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An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
It was a modern thriving economy one day, and then, suddenly, the food disappeared from the shelves, the banks closed, and the ships stopped arriving. Iceland in 2008 experienced an unprecedented economic meltdown that struck fear in the hearts of people all over the world. If it could happen here, it could happen anywhere. The economic crisis led to a political crisis, with resignations galore. The whining and wailing about the disaster continues to this day, with most commentators blaming deregulation and the free market. In Deep Freeze, economists Philipp Bagus and David Howden demonstrate that the real cause of the calamity was bad central bank policy. Rates were way too low, banks were too big to fail, housing was implicitly guaranteed, and banks were borrowing short term from abroad to finance long term bonds. The authors discuss the implications of this maturity mismatching and zero in on the central bank policies that encouraged unsound practices. They demonstrate the cause and effect without a shadow of a doubt, using vast amounts of data and a detailed sector-by-sector look at the economy of Iceland. What they find is another instance of the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, working itself out in a way that is customized for a time and place. Toby Baxendale writes the introducton to this story that reads like a great novel. It serves as a reminder that central banking policies aren't just about monetary arcana. They affect our lives in profound and sometimes catastrophic ways. The Iceland Freeze is one of the great historical cases that makes Mises’s point. Let it always serve as a reminder of what happens when the laws of the market are papered over by politicians and central bankers. This account is likely to remain the definitive one for many years.
The success over the years in reducing inflation and, consequently, the average level of nominal interest rates has increased the likelihood that the nominal policy interest rate may become constrained by the zero lower bound. When that happens, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions and must rely on "non-standard" policy alternatives. To assess the potential effectiveness of such policies, we analyze the behavior of selected asset prices over short periods surrounding central bank statements or other types of financial or economic news and estimate "noarbitrage" models of the term structure for the United States and Japan. There is some evidence that central bank communications can help to shape public expectations of future policy actions and that asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would be able to affect the price or yield of the targeted asset.
I model deflation, at zero nominal interest rate, in a microfounded general equilibrium model. I show that deflation can be analyzed as a credibility problem if the government has only one policy instrument, money supply carried out by means of open market operations in short-term bonds, and cannot commit to future policies. I propose several policies to solve the credibility problem. They involve printing money or nominal debt and either (1) cutting taxes, (2) buying real assets such as stocks, or (3) purchasing foreign exchange. The government credibly "commits to being irresponsible" by using these policy instruments. It commits to higher money supply in the future so that the private sector expects inflation instead of deflation. This is optimal, since it curbs deflation and increases output by lowering the real rate of return.
This book investigates to what extent the quality of eligible collateral is able to explain inflation. Addressing this question, hypotheses derived from the Theory of Property Economics by Heinsohn & Steiger are tested. Data are collected using a questionnaire, answered by central banks. An index of the quality of eligible collateral is constructed. Regression analyses are performed based on a sample of 62 countries for the period 1990 to 2003. A negative, robust and statistically significant correlation between inflation and the quality of eligible collateral is found. Central bank independence cannot contribute to the explanation of inflation. The result supports the theory of Heinsohn & Steiger: Securitisation of central bank lending is crucial for price stability.
"This paper studies a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and rational expectations in an environment of low interest rates and deflationary pressures. We show that small changes in the public's beliefs about the future inflation target of the government can lead to large swings in both inflation and output. This effect is much larger at low interest rates than under regular circumstances. This highlights the importance of effective communication policy at zero interest rates. We argue that confusing communications by the US Federal Reserve, the President of the United States, and key administration officials about future price objectives were responsible for the sharp recession in the US in 1937-38, one of the sharpest recessions in US economic history. Poor communication policy is the mistake of 1937. Before committing the mistake of 1937 the US policy makers faced economic conditions that are similar in some respect to those confronted by Japanese policy makers in the first half of 2006."--Authors' abstract.