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This book examines the relationship between Congress and the Federal Judiciary over time. Several aspects of this separation of power dynamics are examined, including court curbing legislation, court structuring legislation, justiciability, and judicial review. Unlike prior works, this book examines this relationship from a bicameral perspective, as it is argued that there are different motivations and reasons as to why and how each chamber of Congress approaches its relationship with the federal judiciary. In addition, this book considers the role of the judiciary committee in the legislative process, as bills that were reported out of committee are examined. Several possible causes of this legislative activity and judicial responses are analyzed, including polarization, judicial review, unanimity on the court, the changing issue agenda of the Court, ideological institutional distance, and divided government. The results reveal that there are important differences with regard to how the chambers interact with the federal judiciary.
In follow-up studies, dozens of reviews, and even a book of essays evaluating his conclusions, Gerald Rosenberg’s critics—not to mention his supporters—have spent nearly two decades debating the arguments he first put forward in The Hollow Hope. With this substantially expanded second edition of his landmark work, Rosenberg himself steps back into the fray, responding to criticism and adding chapters on the same-sex marriage battle that ask anew whether courts can spur political and social reform. Finding that the answer is still a resounding no, Rosenberg reaffirms his powerful contention that it’s nearly impossible to generate significant reforms through litigation. The reason? American courts are ineffective and relatively weak—far from the uniquely powerful sources for change they’re often portrayed as. Rosenberg supports this claim by documenting the direct and secondary effects of key court decisions—particularly Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade. He reveals, for example, that Congress, the White House, and a determined civil rights movement did far more than Brown to advance desegregation, while pro-choice activists invested too much in Roe at the expense of political mobilization. Further illuminating these cases, as well as the ongoing fight for same-sex marriage rights, Rosenberg also marshals impressive evidence to overturn the common assumption that even unsuccessful litigation can advance a cause by raising its profile. Directly addressing its critics in a new conclusion, The Hollow Hope, Second Edition promises to reignite for a new generation the national debate it sparked seventeen years ago.
This book examines the relationship between Congress and the Federal Judiciary over time. Several aspects of this separation of power dynamics are examined, including court curbing legislation, court structuring legislation, justiciability, and judicial review. Unlike prior works, this book examines this relationship from a bicameral perspective, as it is argued that there are different motivations and reasons as to why and how each chamber of Congress approaches its relationship with the federal judiciary. In addition, this book considers the role of the judiciary committee in the legislative process, as bills that were reported out of committee are examined. Several possible causes of this legislative activity and judicial responses are analyzed, including polarization, judicial review, unanimity on the court, the changing issue agenda of the Court, ideological institutional distance, and divided government. The results reveal that there are important differences with regard to how the chambers interact with the federal judiciary.
In this interdisciplinary book in an interdisciplinary series, Dave Bridge crosses methodological boundaries to offer readers insights on the political “pushback” that historically follows Supreme Court rulings with which most Americans disagree. After developing a framework for identifying the Court’s rare countermajoritarian decisions, Bridge shows how those decisions that liberals backed in the 1950s through the 1970s consistently upset conservative factions in the Democratic Party, which always managed to weather the storms—that is until Roe v. Wade in 1973. In Pushback, Bridge offers compelling hypotheses about how the two major parties can use unpopular Supreme Court rulings to shift the political momentum and win elections. He then puts those hypotheses to the test, analyzing the political fallout of recent rulings on controversial issues such as Obamacare, same-sex marriage, and religious liberty. Certain to appeal to anyone interested in American political science and history, Pushback closes with a detailed examination of the unequivocally countermajoritarian Supreme Court ruling of our lifetimes, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe. For the first time in 50 years, conditions are ripe for a party to win votes by campaigning against the will of the Court. Upcoming elections will tell if the Republicans overplayed their hand, or if Democrats will play theirs as skillfully as did the GOP after Roe.
Since its first edition, Congress Reconsidered was designed to make available the best contemporary work from leading congressional scholars in a form that is both challenging and accessible to undergraduates. With their Twelfth Edition, Lawrence C. Dodd, Bruce I. Oppenheimer, and C. Lawrence Evans continue this tradition as their contributors focus on how various aspects of Congress have changed over time: C. Lawrence Evans partners with Wendy Schiller to discuss the U.S. Senate and the meaning of dysfunction; Molly E. Reynolds analyzes the politics of the budget and appropriations process in a polarized Congress; and Danielle M. Thomsen looks at the role of women and voter preferences in the 2018 elections. With a strong new focus on political polarization, this bestselling volume remains on the cutting edge with key insights into the workings of Congress.
This timely Research Handbook offers a comprehensive examination of judicial politics, both in the US and across the globe. Taking a broad view of the judiciary in all levels of the court, it examines the present state of the field and raises new questions for future scholarly exploration.
Commitment and cooperation on high courts -- How do judges decide? -- Planting the seed : choosing high court judges -- Who hears the particular appeal? -- Do judges care about others? -- Slipping through the screen: how do courts choose the cases they hear? -- The influence of the parties on judges : accuracy or affiliation? -- Norms, leadership, and consensus
This book examines, from a behavioral perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court's exercise of the power of judicial review over Congress across two hundred years of the Court's history, testing the major competing theories in political science - the attitudinal model and the strategic approach - through systematic empirical analysis. Exploring the major trends in the Court's use of this power over time, the book examines a broad range of questions concerning the countermajoritarian nature of this power, and provides an analysis of each of the individual justices' behavior along several dimensions of the power, such as the use of judicial review to protect minority rights against majority intrusion. The book concludes that the Court has shown a high level of deference to Congress, with notable historic highs and lows, and generally that the exercise of the power has been less countermajoritarian than is usually assumed. Its analyses find the strongest level of support for the attitudinal approach to judicial decision making, but also concludes that strategic concerns cannot be dismissed, especially for the more recent Courts.
Introductory textbooks on American government tell us that the Supreme Court is independent from the elected branches and that independent courts better protect rights than their more deferential counterparts. But are these facts or myths? In this groundbreaking new work, Anna Harvey reports evidence showing that the Supreme Court is in fact extraordinarily deferential to congressional preferences in its constitutional rulings. Analyzing cross-national evidence, Harvey also finds that the rights protections we enjoy in the United States appear to be largely due to the fact that we do not have an independent Supreme Court. In fact, we would likely have even greater protections for political and economic rights were we to prohibit our federal courts from exercising judicial review altogether. Harvey’s findings suggest that constitutional designers would be wise to heed Thomas Jefferson’s advice to “let mercy be the character of the law-giver, but let the judge be a mere machine.&rdquo