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The 1986 Printing. The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatly from those of conventional warfare. To be successful in countering this type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations must understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he operates. This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter- guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterin- surgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counterguerrilla operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidance for commanders and staffs conducting counterguerrilla operations. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counterguerrilla situation.
This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment. The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla forces-usually communist forces-rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15, Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (both published in 1963) and in FM 31-23, Stability and Support Operations (1972). After Vietnam, the Army split COIN doctrine off from conventional "high intensity" operations in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990) in which the "light" forces owned counterinsurgency, and FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (1986), where the focus remained on defeating the guerrilla force. This manual is the historical successor to FM 90-8. In addition, parts of FM 100-20 have been integrated into this FM, As have the Army's concept of full-spectrum operations and all elements of COIN operations. At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population.
Trends in international relations indicate that the United States must prepare to support friendly nations in repelling internal and external threats by assisting them in undertaking essential political, social, and economic reform. At the same time, the U.S. must deter third world conflict by preparing to confront aggressors decisively, swiftly, and with discrimination. Consequently, the U.S. Army must prepare to wage counterinsurgency warfare and counterguerrilla operations. FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations defines current Army counterguerrilla doctrine. It describes the characteristics of of insurgencies, the fundamentals of counterguerrilla operations, and the utility of the operational support base (fire base) in facilitating command and control fire support, and logistics. This monograph examines the effectiveness of the fire base concept in generating and projecting combat power in counterinsurgency operations. It focuses on the value of the fire base in three counterguerrilla operations: strike campaigns, consolidation campaigns, and fire base defense. Using Huba Wass de Czege's combat power model as criterion for analysis and the Vietnam War as an example of counterinsurgency, it is possible to assess the beneficial and detrimental effects of the fire base concept on combat power. Keywords: Low intensity conflict; Counterinsurgency; Vietnam; Infantry tactics. (cp).
This Field Manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)- an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.
This combat manual covers ground operations in urban settings. It clearly outlines skills unique to city fighting, including analyzing terrain, seizing blocks and buildings, setting up firing positions, scaling walls, employing snipers, evaluating civilian impact and effects of small arms and support weapons, and much more.
Tunnell¿s memoir is the history of one Soldier¿s and one unit¿s experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Personal accounts of war are a critical aspect of understanding that immensely complex phenomenon. Using a journal which he kept during the war, then reflecting on his experiences while recovering from the wounds he suffered, LTC Tunnell tells the story of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Northern Iraq. The story of the Red Devils covers that crucial period of time from early 2003 when the Army prepared for war, through the end of so called 'major combat operations¿, and into the start of the insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is a first hand account of Operation Iraqi Freedom¿s earliest period.
This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.