Download Free Credit Risk Transfer By Eu Banks Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Credit Risk Transfer By Eu Banks and write the review.

We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze the interaction between capital adequacy regulation and credit risk transfer with credit default swaps (CDS) including its effect on lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. CDS contracts may be used to hedge a bank's credit risk exposure at a certain (potentially distorted) price. Regulation is found to induce the risk-neutral bank to behave in a more risk-sensitive way: Compared to a situation without regulation the optimal volume of loans decreases more as the riskiness of loansincreases. CDS trading is found to interact with the former effect when regulation accepts CDS as an instrument to mitigate credit risk. Under the substitution approach in Basel II (and III) a risk-neutral bank will over-, fully or under-hedge its total exposure to credit risk conditional on the CDS price being downward biased, unbiased or upward biased. However, the substitution approach weakens the tendency to over-hedge or under-hedge when CDS markets are biased. This promotes the intention of the Basel II (and III) regulations to 'strengthen the soundness and stability of banks'
The increasing ability to trade credit risk in financial markets has facilitated its dispersion across the financial and other sectors. However, specific risks attached to credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments in a market with still-limited liquidity means that its rapid expansion may actually pose problems for financial sector stability in the event of a major negative shock to credit markets. This paper attempts to quantify the exposure of major U.K. financial groups to credit derivatives, by applying a vector autoregression (VAR) model to publicly available market prices. Our results indicate that use of credit derivatives does not pose a substantial threat to financial sector stability in the United Kingdom. Exposures across major financial institutions appear sufficiently diversified to limit the impact of any shock to the market, while major insurance companies are largely exposed to the "safer" senior tranches.
The European Central Bank (ECB) supervises large banks in the Banking Union, assessing their prudential risks. This includes credit risk, which is when loans become non performing and threaten the viability of banks and sometimes the whole financial system. We found that while the ECB has stepped up its efforts, more needs to be done for the ECB to gain increased assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered by banks. Its new methodology for determining additional capital requirements (pillar 2) does not provide assurance that individual risks are fully covered, and has been inconsistently applied: higher-risk banks did not receive proportionally higher capital requirements. The ECB made inefficient use of its existing tools and supervisory powers to ensure appropriate coverage of banks' credit risk. We recommend strengthening risk assessments, streamlining the supervisory review and evaluation process, and applying better supervisory measures to manage risks effectively. ECA special report pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU.
A main cause of the ongoing financial crisis is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. In this paper we study the riskiness of banks that have used these methods, as perceived by the market. For this we analyze a sample of banks that trade Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and a sample of banks that issued Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) between 1997 and 2006. We find that after their first usage of either risk transfer method, these banks experience a large and significant permanent increase in their share price beta. This suggests that the market was aware of the risks arising from these methods, long before the actual onset of the crisis. We also address the question of the source of the beta effect by separating it into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly we find that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks' correlations. The volatility of these banks' returns actually declines. This suggests that banks undertaking credit risk transfer activities may appear individually less risky, while actually posing a greater risk for the financial system. We argue that this posits a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on the level of the individual institution.
'The present paper shows that, everything else equal, some transactions to transfer portfolio credit risk to third-party investors increase the insolvency risk of banks. This is particularly likely if a bank sells the senior tranche and retains a sufficiently large first-loss position. The results do not rely on banks increasing leverage after the risk transfer, nor on banks taking on new risks, although these could aggravate the effect. High leverage and concentrated business models increase the vulnerability to the mechanism. These results are useful for risk managers and banking regulation. The literature on credit risk transfers and information asymmetries generally tends to advocate the retention of 'information-sensitive' first-loss positions. The present study shows that, under certain conditions, such an approach may harm financial stability, and thus calls for further reflection on the structure of securitization transactions and portfolio insurance'--Abstract, p. ii.
Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events—such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode—has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risks affecting financial institutions and explores a variety of methods to help institutions and regulators more accurately measure and forecast risk. The contributors--from academic institutions, regulatory organizations, and banking--bring a wide range of perspectives and experience to the issue. The result is a volume that points a way forward to greater financial stability and better risk management of financial institutions.
Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than other financial intermediaries. As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than otherwise similar nonsecuritized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on loans’ relative credit quality employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that, at issuance, banks do not seem to select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. Following securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group. We find tentative evidence suggesting that poorer performance by securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced monitoring incentives.