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Content: Sprache, Recht und Rechtsverbindlichkeit: R. Fukawa: An Analysis of the aeRules of Recognition Statement' u W. Krawietz: What does it mean to follow an aeInstitutionalised Legal Rule'? u N. MacCormick: Citizens' Legal Reasoning and its Importance for Jurisprudence u Y. Morigiwa: Hart's Theories of Language and Law u R.Tuomela: Supervenience, Collective Action, and Kelsen's Organ Theory uRecht und politische Kultur: G. Haney: Recht als Form von Kultur u A. Kojder: Dysfunctionalities of Legal Cultur u A. Lopatka: Law and Religion in Poland u M. Samu: Culture and Law: Legal Culture uWerteordnung als ideologische Basis des Rechtsstaats: R. Dreier: Konstitutionalismus und Legalismus u O. Maenpaa: Unilaterality and Consensualism in the Application of Law u K.-F. Lenz: Zivilprozea und Spiel u M. Pavcnik: Ideologie der Rechtsanwendung versus argumentierte Rechtsentscheidung u J. Uusitalo: Legal Dogmatics, Epistemology, Radical Hermeneutics u Entwicklung der Rechtsordnung und soziale Gerechtigkeit: V. Luizzi: Legal Validity and Justice u H. Rottleuthner: Recht und Technik in entwicklungstheor. Perspektive u S. Panou: Uber die aeGerechtigkeit' des Rechts u A. Squella: Legal Positivism and Democracy in the 20. Century u D. Wyduckel: Konsens und gesellschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt u Soziale Mechanismen der Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsfindung: H. Aoi: Richterliche Rechtsfindung als Pattern-Matching-Prozea uu.a. (Franz Steiner 1991)
By reminding readers that early Supreme Court justices refused to reduce the Constitution to a mere legal document, Approaching the U.S. Constitution provides a definitive response to Reading Law by Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner. Turning to the vision of Alexander Hamilton found in Federalists No. 78, Hunter argues that rather than seeing the judiciary as America’s legal guardian, Hamilton looked to independent individuals of integrity on the judiciary to be the nation’s collective conscience. For Hamilton, the judiciary’s authority over the legislature does not derive from positive law but is extra-legal by 'design' and is purely moral. By emphasizing the legal expertise of judges alone, individuals such as Justice Scalia mistakenly demand that judges exercise no human ethical judgment whatsoever. Yet the more this happens, the more the “rule of law” is replaced by the rule of lawyers. Legal sophistry becomes the primary currency wherewith society’s ethical and moral questions are resolved. Moreover, the alleged neutrality of legal analysis is deceptive with its claims of judicial modesty. It is not only undemocratic, it is dictatorial and highly elitist. Public debate over questions of fairness is replaced by an exclusive legalistic debate between lawyers over what is legal. The more Scalia and Garner realize their agenda, the more all appeals to what is moral will be effectively removed from political debate. 'Conservatives' lament the 'removing God from the classroom,' by 'liberals,' yet if the advocates of legalism get their way, God will be effectively removed from the polis altogether. The answer to preserving both separation of powers and the American commitment to unalienable human rights is to view the Supreme Court in the same way early founders such as Hamilton did and in the way President Abraham Lincoln urged. The Court’s most important function in exercising the power of judicial review is to serve as the nation’s conscience just as it did in Brown v. Board of Education.
The way that Americans understand their Constitution and wider legal tradition has been dominated in recent decades by two exhausted approaches: the originalism of conservatives and the “living constitutionalism” of progressives. Is it time to look for an alternative? Adrian Vermeule argues that the alternative has been there, buried in the American legal tradition, all along. He shows that US law was, from the founding, subsumed within the broad framework of the classical legal tradition, which conceives law as “a reasoned ordering to the common good.” In this view, law’s purpose is to promote the goods a flourishing political community requires: justice, peace, prosperity, and morality. He shows how this legacy has been lost, despite still being implicit within American public law, and convincingly argues for its recovery in the form of “common good constitutionalism.” This erudite and brilliantly original book is a vital intervention in America’s most significant contemporary legal debate while also being an enduring account of the true nature of law that will resonate for decades with scholars and students.
This book is a large-scale historical reconstruction of liberal legalism, from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the moment in which the jurists forged the alliance between political liberalism and legal expertise embodied in classical private law doctrine, to the contemporary anxiety about the possibility of both a liberal solution to the problem of political justification and of law as a respectable form of expert knowledge. Each stage in the history is a moment of synthesis between a substantive and a methodological idea. The former is the liberal political theory of the period, purporting to provide a solution to the problem of political justification. The latter is a conception of legal method or science, supposedly vindicating the access of the expert to the political choices embodied in the law. Thus, each moment in the history of liberal legalism integrates a political theory with a jurisprudential conception. Although it reaches the unsettling conclusion that liberal legalism has largely failed by its own standards, the book urges us to avoid quietism, scepticism or cynicism, in the hope that a deeper understanding of the fragility of our values and institutions inspires a more thoughtful, broadminded and nurtured citizenship.
