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Transaction cost economics has and continues to be a fruitful area of research. There is still much to be done in the field with past research being used in conjunction with the vast number of contractual phenomena that have yet to be investigated in transaction cost economics terms. New challenges are posed by the need to move beyond the design of new contractual instruments (such as financial derivatives) to include an examination of the lurking hazards that attend contract implementation.
This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.
In recent years transaction cost economics have come to dominate the discussion of the nature and organization of firms. In Transaction Costs Economics and Beyond Michael Dietrich offers a critical exploration of transaction costs. He argues that whilst they have much to offer, they are still an inadequate basis for a general theory of the firm. Drawing on theories of organizational behaviour as well as economics, he concludes by offering a theory of the firm that allows for both hierarchical and creative decision making.
This long-awaited sequel to the modem classic "Markets and Hierarchies" develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labor as well as the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labor policy, and SEC and public utility regulations.
A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.
Transaction cost economics began to take shape around 1970 and has since been established as an essential tool used to illuminate a wide range of problems in economics and other social sciences. This reader presents articles which together form the foundations of research in transaction cost economics.
The theoretical foundations of management strategy are identified and outlined in this text. Five theories are considered in the light of questions about how organisations operate efficiently, cost minimization, wealth creation, individual self-interest, and continued growth.
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory is written in response to the neo-classical economic rational choice theories and organizational economic theories which have emerged in the past decade and gained center stage in current organizational analysis.