Download Free Counternarcotics Efforts In Mexico And Along The Southwest Border Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Counternarcotics Efforts In Mexico And Along The Southwest Border and write the review.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The original Nat. Southwest Border Counter-Narcotics Strategy (2007) focused primarily on what the entities of the U.S. Fed. Gov¿t. could do to prevent the illegal trafficking of drugs across the border with Mexico. As the cartels battle the Mexican Gov¿t. and one another, we have seen significant disruptions in the availability of such drugs as cocaine and meth in U.S. markets. The new Strategy recognizes the role that the outbound flow of illegal cash and weapons plays in sustaining the cartels and addresses this threat. Contents: Intelligence and Info. Sharing; At the Ports of Entry; Between the Ports of Entry; Air and Marine; Investigations and Prosecutions; Money; Weapons; Technology; Cooperation with Mexico; Tunnel Strategy; Resources. Illus.
Drug trafficking (DT) across the Southwest border remains an threat to our homeland security and a top drug control priority. Mexican DT org. dominate the illegal drug supply chain, taking ownership of drug shipments after they depart S. America and overseeing their dist. throughout the U.S. Mexican DT org. dominate the U.S. drug trade from within, overseeing drug dist. in many cities. They also control the southbound flow of other forms of drug related contraband, such as bulk currency and illegal weapons. This report presents the U.S. gov¿t. strategy for stemming the inbound flow of illegal drugs from Mexico. It also recognizes the role that the outbound flow of illegal cash and weapons plays in sustaining the cartels. A print on demand pub.
On Oct. 22, 2007, the U.S. and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative (MI), a package of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY 2008 and last through FY 2010. Contents of this report: (1) Introduction; (2) Development of the MI; (3) Funding the MI: FY 2008-10: Mexico; Central America; The Caribbean; (4) Other MI Legislation in the 111th Congress; (5) Status of Implementation; (6) Policy Issues: Is MI the Right Drug Control Approach?; Monitoring Progress; Interagency Coordination; Role of the DoD; U.S. Pledges Under the MI; Mexico Policy Issues; (7) Beyond the MI: The FY 2011 Request: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation. Illustrations.

Border Violence

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 68


Get eBook

Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States and have "the greatest drug trafficking influence," according to the annual U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations work across the Western Hemisphere and globally. They are involved in extensive money laundering, bribery, gun trafficking, and corruption, and they cause Mexico's homicide rates to spike. They produce and traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and powerful synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and they traffic South American cocaine. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings addressing violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues. Mexican DTO activities significantly affect the security of both the United States and Mexico. As Mexico's DTOs expanded their control of the opioids market, U.S. overdoses rose sharply to a record level in 2017, with more than half of the 72,000 overdose deaths (47,000) involving opioids. Although preliminary 2018 data indicate a slight decline in overdose deaths, many analysts believe trafficking continues to evolve toward opioids. The major Mexican DTOs, also referred to as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), have continued to diversify into such crimes as human smuggling and oil theft while increasing their lucrative business in opioid supply. According to the Mexican government's latest estimates, illegally siphoned oil from Mexico's state-owned oil company costs the government about $3 billion annually. Mexico's DTOs have been in constant flux. In 2006, four DTOs were dominant: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which increased instability among the groups and violence. Over the next dozen years, Mexico's large and comparatively more stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven major groups, and then nine, which are briefly described in this report. The DEA has identified those nine organizations as Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation (CJNG). In mid-2019, leader of the long-dominant Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquin ("El Chapo") Guzmán, was sentenced to life in a maximum-security U.S. prison, spurring further fracturing of a once hegemonic DTO. By some accounts, a direct effect of this fragmentation has been escalated levels of violence. Mexico's intentional homicide rate reached new records in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, Mexico's national public security system reported more than 17,000 homicides between January and June, setting a new record. In the last months of 2019, several fragments of formerly cohesive cartels conducted flagrant acts of violence. For some Members of Congress, this situation has increased concern about a policy of returning Central American migrants to cities across the border in Mexico to await their U.S. asylum hearings in areas with some of Mexico's highest homicide rates. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected in a landslide in July 2018, campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime, including the drug trade. According to some analysts, challenges for López Obrador since his inauguration include a persistently ad hoc approach to security; the absence of strategic and tactical intelligence concerning an increasingly fragmented, multipolar, and opaque criminal market; and endemic corruption of Mexico's judicial and law enforcement systems. In December 2019, Genero Garcia Luna, a former top security minister under the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012), was arrested in the United States on charges he had taken enormous bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel.