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This book deals with economic policy regarding the Greenhouse Effect using control and game models. First, a literature review is given of intertemporal optimisation models of environmental issues with special focus on the Greenhouse Effect. Next, the issue of sustainability is discussed for different specifications of the natural assimilation function. Furthermore, capital accumulation is considered both in abatement and in human capital. The international dimension is analysed next with focus on the difference between feedback and open-loop solutions, as well as on cooperative outcomes using trigger and renegotiation-proof strategies. Finally, second best forms of cooperation in the form of "issue linkage" and "technology transfers" are worked out.
This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book.
In this book we intend to discuss economic fluctuations and growth and possible stabilizing fiscal policies. Since these topics are major preoccupa tions of economic theorists and have been extensively discussed since the classics, one may wonder why another book on these subjects. A possible defense is that we are going to do so in the framework of a two-sector model where the main featureS of each sector depend on the characteristics of the goods produced by the sector itself. The conventional wisdom suggests that the problem of (dis )aggregation in growth and business cycle theory is basically a quantitative one: the model should consider as many sectors, goods, and agents as necessary to provide a sufficiently rich picture, the upper bound obviously resulting from the tractability of the problem. In this attitude the same equilibrium (or diseqUilibrium) assumptions generally hold true throughout all sectors. Here we want to prove the relevance of an alternative approach: we look at the qualitative differences across sectors and at the peculiarities of each market as at the determinants of the economic dynamics. This tradition goes back over one hundred years to Tugan-Baranowkj and has been de veloped by Aftalion, Fanno, Spiethof, and Lowe, but has never been sys tematically formalized.
I first came across the issue of derivatives documentation when writing my diploma thesis on measuring the credit risk ofOTC derivatives while I was an economics student at the University of Bonn. Despite the fact that security design has been an area of research in economics for many years and despite the widespread use of derivatives documentation in financial practice, the task of designing contracts for derivatives transactions has not been dealt with in financial theory. The one thing that aroused my curiosity was that two parties with usually opposing interests, namely banking supervisors and the banking industry's lobby, unanimously endorse the use ofcertain provisions in standardized contracts called master agreements. Do these provisions increase the ex ante efficiency of contracts for all parties involved? I actually began my research expecting to find support for the widely held beliefs about the efficiency or inefficiency of certain provisions and was sur prised to obtain results that contradicted the conventional wisdom. I would strongly advise against using these results in any political debate on deriva tives documentation. They were obtained within a highly stylized model with some restrictive assumptions. This work should rather be seen as an attempt to formalize the discussion on derivatives documentation and to challenge the notion that certain provisions are generally ex ante efficient. It is also an invitation to all those advocating the use of certain provisions in master agreements to formalize their arguments and to explain the economic ratio nale behind these provisions.
The main purpose of this monograph is to give a detailed account of a contemporary, state-of-the art, macroeconometric model that is regularly used for policy advising, and for forecasting in commerce and industry.
The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph.
Modem option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. C. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. However, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of corporate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, virtually no attempt has been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of continuous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr.
Game theory involves multi-person decision making and differential dynamic game theory has been widely applied to n-person decision making problems, which are stimulated by a vast number of applications. This book addresses the gap to discuss general stochastic n-person noncooperative and cooperative game theory with wide applications to control systems, signal processing systems, communication systems, managements, financial systems, and biological systems. H∞ game strategy, n-person cooperative and noncooperative game strategy are discussed for linear and nonlinear stochastic systems along with some computational algorithms developed to efficiently solve these game strategies.
My interest in microsimulation started to develop when I was exposed to the works of Guy Orcutt and his associates on microsimulation of households in the USA, and those of Gunnar Eliasson and his associates on simulatio~ of Swedish firms. Their approaches promised the exciting possibility to represent an by simulating the behaviour of individual microeconomic entire economic system units on a computer. The construction of a large scale microsimulation model seemed to be a worthwhile adventure which could yield much more detailed results than existing models. It was also evident that microsimulation of firms is a relatively underdeveloped area, in spite of the large number of operational microsimulation models of households in the USA and Europe. Developing the computer implementation has been an integral part of the research. Translating initially vague ideas into mathematical formulae and subsequently into a structured computer language provides a testing ground for 10Bical consistency of ideas. When writing this book I have purposefully abstained from describing the computer program and dedicated solution algorithms. The reason is that the book is primarily directed towards readers interested in economics and therefore uses the language of economics and not that of computer science. The simulation model has been programmed for the personal computer in Turbo Pascal. Sophisticated memory management techniques have lifted constraints on the number of firms which can be simulated on the PC.