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A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
This report examines the interplay between banking competition and financial stability, taking into account the experiences in the recent global crisis and the policy response to it. The report has been prepared by members of the Directorate of ...
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
The banking sector in Europe is subject to continuous change. Banks are taking up new types of business in order to diversify their risk; new players such as insurance companies, credit card providers, and non-financial companies enter market segments which used to be the territory of commercial banks; and banks increasingly operate outside their home country or merge with cross-border partners. These developments, triggered by new information technology, disintermediation, deregulation, and the arrival of the Euro, change the landscape in the banking sector and raise a number of policy issues. What are the implications for competition among banks? How can financial stability best be maintained in this changing market? Is there a conflict between increasing competition among banks and stability?
Banking market integration in the Asia Pacific has greatly accelerated in recent years, in an environment of many other rapid advances in banking and finance. This has increased competition between domestic and foreign banks, and made the measurement of bank efficiency, competition, and liquidity creation a critical issue for both policy makers and bank managers. This book investigates important policy-related issues in Asia Pacific banking. It analyses the link between competition and stability, examining the cases of fourteen Asia Pacific countries between 2003 and 2010, and goes on to discuss whether bank shareholder value is influenced by cost and profit efficiency changes over time. The authors explore the different ways in which banks in Asia-Pacific create liquidity, and whether this is linked to capital generation. This book provides valuable insight for researchers, policy makers and bank managers with an interest in financial rationalization, restructuring and consolidation.
We analyze how bank profitability impacts financial stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first develop a theoretical model of the relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role of non-interest income and retail-oriented business models. We then conduct panel regression analysis to examine the empirical determinants of bank risks and profitability, and how the level and the source of bank profitability affect risks for 431 publicly traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to 2017. Results reveal that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and its idiosyncratic risk, and an over-reliance on non-interest income, wholesale funding and leverage is associated with higher risks. Low competition is associated with low idiosyncratic risk but a high contribution to systemic risk. Lastly, the problem loans ratio and the cost-to-income ratio are found to be key factors that influence bank profitability. The paper’s findings suggest that policy makers should strive to better understand the source of bank profitability, especially where there is an over-reliance on market-based non-interest income, leverage, and wholesale funding.
More competition among banks typically enhances the welfare of consumers. However, it may also involve a threat to financial stability, that is of vital importance for the functioning of economies. This study reveals that many forms of competition do not endanger financial stability, however. For instance, intensified competition among incumbant banks usually has little impact on financial stability. Moreover, in cases where competition does affect financial stability, the latter might best be safeguarded by sound prudential regulation or good corporate governance.
Seminar paper from the year 2021 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1,0, , language: English, abstract: This paper addresses this issue and examines how bank competition affects their stability in the German market. 317 banks are investigated over the period from 2013 to 2019 using panel data estimation models such as the fixed effects and random effects estimator. In order to get a good understanding of the problem and to design an optimal model, the theoretical basics are explained beforehand. In addition, a detailed discussion of how bank competition and stability can be measured is included in the paper. A special focus will be placed on the Lerner index, the H-statistic, and the Boone indicator (competition measures) as well as the Z-score and non-performing loans (stability measures). Previous empirical results and a description of the main characteristics of the German banking market complete the preparation for the model design and implementation, which are discussed and explained in conclusion.
This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect.