and that the Soviet Union had both a 'right' and a 'sacred duty' to 'defend socialism' in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a 'green light,' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.
The Munich crisis of 1938, in which Great Britain and France decided to appease Hitler's demands to annex the Sudentenland, has provoked a vast amount of historical writing. The era has been thoroughly examined from the perspectives of Germans, French, and British political establishments. But historians have had, until now, only a vague understanding of the roles played by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the country whose very existence was at the very center of the crisis. In Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler, Igor Lukes explores this turbulent and tragic era from the new perspective of the Prague government itself. At the center of this study is Edvard Benes, a Czechoslovak foreign policy strategist and a major player in the political machinations of the era. The work looks at the first two decades of Benes's diplomacy and analyzes the Prague Government's attempts to secure the existence of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in the treacherous space between the millstones of the East and West. It studies Benes's relationship with Joseph Stalin, outlines the role assigned to Czechoslovak communists by the VIIth Congress of the Communist International in 1935, and dissects Prague's secret negotiations with Berlin and Benes's role in the famous Tukhachevsky affair. The work also brings evidence regarding the so-called partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak army in May 1938, and focuses on Stalin's strategic thinking on the eve of the World War II. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was difficult for Western researchers to gain access to the rich archival collections of the East. Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler makes ample use of these secret archives, both in Prague and in Russia. As a result, it is an accurate and original rendition of the events which eventually sparked the Second World War.
The edited collection is the first attempt to take a more coherent look at the Russian perception of the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The publication is therefore a collection of interviews, memoirs and academic studies focusing on Russian soldiers, dissidents and journalists involved in and affected by the Soviet invasion. The book begins with a focus on the Soviet soldiers who came to Czechoslovakia. It depicts their inner world and the mighty machinery of the Soviet propaganda to which they were exposed. The Archive supplement offers a fresh look at the role of KGB and the Soviet embassy in the Czechoslovak events of August 1968 by Russian historians Nikita Petrov and Olga Pavlenko. The second part presents the Soviet journalists living in Prague in 1968 who supported the Prague Spring and subsequently paid for their stance by being deported and losing their job. The last part of the book focuses on the kinship that the Soviet liberal intelligentsia and dissident movement, which emerged while Leonid Brezhnev was tightening the screws in the USSR in late 1960s, felt toward events in Prague, which for them represented one of the last hopes for change. It begins with the study of the Czech researcher Tomas Glanc exploring the different reactions on Prague Spring and August 1968 invasion among the Soviet inteligentsia. Interviews with former Soviet dissidents Lyudmila Alexeeva and Natalia Gorbanevskaya follow. As a supplement, the diary of the ordinary Soviet citizen Elvira Filipovich is included.
For about eight months in 1968 Czechoslovakia underwent rapid and radical changes that were unparalleled in the history of communist reform; in the eight months that followed, those changes were dramatically reversed. H. Gordon Skilling provides a comprehensive analysis of the events of 1968, assessing their significance both for Czechoslovakia and for communism generally. The author's account is based on all available written sources, including unpublished Communist Party documents and interviews conducted in Czechoslovakia in 1967, 1968, and 1969. He examines the historical background, the main reforms and political forces of 1968, international reactions, the Soviet intervention, and the experiment's collapse, concluding with his reasons for regarding the events of the Prague spring as a movement of revolutionary proportions. The author's account is based on all available written sources, including unpublished Communist Party documents and interviews conducted in Czechoslovakia in 1967, 1968, 1969. He examines the historical background, the main reforms and political forces on 1968, international reactions, the Soviet intervention, and the experiment's collapse, concluding with his reasons for regarding the events of the Prague spring as a movement of revolutionary proportions. Originally published in 1976. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.