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Comparative Contract Law and Economics provides a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences between the legal systems of France, England, the US and Germany in terms of contract law. The application of the economically inspired optimal model rule as a uniform term of comparison provides valuable insights into the pre-contractual duties of disclosure, the phenomena of unforeseen contingencies and the unilateral termination of contracts. The objective evaluation method enriches traditional comparative contract law by enabling further qualitative assessment. The book offers ample opportunities for further research and for 'better' law making, legislation and jurisprudence. Moreover, it enables comparative contract law to offer clear-cut, objective recommendations on the possible improvements of legal rules or decisions. This well-documented book will appeal to postgraduate students and scholars of law and economics, and comparative law. Judges and law practitioners will also find much to interest them in this pioneering volume. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Pre-contractual Duty to Disclose Information 3. Unforeseen Contingencies 4. Unilateral Termination 5. Summary and Conclusions References Index
A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.
This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
This important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor's comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field. Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.
'The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and Law' brings together leading scholars of law, psychology, and economics to provide an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of this field of research, including its strengths and limitations as well as a forecast of its future development. Its twenty-nine chapters are organized into four parts.
The Choice Theory of Contracts is an engaging landmark that shows, for the first time, how freedom matters to contract.
Contract law allows parties to set their own rules within constraints. It provides a set of default rules and if the parties do not like them, they can change them. Rethinking Contract Law and Contract Design explores various long-standing contract doc
This book analyses the theory of efficient breach in English sales law, European Union contract law and Chinese contract law. It analyses the framework of the efficient breach theory and reconsiders the implications of this theory. According to the traditional efficient breach theory, the remedy of expectation damages is able to motivate efficient breach, which brings the breaching party economic surplus without making the non-breaching party worse off. The essential problems are how to motivate contract parties to make rational decisions and how to solve cases where performance of a contract turns out to be less efficient after its conclusion. The second part of the book further extends the efficient breach theory to the study of contract law systems by analysing how exactly those laws react to breach and what solutions are adopted by them. The comparison of these three systems is more than a mere description of the differences and similarities in the content. More importantly, this comparative research also analyses whether or not the differences between these systems will influence the level of efficiency produced by each legal system by taking account of the different traditions and the concepts of contracts involved in each legal system. Researchers in contract law will also be interested in this approach, particularly for re-thinking the question of whether one legal system is definitely better or worse than the other two. (Series: Ius Commune Europaeum - Vol. 142) Subject: Contract Law, Sales Law, European Law, Chinese Law, International Law]
The field of law and economics has matured to a point where scholars employ economic methods to understand the nature of legal rules and guide legal reform. This text is a broad survey of that scholarship as it has been applied to problems in tort, contracts, property and litigation.