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Conventional wisdom holds that the President enjoys the preponderance of foreign policy power, however Congress has influenced China policymaking more than is generally recognized. The legislature has demonstrated consistent interests in the realm of China policy, and it has invariably pursued those interests through law-making. During the post-Cold War period in particular, the Sino-U.S. relationship has evolved in a radically changing international environment, marked by a power transition inherent in China's rise. The development of official relations between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War occurred in the shadow of an assertive Soviet power, when the United States and China were able to find common geopolitical ground in opposing Soviet expansion while overlooking longstanding political disagreements. The dissolution of the Soviet empire, however, put the United States and China on a new geostrategic footing. Political disagreements were no longer exempted in light of a counter-Soviet strategy, and the reduction in concern for the Soviet threat allowed policymakers in Washington to more aggressively pursue trade interests that conflicted with those of China. Given this international context, this book aims to discern how Congress reconciled competing Sino-U.S. interests in a post-Cold War era, when external threats no longer dictated an apparent hierarchy that favored China over the Soviet Union. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, China Studies and international relations in general.
Conventional wisdom holds that the President enjoys the preponderance of foreign policy power, however Congress has influenced China policymaking more than is generally recognized. The legislature has demonstrated consistent interests in the realm of China policy, and it has invariably pursued those interests through law-making. During the post-Cold War period in particular, the Sino-U.S. relationship has evolved in a radically changing international environment, marked by a power transition inherent in China's rise. The development of official relations between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War occurred in the shadow of an assertive Soviet power, when the United States and China were able to find common geopolitical ground in opposing Soviet expansion while overlooking longstanding political disagreements. The dissolution of the Soviet empire, however, put the United States and China on a new geostrategic footing. Political disagreements were no longer exempted in light of a counter-Soviet strategy, and the reduction in concern for the Soviet threat allowed policymakers in Washington to more aggressively pursue trade interests that conflicted with those of China. Given this international context, this book aims to discern how Congress reconciled competing Sino-U.S. interests in a post-Cold War era, when external threats no longer dictated an apparent hierarchy that favored China over the Soviet Union. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, China Studies and international relations in general.
Winning the Third World examines afresh the intense and enduring rivalry between the United States and China during the Cold War. Gregg A. Brazinsky shows how both nations fought vigorously to establish their influence in newly independent African and Asian countries. By playing a leadership role in Asia and Africa, China hoped to regain its status in world affairs, but Americans feared that China's history as a nonwhite, anticolonial nation would make it an even more dangerous threat in the postcolonial world than the Soviet Union. Drawing on a broad array of new archival materials from China and the United States, Brazinsky demonstrates that disrupting China's efforts to elevate its stature became an important motive behind Washington's use of both hard and soft power in the "Global South." Presenting a detailed narrative of the diplomatic, economic, and cultural competition between Beijing and Washington, Brazinsky offers an important new window for understanding the impact of the Cold War on the Third World. With China's growing involvement in Asia and Africa in the twenty-first century, this impressive new work of international history has an undeniable relevance to contemporary world affairs and policy making.
For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
Conventional wisdom holds that the President enjoys the preponderance of foreign policy power, however Congress has influenced China policymaking more than is generally recognized. The legislature has demonstrated consistent interests in the realm of China policy, and it has invariably pursued those interests through law-making. During the post-Cold War period in particular, the Sino-U.S. relationship has evolved in a radically changing international environment, marked by a power transition inherent in China's rise. The development of official relations between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War occurred in the shadow of an assertive Soviet power, when the United States and China were able to find common geopolitical ground in opposing Soviet expansion while overlooking longstanding political disagreements. The dissolution of the Soviet empire, however, put the United States and China on a new geostrategic footing. Political disagreements were no longer exempted in light of a counter-Soviet strategy, and the reduction in concern for the Soviet threat allowed policymakers in Washington to more aggressively pursue trade interests that conflicted with those of China. Given this international context, this book aims to discern how Congress reconciled competing Sino-U.S. interests in a post-Cold War era, when external threats no longer dictated an apparent hierarchy that favored China over the Soviet Union. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of US foreign policy, China Studies and international relations in general.
Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that the United States has responded inadequately to the rise of Chinese power. This Council Special Report recommends placing less strategic emphasis on the goal of integrating China into the international system and more on balancing China's rise.
While Americans are generally aware of China's ambitions as a global economic and military superpower, few understand just how deeply and assertively that country has already sought to influence American society. As the authors of this volume write, it is time for a wake-up call. In documenting the extent of Beijing's expanding influence operations inside the United States, they aim to raise awareness of China's efforts to penetrate and sway a range of American institutions: state and local governments, academic institutions, think tanks, media, and businesses. And they highlight other aspects of the propagandistic “discourse war” waged by the Chinese government and Communist Party leaders that are less expected and more alarming, such as their view of Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that owes undefined allegiance to the so-called Motherland.Featuring ideas and policy proposals from leading China specialists, China's Influence and American Interests argues that a successful future relationship requires a rebalancing toward greater transparency, reciprocity, and fairness. Throughout, the authors also strongly state the importance of avoiding casting aspersions on Chinese and on Chinese Americans, who constitute a vital portion of American society. But if the United States is to fare well in this increasingly adversarial relationship with China, Americans must have a far better sense of that country's ambitions and methods than they do now.
Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.
To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.
In the political landscape emerging from the end of the Cold War, making U.S. foreign policy has become more difficult, due in part to less clarity and consensus about threats and interests. In After the End James M. Scott brings together a group of scholars to explore the changing international situation since 1991 and to examine the characteristics and patterns of policy making that are emerging in response to a post–Cold War world. These essays examine the recent efforts of U.S. policymakers to recast the roles, interests, and purposes of the United States both at home and abroad in a political environment where policy making has become increasingly decentralized and democratized. The contributors suggest that foreign policy leadership has shifted from White House and executive branch dominance to an expanded group of actors that includes the president, Congress, the foreign policy bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, and the public. The volume includes case studies that focus on China, Russia, Bosnia, Somalia, democracy promotion, foreign aid, and NAFTA. Together, these chapters describe how policy making after 1991 compares to that of other periods and suggest how foreign policy will develop in the future. This collection provides a broad, balanced evaluation of U.S. foreign policy making in the post–Cold War setting for scholars, teachers, and students of U.S. foreign policy, political science, history, and international studies. Contributors. Ralph G. Carter, Richard Clark, A. Lane Crothers, I. M. Destler, Ole R. Holsti, Steven W. Hook, Christopher M. Jones, James M. McCormick, Jerel Rosati, Jeremy Rosner, John T. Rourke, Renee G. Scherlen, Peter J. Schraeder, James M. Scott, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Rick Travis, Stephen Twing