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Counterinsurgency is a complex phenomenon that needs complex answer. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Though it is very much a form of warfare, and can fit into the description given by Jomini as wars of opinion or Clausewitzian wars of resistance. The research for the present book was carried out under the sponsorship of Gen D K Palit and Chatrapati Shivaji fellowship of the USI. This book is a cumulative result of over two decades of study of counterinsurgency and peace process by the author. The book encompasses the study of tribal insurgency in Northeast India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Communist or Naxalite revolt, South African uprising against Racist regime and troubles in Northern Ireland.
While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency: Find, Fix, Fight focuses on how to understand the relationship between the use of force and the outcomes of such use. Specifically, there is debate as to how to evaluate counterinsurgency conflicts, and what prescriptions flow from that evaluation. The Neo-Classicist school emphasises prescriptions which are either directly from, or inspired by, Cold War counterinsurgency efforts undertaken by anti-communist states. The Revisionist school focuses on how best to evaluate the political dimensions of such conflicts. This book finds that a third approach, Reflective-Action, is best as it combines Neo-Classicism’s strength of issuing practical prescriptions with Revisionism’s strength for conceptually evaluating counterinsurgency conflicts. This conceptual debate is exposited in three cases. They are the British counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, American counterinsurgency in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Coalition counterinsurgency in Iraq during the 2000s.
When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won.
This thought-provoking work analyzes the major debates surrounding counterinsurgency campaigns and uncovers the internal security problems derailing effective strategies for restoring stability. As countries across the globe continue to adjust their security operations to counter an increasingly volatile political landscape, the issue of how to identify and derail a host of violent groups remains of considerable interest. This comprehensive volume offers an examination of the effectiveness of contemporary counterinsurgency efforts, revealing which approaches offer the greatest chances of success internally, regionally, and internationally. Featuring perspectives from experts and analysts in the field of irregular warfare and international security, this is an unparalleled exploration of all types of insurgency from warlordism, to piracy, to guerilla movements. The book looks beyond the popular focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, delving into the internal security operations of regions not normally studied. Chapters cover goal setting and measurements for restoring security, information operations and strategic communications between insurgent groups and governments, and the different approaches of governments in combating political unrest. Case studies include movements in Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and South Africa.
This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, arguing that it is crucial to ground contemporary experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in a global framework. Unlike other studies that begin with the American and French revolutions, this book reaches back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. Interweaving thematic and chronological narratives, Black probes the enduring linkages between beliefs, events, and people on the one hand and changes over time on the other hand. He shows the extent to which power politics, technologies, and ideologies have evolved, creating new parameters and paradigms that have framed both governmental and public views. Tracing insurgencies ranging from China to Africa to Latin America, Black highlights the widely differing military and political dimensions of each conflict. He weighs how, and why, lessons were “learned” or, rather, asserted, in both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. At every stage, he considers lessons learned by contemporaries, the ways in which norms developed within militaries and societies, and their impact on doctrine and policy. His sweeping study of insurrectionary warfare and its counterinsurgency counterpart will be essential reading for all students of military history.
Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
No country has managed as rapid and positive a turnaround in governance and security conditions this century as Colombia. In 1999, FARC and ELN rebels were literally at the gates of Bogotá, and Colombia was a country synonymous with the antics of Pablo Escobar, known primarily for rapacious corruption, weak government, drug smuggling and criminality. Fifteen years later the guerrillas, seriously weakened, have been persuaded to attend peace talks in Havana, and the Colombian economy had been a top performer in Latin America. [...] Based on field-work in Colombia’s regions, the study provides a history of the conflict, compares it to other historical and contemporary case-studies, examines the war from the perspectives of the government and the guerrillas, delves into the development of special Colombian capabilities (notably in intelligence and the use of airpower and special forces), and explains the economic dimension in terms both of historical exclusion and ongoing attempts at growth and inclusion. Finally, it concludes with an assessment of the country’s prospects: can the combination of improved security, a flourishing economy and the peace process offer an opportunity to finally translate Colombia from, in Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s words, ‘a great perhaps’ into something more permanent? -- Publisher description.
Uneasy Military Encounters presents a historically and theoretically grounded political ethnography of the Thai military's counterinsurgency practices in the southern borderland, home to the greater part of the Malay-Muslim minority. Ruth Streicher argues that counterinsurgency practices mark the southern population as the racialized, religious, and gendered other of the Thai, which contributes to producing Thailand as an imperial formation: a state formation based on essentialized difference between the Thai and their others. Through a genealogical approach, Uneasy Military Encounters addresses broad conceptual questions of imperial politics in a non-Western context: How can we understand imperial policing in a country that was never colonized? How is "Islam" constructed in a state that is officially secular and promotes Buddhist tolerance? What are the (historical) dynamics of imperial patriarchy in a context internationally known for its gender pluralism? The resulting ethnography excavates the imperial politics of concrete encounters between the military and the southern population in the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand.
Volume 2 continues the history of the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in "small wars" after World War II, beginning with advisory efforts with the Netherlands Marine Korps (1943-1946). The authors describe counterinsurgency efforts during the Korean War (1950-1953), the development of vertical assault tactics in the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia (1962-1975), involvement in Central America (1983-1989), and present-day conflicts, including the War on Terror and operations in Iraq and Libya.