Download Free Constitutionalism Versus Legalism Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Constitutionalism Versus Legalism and write the review.

The way that Americans understand their Constitution and wider legal tradition has been dominated in recent decades by two exhausted approaches: the originalism of conservatives and the “living constitutionalism” of progressives. Is it time to look for an alternative? Adrian Vermeule argues that the alternative has been there, buried in the American legal tradition, all along. He shows that US law was, from the founding, subsumed within the broad framework of the classical legal tradition, which conceives law as “a reasoned ordering to the common good.” In this view, law’s purpose is to promote the goods a flourishing political community requires: justice, peace, prosperity, and morality. He shows how this legacy has been lost, despite still being implicit within American public law, and convincingly argues for its recovery in the form of “common good constitutionalism.” This erudite and brilliantly original book is a vital intervention in America’s most significant contemporary legal debate while also being an enduring account of the true nature of law that will resonate for decades with scholars and students.
The political changes which have occurred in the last three years have been phenomenal--the dissolving of the former Soviet Union, the impending union of Western Europe, and the evolution of democracy in Eastern Europe. What changes have occurred in the legal structure of these countries? How have their constitutions been affected by these developments? Stanley Katz, Douglas Greenberg, and other scholars and politicians from numerous countries discuss in this work the experiences of constitutionalism. Previously, little work has been done in this field, but now Constitutionalism and Democracy represents the range and depth for serious constitutional analysis. Discussing concrete issues such as human rights, nationalism, and pluralism, this volume will be essential in understanding the phenomenon of constitutionalism in various parts of the world.
Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.
This book is a topical study of populist constitutionalism and illiberal democracies, exploring their roots in constitutional imagination as well as their normative entrenchment and performance in political reality. It provides insightful analysis of republican constitutionalism, focusing on the role of people in radical democracy and revolutionary constitutional reform. Furthermore, the outlook, adequacy and performance of constitutional principles in times of democratic ruptures are assessed. The contributors examine the rise of populist constitutionalism and the main trends that have led to the current, ongoing crises in liberal democracy. The book includes original analyses of populist constitutionalism from the viewpoint of emotions and constitutional imagination, as well as a special chapter devoted to the challenges posed to constitutional democracy by COVID-19. Combining theoretical contributions, comparative typologies and important case studies, the spread of populism and illiberal democracy in Europe is critically explored.00'Populist Constitutionalism and Illiberal Democracies' is a timely contribution to the lively discussion surrounding constitutional law, comparative constitutional law, comparative constitutionalism and political science regarding the rise and spread of illiberal democracies, authoritarian political regimes and revolutionary, radical democratic and populist constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism under Stress reflects on comparative constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe through the work of eminent constitutional scholar Wojciech Sadurski. The book examines the current decline of liberal democracies and populist challenges to the rule of law in the region - events that Sadurski predicted early on in his writings about Jörg Haider affair in Austria and the introduction of Article 7 TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty. Sadurski's work has chronicled the transition from concern for the most basic of human rights under authoritarian rule to the challenges of democratic governance. The compelling rights discourse of an earlier period gave way to claims of abuse of majoritarian prerogatives as the hopes of liberal democracy encountered the power of illiberalism. The theoretical responses offered for the preservation of liberal democracy, in light of the current turbulence regarding the rule of law in the region, produces a far reaching and effective reference tool on matters of constitutional capture and illiberal democracy.
At the intersection of two sweeping global trends—the rise of popular support for principles of theocratic governance and the spread of constitutionalism and judicial review—a new legal order has emerged: constitutional theocracy. It enshrines religion and its interlocutors as “a” or “the” source of legislation, and at the same time adheres to core ideals and practices of modern constitutionalism. A unique hybrid of apparently conflicting worldviews, values, and interests, constitutional theocracies thus offer an ideal setting—a “living laboratory” as it were—for studying constitutional law as a form of politics by other means. In this book, Ran Hirschl undertakes a rigorous comparative analysis of religion-and-state jurisprudence from dozens of countries worldwide to explore the evolving role of constitutional law and courts in a non-secularist world. Counterintuitively, Hirschl argues that the constitutional enshrinement of religion is a rational, prudent strategy that allows opponents of theocratic governance to talk the religious talk without walking most of what they regard as theocracy’s unappealing, costly walk. Many of the jurisdictional, enforcement, and cooptation advantages that gave religious legal regimes an edge in the pre-modern era, are now aiding the modern state and its laws in its effort to contain religion. The “constitutional” in a constitutional theocracy thus fulfills the same restricting function it carries out in a constitutional democracy: it brings theocratic governance under check and assigns to constitutional law and courts the task of a bulwark against the threat of radical religion.
It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean dictatorship (1973–1990). It examines the structuring of institutions at the apex of the military junta, the relationship of military rule with the prior constitution, the intra-military conflicts that led to the promulgation of the 1980 constitution, the logic of institutions contained in the new constitution, and how the constitution constrained the military junta after it went into force in 1981. This provocative account reveals the standard account of the dictatorship as a personalist regime with power concentrated in Pinochet to be grossly inaccurate.
This work provides a rational framework for legislation. The unifying premise behind the essays is that, although legislation and regulation are the result of a political process, legislation and regulation can be the object of theoretical study. The volume focuses on problems that are common to most European legal systems and the approach involves applying to legislative problems the tools of legal theory - hence 'legisprudence'. Whereas traditional legal theory deals predominantly with the application of law by the judge, legisprudence enlarges the field of study so as to include the creation of law by the legislator. The original essays published in this collection expose and develop a range of new insights into the relationship between legislative problems and legal theory in a way which will engage and interest legal scholars throughout the world.
Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers. But there is nothing in our system of checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority straight through to the Obama presidency. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution.
Two decades since the enactment of South Africa’s present constitution, the durability and endurance of ‘past’ inequalities and injustices illustrate that the ‘new South Africa’ – lauded as a miracle nation with the best constitution in the world – can no longer be regarded as an unqualified success. The legal and constitutional foundations of post-1994 South Africa are in a process of renegotiation that invites new and alternative perspectives and approaches. This comprehensive volume explores this process of renegotiation by engaging political and intellectual contestations circulating in South African academic and public discourse relating to continuities and discontinuities between the colonial-apartheid past and the post-1994 constitutional present. The authors analyse the moral, intellectual and political unravelling of post-1994 South African constitutionalism (as legal text and political culture) and enquire whether it has been able to respond adequately to the fundamental contradictions generated by colonisation and apartheid. They also consider how centring the historical problem of European domination and conquest in Africa – and South Africa in particular – might provide an alternative frame or lens to theorise and understand contemporary South African realities. This book marks out a complex field of contestation – involving competing histories, locations, visions and perspectives – that raises multifaceted questions regarding law, history and politics. It is the outcome of a South African Journal of Human Rights colloquium and was originally published as a special issue of the journal.