Download Free Contracts In Crises Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Contracts In Crises and write the review.

This book is about one of the most controversial dilemmas of contract law: whether or not the unexpected change of circumstances due to the effects of financial crises may under certain conditions be taken into account. Growing interconnectedness of global economies facilitates the spread of the effects of the financial crises. Financial crises cause severe difficulties for persons to fulfill their contractual obligations. During the financial crises, performance of contractual obligations may become excessively onerous or may cause an excessive loss for one of the contracting parties and consequently destroy the contractual equilibrium and legitimate the governmental interventions. Uncomfortable economic climate leads to one of the most controversial dilemmas of the contract law: whether the binding force of the contract is absolute or not. In other words, unstable economic circumstances impose the need to devote special attention to review and perhaps to narrow the binding nature of a contract. Principle of good faith and fair dealing motivate a variety of theoretical bases in order to overcome the legal consequences of financial crises. In this book, all these theoretical bases are analyzed with special focus on the available remedies, namely renegotiation, rescission or revision and the circumstances which enables the revocation of these remedies. The book collects the 19 national reports and the general report originally presented in the session regarding the Effects of Financial Crises on the Binding Force of Contracts: Renegotiation, Rescission or Revision during the XIXth congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Vienna, July 2014.
'It is a familiar remark that only 'the rich can borrow,' and the experience of every day seems to prove it. Yet the poor also may have need of credit, even more than the rich. How, then, can they obtain it? This problem is easily solved by cooperation. An isolated laborer or artisan, no matter how honest or industrious he may be, cannot furnish sufficient guarantee for a loan. Sickness, loss of work, and death, may at any time overtake him and make it impossible, despite his best intentions, to pay back what he has borrowed. But if laborers or artisans to the number of ten, a hundred, or a thousand, are grouped in an organization, and held together, if need be, by the ties of collective responsibility, the security they have to offer will be considerably greater, and they will find it much easier to obtain credit without falling into the hands of usurers. The dues which are paid to such an organization, moreover, will ultimately build up to a large amount of capital which the organization can lend to its members.'Charles GidePrinciples of Economic Policy (1984), Boston USA: DC Heath & Co, publishers translated by C Williams A VerditzA professor of economics, who predicted the subprime mortgage crisis in her doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne between 2006 and 2009, and the general secretary of a major bank analyse the role of banks in triggering the Great Depression and the Great Recession, as well as in helping companies out of the COVID-19 crisis and into the New Environmental Cycle. The book focuses on the dynamics of financial crises that led to the Second World War, Brexit and Donald Trump's presidency. It also chronicles the metamorphosis of the banking profession over the centuries and its reinvention by cooperative banks by and for their customers.
Financial crises have been pervasive for many years. Their frequency in recent decades has been double that of the Bretton Woods Period (1945-1971) and the Gold Standard Era (1880-1993), comparable only to the period during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 came as a great surprise to most people. What initially was seen as difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, rapidly escalated and spilled over first to financial markets and then to the real economy. The crisis changed the financial landscape worldwide and its full costs are yet to be evaluated. One important reason for the global impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was massive illiquidity in combination with an extreme exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs and market conditions. As a consequence, many financial instruments could not be traded anymore, investors ran on a variety of financial institutions particularly in wholesale markets, financial institutions and industrial firms started to sell assets at fire sale prices to raise cash, and central banks all over the world injected huge amounts of liquidity into financial systems. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for firms and financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field of research. It provides comprehensive coverage of the role of liquidity in financial crises and is divided into five parts: (i) liquidity and interbank markets; (ii) the public provision of liquidity and regulation; (iii) money, liquidity and asset prices; (iv) contagion effects; (v) financial crises and currency crises.
