Published: 2000
Total Pages: 13
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For most of the past two decades, the U.S. accepted Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without acknowledging that a valid act of self-determination had taken place. That formulation arose from a 'realist' evaluation that Indonesia was key to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, that Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor was a fact not likely to be reversed, and that legitimate human rights concerns would be most effectively addressed within the context of the larger Washington-Jakarta relationship. This year, a U.N.-sponsored referendum brought a 78 percent East Timorese vote for independence. Resulting pressures eventuated in a reluctant Indonesia s acceptance of international peacemakers. While Washington was not central to most of those developments, it was supportive, and at times instrumental, for them. This was an apparent change from the earlier policy. This paper briefly recalls (from the author s memory) the U.S. policy process of the early '90s, fast-forwards to 1999 to describe current players and their influences (based on interviews with participants), and evaluates how well the 'process' has performed this year. It appears that American decision-makers in 1999 were primarily influenced by events and by our Australian ally. It is less clear that Washington overtly considered all U.S. interests. A more U.S.-centered approach may well have come to a very similar outcome regarding East Timor. Still, in general, the U.S. best supports its interests by engaging in a more structured strategic analysis and a longer-term view.