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Essay from the year 2007 in the subject Sociology - Individual, Groups, Society, grade: 1,7, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, language: English, abstract: Today, nearly all organizations have to negotiate and cooperate with „strangers“, that means with trading partners (individuals or organizations) of which none or few informa-tion is available. One reason is the increasing trade and communication via internet in or-ganizations. But also in private transactions we often have to deal or to cooperate with un-known individuals, for example in the case of buying something on Ebay or similar online-portals. The amount of institutional intervention which is necessary to ensure efficient co-operation in markets and organizations, in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers, depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need to transmit (Bolton et al., 2004). One important factor to enforce cooperation in small groups or in information-tracking organizations is reputation. When you think for example of credit-agencies, the willingness to afford a loan increases with the amount of information and reputation of the customer – of course the information has to fit the existing terms. In contrast, the effectiveness of reputation in circumstances where persons are essentially strangers, knowing about one another only through word-of-mouth, is far less certain. The issue is important because word-of-mouth mechanisms are typically less costly than formal institutional interventions such as legal contracts. The central question to be answered in the presented experiment of Bolton, G. E. et al. (2004) is what information is necessary about reputation to support cooperative effort among strangers. The experiment indicates that even without any reputation information there is an amount of cooperation that is, however, influenced by the cooperation costs. For high costs, providing information about a partner’s immediate past action increases coop-eration. Recursive information about the partners’ previous partners’ reputation further promotes cooperation, regardless of the cooperation costs.
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The amount of institutional intervention necessary to secure efficiency-enhancing cooperation in markets and organizations, in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers, depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need transmit. Models based on subgame perfection find that the information necessary to support cooperation is recursive in nature and thus information generating and processing requirements are quite demanding. Models that do not rely on subgame perfection, on the other hand, suggest that the information demands may be quite modest. The experiment we present indicates that even without any reputation information there is a non-negligible amount of cooperation that is, however, quite sensitive to the cooperation costs. For high costs, providing information about a partner's immediate past action increases cooperation. Recursive information about the partners' previous partners' reputation further promotes cooperation, regardless of the cooperation costs.
We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely and lacking formal enforcement institutions. In all treatments the efficient outcome is sustainable as an equilibrium. We address the following questions: can these economies achieve full efficiency? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement promote cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies are employed to achieve high efficiency? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, objects dislike indiscriminate strategies and prefer selective strategies.
With rare exceptions, few large institutions change bosses every two or three years. Yet the U.S. Government has temps on top. American government has 3,000 presidential political appointees and thousands more state and local political appointees, who refer to their in-and-out bosses as 'Christmas help.' Beyond a Government of Strangers is the first book to focus on the men and women who stick around, on the career executives and their own roles in the executive branch. Robert Maranto provides pithy, sage advice on how career bureaucrats can improve tenuous relationships and overcome conflicts with political appointees, especially during presidential transitions, for more effective government from the top down.
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners' dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
This classic example of the sociological essay examines the unspoken social agreements known as conventions and describes how they originate and how they can be used to solve problems that elude legal or political solutions.
A “meticulously researched and buoyantly written” (Esquire) look at what happens when we talk to strangers, and why it affects everything from our own health and well-being to the rise and fall of nations in the tradition of Susan Cain’s Quiet and Yuval Noah Harari’s Sapiens “This lively, searching work makes the case that welcoming ‘others’ isn’t just the bedrock of civilization, it’s the surest path to the best of what life has to offer.”—Ayad Akhtar, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of Homeland Elegies In our cities, we stand in silence at the pharmacy and in check-out lines at the grocery store, distracted by our phones, barely acknowledging one another, even as rates of loneliness skyrocket. Online, we retreat into ideological silos reinforced by algorithms designed to serve us only familiar ideas and like-minded users. In our politics, we are increasingly consumed by a fear of people we’ve never met. But what if strangers—so often blamed for our most pressing political, social, and personal problems—are actually the solution? In The Power of Strangers, Joe Keohane sets out on a journey to discover what happens when we bridge the distance between us and people we don’t know. He learns that while we’re wired to sometimes fear, distrust, and even hate strangers, people and societies that have learned to connect with strangers benefit immensely. Digging into a growing body of cutting-edge research on the surprising social and psychological benefits that come from talking to strangers, Keohane finds that even passing interactions can enhance empathy, happiness, and cognitive development, ease loneliness and isolation, and root us in the world, deepening our sense of belonging. And all the while, Keohane gathers practical tips from experts on how to talk to strangers, and tries them out himself in the wild, to awkward, entertaining, and frequently poignant effect. Warm, witty, erudite, and profound, equal parts sweeping history and self-help journey, this deeply researched book will inspire readers to see everything—from major geopolitical shifts to trips to the corner store—in an entirely new light, showing them that talking to strangers isn’t just a way to live; it’s a way to survive.