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Starting with a major survey of the economics of sport, this volume involves primarily a comparison of the European and American models of sport, how to restructure leagues to make them more competitive, the analysis of gate-sharing mechanisms, the economic impact of promotion and relegation and a comparison of broadcasting regimes.
This revised and updated edition of The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports elaborates on the themes of the successful first edition of this book.
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite time horizon. We show that the clubs' investment decisions and the effects of revenue sharing on competitive balance depend on the following three factors: (i) the cost function of talent investments, (ii) the clubs' market sizes, and (iii) the initial endowments of talent stock. We analyze how these factors interact in the transition to the steady state as well as in the steady state itself.
This volume deals with the competitive structure of football. It examines the relationship between sporting success and economic variables, the structure of European competitions, financial problems in football, their origins and options for reform, racial discrimination in English football, and the economic impact of the World Cup.
This paper analyzes issues associated with network effects and two-sidedness in the market for professional team sports. Teams in professional sports leagues have to compete both for players (inputs) and fans (consumers). In this setting, we construct a theoretical framework where fans are more attracted to a team with a large portion of talented players from a fixed talent pool, at the same time that players want to show their ability in front of a large number of fans. We observe that either perfect imbalance or alleviated imbalance will prevail as an equilibrium. The outcome depends upon the relative magnitude of two opposite effects, the product differentiation effect and the wage reduction effect caused by externalities from the size of talented players and fans respectively. Furthermore, we incorporate asymmetric relative quality effects into consumers' utility in order to analyze its impact on competitive balance. This is shown to either exacerbate or improve the imbalanced distribution of talented players, depending on fans' sensitivity to the relative quality between teams. The policy implications of revenue sharing on competitive balance and the level of wage offers under the condition of two-sided network effects are analyzed.