Today we hear much talk of crisis and comparisons are often made with the Great Depression of the 1930s, but there is a crucial difference that sets our current malaise apart from the 1930s: today we no longer trust in the capacity of the state to resolve the crisis and to chart a new way forward. In our increasingly globalized world, states have been stripped of much of their power to shape the course of events. Many of our problems are globally produced but the volume of power at the disposal of individual nation-states is simply not sufficient to cope with the problems they face. This divorce between power and politics produces a new kind of paralysis. It undermines the political agency that is needed to tackle the crisis and it saps citizens’ belief that governments can deliver on their promises. The impotence of governments goes hand in hand with the growing cynicism and distrust of citizens. Hence the current crisis is at once a crisis of agency, a crisis of representative democracy and a crisis of the sovereignty of the state. In this book the world-renowned sociologist Zygmunt Bauman and fellow traveller Carlo Bordoni explore the social and political dimensions of the current crisis. While this crisis has been greatly exacerbated by the turmoil following the financial crisis of 2007-8, Bauman and Bordoni argue that the crisis facing Western societies is rooted in a much more profound series of transformations that stretch back further in time and are producing long-lasting effects. This highly original analysis of our current predicament by two of the world’s leading social thinkers will be of interest to a wide readership.
What causes a financial crisis? Can financial crises be anticipated or even avoided? What can be done to lessen their impact? Should governments and international institutions intervene? Or should financial crises be left to run their course? In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many blamed international institutions, corruption, governments, and flawed macro and microeconomic policies not only for causing the crisis but also unnecessarily lengthening and deepening it. Based on ten years of research, the authors develop a theoretical approach to analyzing financial crises. Beginning with a review of the history of financial crises and providing readers with the basic economic tools needed to understand the literature, the authors construct a series of increasingly sophisticated models. Throughout, the authors guide the reader through the existing theoretical and empirical literature while also building on their own theoretical approach. The text presents the modern theory of intermediation, introduces asset markets and the causes of asset price volatility, and discusses the interaction of banks and markets. The book also deals with more specialized topics, including optimal financial regulation, bubbles, and financial contagion.
Although now a growing and respectable research field, crisis management—as a formal area of study—is relatively young, having emerged since the 1980s following a succession of such calamities as the Bhopal gas leak, Chernobyl nuclear accident, Space Shuttle Challenger loss, and Exxon Valdez oil spill. Analysis of organizational failures that caused such events helped drive the emerging field of crisis management. Simultaneously, the world has experienced a number of devastating natural disasters: Hurricane Katrina, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, etc. From such crises, both human-induced and natural, we have learned our modern, tightly interconnected and interdependent society is simply more vulnerable to disruption than in the past. This interconnectedness is made possible in part by crisis management and increases our reliance upon it. As such, crisis management is as beneficial and crucial today as information technology has become over the last few decades. Crisis is varied and unavoidable. While the examples highlighted above were extreme, we see crisis every day within organizations, governments, businesses and the economy. A true crisis differs from a "routine" emergency, such as a water pipe bursting in the kitchen. Per one definition, "it is associated with urgent, high-stakes challenges in which the outcomes can vary widely (and are very negative at one end of the spectrum) and will depend on the actions taken by those involved." Successfully engaging, dealing with, and working through a crisis requires an understanding of options and tools for individual and joint decision making. Our Encyclopedia of Crisis Management comprehensively overviews concepts and techniques for effectively assessing, analyzing, managing, and resolving crises, whether they be organizational, business, community, or political. From general theories and concepts exploring the meaning and causes of crisis to practical strategies and techniques relevant to crises of specific types, crisis management is thoroughly explored. Features & Benefits: A collection of 385 signed entries are organized in A-to-Z fashion in 2 volumes available in both print and electronic formats. Entries conclude with Cross-References and Further Readings to guide students to in-depth resources. Selected entries feature boxed case studies, providing students with "lessons learned" in how various crises were successfully or unsuccessfully managed and why. Although organized A-to-Z, a thematic "Reader's Guide" in the front matter groups related entries by broad areas (e.g., Agencies & Organizations, Theories & Techniques, Economic Crises, etc.). Also in the front matter, a Chronology provides students with historical perspective on the development of crisis management as a discrete field of study. The work concludes with a comprehensive Index, which—in the electronic version—combines with the Reader's Guide and Cross-References to provide thorough search-and-browse capabilities. A template for an "All-Hazards Preparedness Plan" is provided the backmatter; the electronic version of this allows students to explore customized response plans for crises of various sorts. Appendices also include a Resource Guide to classic books, journals, and internet resources in the field, a Glossary, and a vetted list of crisis management-related degree programs, crisis management conferences, etc.
The Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007 reminds us with devastating force that financial instability and crises are endemic to capitalist economies, and that it is only strong and dynamically-changing financial regulations that can keep the damage caused by these crises within bounds. The international financial system and individual national economies, including that of the United States, are suffering from the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Economists are struggling to understand the origins and implications of the crisis. The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crises uses a political economy theoretical framework to analyze the crisis. After an opening chapter that describes the dimensions of the current crisis, the next section provides relevant theoretical frameworks. Subsequent sections apply these theoretical frameworks to analyze the background, dimensions, and implications of the crisis for the world economy. Leading scholars push forward our understanding of how and why our international and domestic economies are susceptible to financial breakdown and what can be done to mitigate this problem in the future. The methodology throughout applies theoretical concepts in the context of an historical and institutional understanding of the real world. By emphasizing the historical and institutional aspects of financial crises, the authors advance economic knowledge and provide insights into how we can manage our financial system to improve the lives of ordinary people.
This timely new book explains why every company and organization needs to identify a Chief Crisis Officer, and provide the proper tools to enable the Chief Crisis Officer to assemble his or her team, and respond--effectively and efficiently--when the crisis occurs. Using a mixture of real life examples, strategies, and tactics, the book will break down crises into their component parts and provide both a strategic approach to effectively dealing with those issues.
Much economic advice is bogus quantification, warn two leading experts in this essential book, now with a preface on COVID-19. Invented numbers offer a false sense of security; we need instead robust narratives that give us the confidence to manage uncertainty. “An elegant and careful guide to thinking about personal and social economics, especially in a time of uncertainty. The timing is impeccable." — Christine Kenneally, New York Times Book Review Some uncertainties are resolvable. The insurance industry’s actuarial tables and the gambler’s roulette wheel both yield to the tools of probability theory. Most situations in life, however, involve a deeper kind of uncertainty, a radical uncertainty for which historical data provide no useful guidance to future outcomes. Radical uncertainty concerns events whose determinants are insufficiently understood for probabilities to be known or forecasting possible. Before President Barack Obama made the fateful decision to send in the Navy Seals, his advisers offered him wildly divergent estimates of the odds that Osama bin Laden would be in the Abbottabad compound. In 2000, no one—not least Steve Jobs—knew what a smartphone was; how could anyone have predicted how many would be sold in 2020? And financial advisers who confidently provide the information required in the standard retirement planning package—what will interest rates, the cost of living, and your state of health be in 2050?—demonstrate only that their advice is worthless. The limits of certainty demonstrate the power of human judgment over artificial intelligence. In most critical decisions there can be no forecasts or probability distributions on which we might sensibly rely. Instead of inventing numbers to fill the gaps in our knowledge, we should adopt business, political, and personal strategies that will be robust to alternative futures and resilient to unpredictable events. Within the security of such a robust and resilient reference narrative, uncertainty can be embraced, because it is the source of creativity, excitement, and profit.
The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and address too little. Though unresolved debt crises impose enormous costs on societies, many recent restructurings have not been deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery (as illustrated by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012). And if the debtor decides not to accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a restructuring can be slowed by legal challenges (as illustrated by the recent case of Argentina, deemed as "the trial of the century"). A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy, yet there is no international bankruptcy framework for sovereign debts. While this problem is not new, the United Nations and the global community are now willing to do something about it. Providing guidance for those who intend to take up reform, this book assesses the relative merits of various debt-restructuring proposals, especially in relation to the main deficiencies of the current nonsystem. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners, Too Little, Too Late reflects the overwhelming consensus among specialists on the need to find workable solutions.