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This volume studies the implications of macroeconomic complementarities for aggregate behaviour. Topics include: economies with production complementarities; search models; imperfectly competitive product markets; and the role of government in resolving and creating coordination problems.
By offering a critical assessment of the evolution of standard game theory, this book argues for a shift in the ontology and methodology of game theory for appraising games, one based on understanding the players’ strategic reasoning process. Analyzing the history of economic thought, the book highlights the methodological issues faced by standard game theory in its treatment of strategic reasoning and the consequence it has on the status of players’ beliefs. It also highlights how the two original contributions of T. C. Schelling and M. Bacharach can be applied to these issues. Furthermore, the book assesses the intersubjective dimension in games by applying the cognitive sciences and by integrating simulation theory into game theory. Consequently, this book offers an interdisciplinary approach for reassessing the nature of the intersubjectivity involved in strategic reasoning. It shows that the analysis of games should involve the study and identification of the reasoning process that leads the players to a specific outcome, i.e., to a specific solution. A game should not be understood (as is done in standard game theory) as a mathematical representation of an individual choice at equilibrium. This requires investigating the players’ capacity for coordination. Understanding the process of coordination allows us to understand strategic reasoning and ultimately to provide new answers to the indeterminacy problem, one of the central hurdles in game theory, and one that underscores its normative difficulties.
This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. The book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others.
Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
. This major new book will be of particular interest not only to philosophers but to decision theorists, political scientists, economists, and researchers in artificial intelligence.
This study presents a view of the economy, and how to model it, in which the current "ideal" of isolated agents coordinated by clearing markets is replaced by an open system in which money, trust, conventions and institutions all play their part in the system's coordination.
This classic games book offers a standby resource for parents, teachers, forest school educators and play leaders. The games are tried and tested. They draw on worldwide Steiner - Waldorf creative education, where a 'child's work is their play.' Child growth is explored and how this is helped by a rich treasury of action, finger, circle, clapping, beanbag, chasing, water, tumbling, story and singing games. There are both traditional favourites and also new games created to engage with digitally challenging behaviour.
From a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided
Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction focuses on the development of game theory, taking into consideration empirical research, theoretical formulations, and research procedures involved. The book proceeds with a discussion on the theory of one-person games. The individual decision that a player makes in these kinds of games is noted as influential as to the outcome of these games. This discussion is followed by a presentation of pure coordination games and minimal situation. The ability of players to anticipate the choices of others to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome is emphasized. A favorable social situation is also influential in these kinds of games. The text moves forward by presenting studies on various kinds of competitive games. The research studies presented are coupled with empirical evidence and discussion designed to support the claims that are pointed out. The book also discusses several kinds of approaches in the study of games. Voting as a way to resolve multi-person games is also emphasized, including voting procedures, the preferences of voters, and voting strategies. The book is a valuable source of data for readers and scholars who are interested in the exploration of game theories.