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There is growing evidence that economic crises are transmitted across economies and equity markets. This motivates two questions. First, can the direction and magnitude of a country's stock market reaction during an extreme case (quot;contagionquot;) be explained by economic fundamentals? Second, are there benefits of international diversification during times of widespread contagion among equity markets?We examine the reaction of major world equity markets to the 1997 Asian Crisis. In particular, we investigate the interrelationships among world equity markets, the factors explaining the different directions and magnitudes of countries' reactions to this crisis and the effectiveness of the global diversification of investment portfolios during financial crises. Our analyses provide evidence that is consistent with the correlations among world equity markets increasing dramatically during the period of the Asian Crisis. However, this effect is concentrated on a short period around the crisis. The benefits of international diversification may be obtainable, even when the period contains a worldwide financial crisis. We show that the productivity and interest rate macroeconomic variables, worldwide beta and the existence of derivatives trading are important in explaining the stock market returns during the Asian Crisis. The effect of the worldwide beta variable is particularly strong. Finally, the trade variables are insignificant, their influences being subsumed by interest rate and inflation macroeconomic variables. On balance, we interpret our results as supporting a rational view of the spread of an economic crisis to other markets.
No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.
This paper tests for evidence of contagion between the financial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines. Cross-country correlations among currencies and sovereign spreads are found to increase significantly during the crisis period, whereas the equity market correlations offer mixed evidence. A set of dummy variables using daily news is constructed to capture the impact of own-country and cross-border news on the markets. After controlling for own-country news and other fundamentals, the paper shows evidence of cross-border contagion in the currency and equity markets.
Currency and banking crises such as those originating in Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), and the Russian Federation (1998) tend to be associated and often take place together across countries. The East Asian experience was a fruitful laboratory for examining key questions. For example: How did contagion occur so extensively, and why was it so devastating? Did policy responses to crises and contagion minimize their impact on the real economy? What type of international financial architecture is needed to prevent and manage crises and contagion?
This study uses bivariate extremal dependence measures, based on the number of equity return co-exceedances in two markets, to quantify both negative and positive equity returns contagion in mature and emerging equity markets during the past decade. The results indicate (a) higher contagion for negative returns than for positive returns; (b) a secular increase in contagion in Latin America not matched in other regions; (c) global increases in contagion following the 1998 financial crises; and (d) that the use of simple correlations as a proxy for contagion could be misleading, as the former exhibit low correlation with extremal dependence measures of contagion.
November 1998 Recent events in East Asia highlighted the risks of weak financial institutions and distorted incentives in a financially integrated world. These weaknesses led to two sources of vulnerability: East Asia's rapid buildup of contingent liabilities, and overreliance on short-term foreign borrowing. The buildup of vulnerabilities in East Asia is shown here to be mainly the result of weaknesses in financial intermediation, poor corporate governance, and deficient government policies, including pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy responses to large capital inflows. Weak due diligence by external creditors, fueled partly by ample global liquidity, also played a role but global factors were more important in triggering the crises than in causing them. The crisis occurred partly because the economies lacked the institutional and regulatory structure to cope with increasingly integrated capital markets. Trouble arose from private sector decisions (by both borrowers and lenders) but governments created incentives for risky behavior and exerted little regulatory authority. Governments failed to encourage the transparency needed for the market to recognize and correct such problems as unreported mutual guarantees, insider relations, and nondisclosure of banks' and companies' true net positions. Domestic weaknesses were aggravated by poorly disciplined foreign lending. The problem was not so much overall indebtedness as the composition of debt: a buildup of short-term unhedged debt left the economies vulnerable to a sudden loss of confidence. The same factors made the crisis's economic and social impact more severe than some anticipated. The loss of confidence directly affected private demand-both investment and consumption-which could not be offset in the short run by net external demand. The effect on corporations and financial institutions has been severe because of the high degree of leveraging and the unhedged, short-term nature of foreign liabilities, which has led to a severe liquidity crunch. Domestic recession, financial and corporate distress, liquidity constraints, and political uncertainty were self-reinforcing, leading to a severe downturn. This paper-a joint product of the Economic Policy Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network and the Central Bank of Chile-was presented at the CEPR/World Bank conference Financial Crises: Contagion and Market Volatility, May 8-9, 1998, London, and at the PAFTAD 24 conference, Asia Pacific Financial Liberation and Reform, May 20-22, 1998, in Chiangmai, Thailand. Pedro Alba may be contacted at [email protected].
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the Asian economic "miracle" has fueled the greatest expansion of wealth for the largest population in the history of mankind. In the summer of 1997, thirty years of economic boom came crashing back to earth. The reality of unrestrained speculation, inefficiently regulated currency exchange, banking instability and bad loans have struck the much-vaunted "Asian Tigers" like Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and, finally, Japan, casting a shadow of uncertainty on a region recently to the fore in the world economic system. Recovery depends largely on reform within the Asian economies themselves and a cold assessment of the structural weaknesses that lay under the surface, but only now have come to light. The implications for world economies and, more broadly, the dynamics of world politics, are tremendous.
The paper surveys the types of models producing multiple equilibria in financial markets. It argues that such models are consistent with observed phenomena, such as the greater volatility of financial asset prices than of macroeconomic fundamentals. Alternative explanations are compared with the stylized facts concerning capital flows, portfolio shifts, and exchange rate crises. Implications for crisis prediction and prevention are then discussed.
Presents the first theoretical analysis of the Asian financial crisis and draws out the general lessons of an event whose potential long term effects have been likened to those of the Crash of 1929. Part I presents a factual and analytic overview of what happened: the role of 'vulnerability'; the interconnection between currency crises and financial crises; and why crisis turned into collapse. Part II considers more detailed issues, including how the inflation of non-traded goods prices created vulnerability, welfare-reducing capital inflow owing to under-regulated financial markets, and the onset of speculative attacks. Part III assesses all aspects of contagion, in particular the role of geographic proximity. The final section addresses policy issues. Joseph Stiglitz argues that there is much that can be done to reduce the frequency of crises and to mitigate the severity of crises when they happen. The book finishes with a round-table discussion of policy issues.
"Financial Contagion: The Viral Threat to the Wealth of Nations covers a lot of territory. It is, of course, terribly important to analyze case histories to discover potential triggers, mechanisms of transmission, and viable ways to contain the damage of financial contagion. The problem is, as these articles amply demonstrate, that there’s always a new virus or a mutation of a former one lurking in some corner of the financial world. We don’t know what it is or where it is. And, even if we had some inkling, there’s almost never enough time to develop a financial flu shot." --SeekingAlpha.com The latest insights on financial contagion and how both nations and investors can effectively deal with it. The domino-style structure in which the financial system exists is a perilous one. Although historically, the financial system has been able to deal with major shocks, the fact remains that our financial system is not as secure as it should be. Recent years have brought about too many examples of contagion and systemic risk. That is why Financial Contagion is such an important read. In it, the serious concerns that revolve around our fragile economic system are investigated, researched, and explained. Throughout the book, Kolb offers valuable insights on this dilemma as he compiles the history of financial contagion, highlights the latest research on systemic failure and interrelated markets, and analyzes the risks and consequences we face moving forward. Examines the importance of careful regulation and what must be done to stabilize the global financial system Includes contributed chapters from both academics and experienced professionals, offering a variety of perspectives and a rich interplay of ideas Details how close we are to witnessing a financial contagion that could devastate the world economy We have been harshly reminded of how fragile our economic ecosystem is. With Financial Contagion, you'll hold a better understanding of what needs to be done to strengthen our system and safeguard our financial future.