In a wide-ranging study based on legal history, political theory, and philosophical ideas going all the way back to Plato and Roman law, Robert Clinton challenges current faith in an activist judiciary. Claiming that a human-centered Constitution leads to government by reductive moral theory and illegitimate judicial review, he advocates a return to traditional jurisprudence and a God-centered Constitution grounded in English common law and its precedents.
Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.
The political changes which have occurred in the last three years have been phenomenal--the dissolving of the former Soviet Union, the impending union of Western Europe, and the evolution of democracy in Eastern Europe. What changes have occurred in the legal structure of these countries? How have their constitutions been affected by these developments? Stanley Katz, Douglas Greenberg, and other scholars and politicians from numerous countries discuss in this work the experiences of constitutionalism. Previously, little work has been done in this field, but now Constitutionalism and Democracy represents the range and depth for serious constitutional analysis. Discussing concrete issues such as human rights, nationalism, and pluralism, this volume will be essential in understanding the phenomenon of constitutionalism in various parts of the world.
What do constitutional interpretation and legal education have in common?For one thing, they share the same tension between theory and practice, between form and substance, between process and outcomes, between constancy and change, and between local and comparative perspectives. Each also has a substratum of fundamental underlying values that demand, but do not always receive, clear articulation.For another thing, they have both been the subject of illuminating examination by Michael Coper over the course of a long and distinguished career.An extraordinary group of authors, including Justice Stephen Gageler, the Hon Michael Kirby and Sir Anthony Mason, come together in this book to celebrate Coper's achievement, and take his various contributions as a jumping off point for their own further scholarly insights.From the gripping story of the revolution that swept away the old law on section 92 of the Constitution, to the endemic conflict in the judicial process between legalism and realism, to the never-ending controversy about the Dismissal, to perceiving the world and organising legal knowledge in new ways through biography and oral history, to the role of educators in shaping the views and values of newcomers to this knowledge, this book contains over a dozen sparkling essays by some of Australia's most renowned and respected lawyers, as well as a substantial reflective commentary by Michael Coper himself.An intellectual feast!
Constitutional democracy is more fragile and less 'natural' than autocracy. While this may sound surprising to complacent democrats, more and more people find autocracy attractive, because they were never forced to understand or imagine what despotism is. Generations who have lived in stable democracies with the promise that their enviable world will become the global 'normal' find government rule without constitutionalism difficult to conceive. It is difficult, but never too late, to see one's own constitutional system as something that is fragile, or up for grabs and in need of constant attention and care. In this book, Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz explore how constitutionalism protects us and how it might be undone by its own means. Sajo and Uitz's intellectual history of the constitutional ideal is rich in contextual detail and informed by case studies that give an overview of both the theory and practice of constitutionalism worldwide. Classic constitutions are contrasted with twentieth-century and contemporary endeavours, and experimentations in checks and balances. Their endeavour is neither apologetic (and certainly not celebratory), nor purely defensive: this book demonstrates why constitutionalism should continue to matter. Between the rise of populist, anti-constitutional sentiment and the normalization of the apparatus of counter-terrorism, it is imperative that the political communities who seek to sustain democracy as freedom understand the importance of constitutionalism. This book is essential reading for students of law and general readers without prior knowledge of the field, as well as those in politics who believe they know how government works. It shows what is at stake in the debate on constitutionalism.
Constitutional Rights after Globalization juxtaposes the globalization of the economy and the worldwide spread of constitutional charters of rights. The shift of political authority to powerful economic actors entailed by neo-liberal globalization challenges the traditional state-centred focus of constitutional law. Contemporary debate has responded to this challenge in normative terms, whether by reinterpreting rights or redirecting their ends, e.g. to reach private actors. However, globalization undermines the liberal legalist epistemology on which these approaches rest, by positing the existence of multiple sites of legal production, (e.g. multinational corporations) beyond the state. This dynamic, between globalization and legal pluralism on one side, and rights constitutionalism on the other, provides the context for addressing the question of rights constitutionalism's counterhegemonic potential. This shows first that the interpretive and instrumental assumptions underlying constitutional adjudication are empirically suspect: constitutional law tends more to disorder than coherence, and frequently is an ineffective tool for social change. Instead, legal pluralism contends that constitutionalism's importance lies in symbolic terms as a legitimating discourse. The competing liberal and 'new' politics of definition (the latter highlighting how neoliberal values and institutions constrain political action) are contrasted to show how each advances different agenda. A comparative survey of constitutionalism's engagement with private power shows that conceiving of constitutions in the predominant liberal, legalist mode has broadly favoured hegemonic interests. It is concluded that counterhegemonic forms of constitutional discourse cannot be effected within, but only by unthinking, the dominant liberal legalist paradigm, in a manner that takes seriously all exercises of political power.