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Trial attorney, Daniel Buttafuoco addresses this question so capably in his recent work. As he observes, ''The Bible is a document we can use to examine whether the claims made in regard to our souls are true. If these claims are provably false, we need not worry about this subject at all. If they are true, we need to pay careful attention.''
Over twenty-two months in 1979 and 1981 nearly two dozen children were unspeakably murdered in Atlanta despite national attention and outcry; they were all Black. James Baldwin investigated these murders, the Black administration in Atlanta, and Wayne Williams, the Black man tried for the crimes. Because there was only evidence to convict Williams for the murders of two men, the children's cases were closed, offering no justice to the families or the country. Baldwin's incisive analysis implicates the failures of integration as the guilt party, arguing, "There could be no more devastating proof of this assault than the slaughter of the children." As Stacey Abrams writes in her foreword, "The humanity of black children, of black men and women, of black lives, has ever been a conundrum for America. Forty years on, Baldwin's writing reminds us that we have never resolved the core query: Do black lives matter? Unequivocally, the moral answer is yes, but James Baldwin refuses such rhetorical comfort." In this, his last book, by excavating American race relations Baldwin exposes the hard-to-face ingrained issues and demands that we all reckon with them.
The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.tandfebooks.com/, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. There has been an enormous increase in interest in the use of evidence for public policymaking, but the vast majority of work on the subject has failed to engage with the political nature of decision making and how this influences the ways in which evidence will be used (or misused) within political areas. This book provides new insights into the nature of political bias with regards to evidence and critically considers what an ‘improved’ use of evidence would look like from a policymaking perspective. Part I describes the great potential for evidence to help achieve social goals, as well as the challenges raised by the political nature of policymaking. It explores the concern of evidence advocates that political interests drive the misuse or manipulation of evidence, as well as counter-concerns of critical policy scholars about how appeals to ‘evidence-based policy’ can depoliticise political debates. Both concerns reflect forms of bias – the first representing technical bias, whereby evidence use violates principles of scientific best practice, and the second representing issue bias in how appeals to evidence can shift political debates to particular questions or marginalise policy-relevant social concerns. Part II then draws on the fields of policy studies and cognitive psychology to understand the origins and mechanisms of both forms of bias in relation to political interests and values. It illustrates how such biases are not only common, but can be much more predictable once we recognise their origins and manifestations in policy arenas. Finally, Part III discusses ways to move forward for those seeking to improve the use of evidence in public policymaking. It explores what constitutes ‘good evidence for policy’, as well as the ‘good use of evidence’ within policy processes, and considers how to build evidence-advisory institutions that embed key principles of both scientific good practice and democratic representation. Taken as a whole, the approach promoted is termed the ‘good governance of evidence’ – a concept that represents the use of rigorous, systematic and technically valid pieces of evidence within decision-making processes that are representative of, and accountable to, populations served.
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.
If you litigate or preside in any court in the state of New York, you know just how confounding the state's evidence law can be. New York Evidence Handbook is the new, comprehensive guide to all of the rules and principles of evidence applicable in New York courts. This new 1,000+ page handbook presents a practical, contemporary approach to evidence -- written with the real-world challenges of the New York trial lawyer and judge in mind. It gathers into one, easy-to-use handbook all of the rules, the leading decisions and the significant statutes you need to consider when assessing the admissibility of evidence. The book walks you through all the rules and their operation (as they relate to judicial notice, presumptions, relevance, the best evidence rule, etc.), discussing all of the leading authorities and citing numerous trial examples. Throughout New York Evidence Handbook, special attention is paid to helping you quickly solve commonly encountered, but difficult, evidence questions.
This book explains the correct logical approach to analysis of forensic scientific evidence. The focus is on general methods of analysis applicable to all forms of evidence. It starts by explaining the general principles and then applies them to issues in DNA and other important forms of scientific evidence as examples. Like the first edition, the book analyses real legal cases and judgments rather than hypothetical examples and shows how the problems perceived in those cases would have been solved by a correct logical approach. The book is written to be understood both by forensic scientists preparing their evidence and by lawyers and judges who have to deal with it. The analysis is tied back both to basic scientific principles and to the principles of the law of evidence. This book will also be essential reading for law students taking evidence or forensic science papers and science students studying the application of their scientific specialisation to forensic questions.
Well-chosen negative legal proof rules can be useful procedural safeguards. They existed in both pre-modern and modern criminal procedures.
This book examines systematically the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems and identifies the defining characteristics of adjudicative fact-finding. Stein develops a detailed innovative theory which sets aside the traditional vision of evidence law as facilitating the discovery of the truth. Combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis, and moral philosophy; he argues instead that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk oferror in conditions of uncertainty. Stein begins by identifying the domain of evidence law.He then describes the basic traits of adjudicative fact-finding and explores the epistemological foundations of the concept. This discussion identifies the problem of probabilistic deduction that accompanies generalizations to which fact-finders resort. This problem engenders paradoxes which Stein proposes to resolve by distinguishing between probability and weight. Stein advances the principle of maximal individualization that does not allow factfinders to make a finding against a person when the evidence they use is not susceptible to individualized testing.He argues that this principle has broad application, but may still be overridden by social utility. This analysis identifies allocation of the risk of error as requiring regulation by evidence law. Advocating a principled allocation of the risk of error, Stein denounces free proof for allowing individual judges to apportion this risk asthey deem fit.He criticizes the UK's recent shift to a discretionary regime on similar grounds. Stein develops three fundamental principles for allocating the risk of error: the cost-efficiency principle which applies across the board; the equality principle which applies in civil litigation; and the equal best principle which applies in criminal trials. The cost-efficiency principle demands that fact-finders minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance.Under the equality principle,fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce an unequal apportionment of the risk of error between the claimant and the defendant. This risk should be apportioned equally between the parties. The equal best principle sets forth two conditions for justifiably convicting and punishing a defendant. The state must do its best to protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must not provide better protection to other individuals. Regulating both the admissibility of evidence and its sufficiency, these principles explain and justify many existing evidentiary rules. Alex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.Cardozo School of Law,New York.