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Nations throughout the world receive more patent applications, grant more patents, and entertain more patent infringement lawsuits than ever before. To understand the contemporary patent system, it is crucial to become familiar with how courts and other actors in different countries enable patent owners to enforce their rights. This is increasingly important, not only for firms that seek to market their products worldwide and for the lawyers who provide them with counsel, but also for scholars and policymakers working to develop better policies for promoting the innovation that drives long-term economic growth. Comparative Patent Remedies provides a critical and comparative analysis of patent enforcement in the United States and other major patent systems, including the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Thomas Cotter shows how different countries respond to similar issues, and suggests how economic analysis can assist in adapting current practice to the needs of the modern world. Among the topics addressed are: how courts in various nations award monetary compensation for patent infringement, including lost profits, infringer's profits, and reasonable royalties; the conditions under which patent owners may obtain preliminary and permanent injunctions, including cross-border injunctions in the European Union; the availability of various options for potential defendants to challenge patent validity; and other matters, such as the availability of criminal enforcement and border measures to exclude infringing goods.
Over the past two decades, a small but growing number of law-and-economics scholars have begun to apply the standard tools of economic analysis to a field that long had evaded scrutiny by the law-and-economics community, namely the field of comparative law. To date, however, comparative law and economics scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the law of intellectual property - a gap that is in some ways surprising, given the professedly instrumental character of (much of) intellectual property law and policy. This essay, which will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming edited volume titled Global Perspectives on Patent Law (Ruth Okediji & Margo Bagley eds., Oxford Univ. Press), presents a modest effort at remedying this state of affairs, by presenting a proposed research agenda for a comparative law and economics analysis of one specific set of issues within the law of intellectual property: the law of patent remedies. Part I lays out a proposed protocol for the use of economic analysis to better understand, evaluate, and critique the law of patent remedies as it exists both in the United States and abroad. Part II focuses on the two principal remedies for patent infringement, permanent injunctions and monetary damages. In particular, Part II outlines the similarities and differences among various nations' approaches to injunctions and damages for patent infringement; suggests some possible explanations for, and consequences of, the perceived differences; and proposes some areas which I plan to explore in greater depth in connection with my own pending book project on the topic.
Through a collaboration among twenty legal scholars from North America, Europe and Asia, this book presents an international consensus on the use of patent remedies for complex products such as smartphones, computer networks, and the Internet of Things. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This essay, which builds on my recent work on the law and economics of comparative patent remedies, presents three proposals relating to the enforcement of domestic patent rights. The first, which may be close to being adopted in the United States, is for the courts and the International Trade Commission (ITC) to adopt a general presumption, grounded in patent law and policy, that patent owners who have committed to license their standard essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms are not entitled to permanent injunctions or exclusion orders, but rather only to a damages in the form of an ongoing royalty calculated on the basis of what a reasonable licensor and licensee would have agreed to prior to the adoption of the standard in question. Countries such as Germany that have addressed the issue of remedies for the infringement of SEPs within the context of competition law, while otherwise leaving in place an almost-automatic entitlement to permanent injunctive relief, have in my view taken the wrong tack. Second, I argue that Congress should amend Patent Act § 289, which permits design patent owners to recover the infringer's profits, so as to require that such awards reflect only the profit derived from the use of the infringed design (and not the entire product of which the design is a part). Such apportionment is the norm in other countries (and in U.S. copyright and trademark law). By contrast, the archaic U.S. design patent rule threatens substantial overdeterrence and overcompensation, as reflected in the recent jury award in Apple v. Samsung. My third suggestion -- really more of a thought experiment inspired by Judge Posner's opinion in Apple v. Motorola than a serious proposal for reform -- is to consider whether it would be possible to eliminate the unique U.S. practice of trial by jury in a wide swath of U.S. patent cases by statutorily recasting awards of reasonable royalties as a form of equitable restitution rather than as compensation.
Patents are ubiquitous in contemporary life. Practically everything we use incorporates one or more patented inventions, and recent years have witnessed epic disputes over such matters as the patenting of human genes, the control of smartphone design and technology, the marketing of patented drugs, and the conduct of "patent trolls" accused of generating revenue from nuisance litigation. But what exactly is a patent? Why do governments grant them? Can patents simultaneously encourage new invention, while limiting monopoly and other abuses? In Patent Wars, Thomas Cotter, one of America's leading patent law scholars, offers an accessible, lively, and up-to-date examination of the current state of patent law, showing how patents affect everything from the food we eat to the cars we drive to the devices that entertain and inform us. Beginning with a general overview of patent law and litigation, the book addresses such issues as the patentability of genes, medical procedures, software, and business methods; the impact of drug patents and international treaties on the price of health care; trolls; and the smartphone wars. Taking into account both the benefits and costs that patents impose on society, Cotter highlights the key issues in current debates and explores what still remains unknown about the effect of patents on innovation. An essential one-volume analysis of the topic, Patent Wars explains why patent laws exist in the first place and how we can make the system better.
In numerous jurisdictions, courts have realized that injunctive relief should not be available automatically in case of patent infringement. Particularly in the wake of the US Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange, it has become clear that granting an injunction may in some cases enable abuse by patent holders in order to obtain royalties exceeding significantly the value of patent-protected invention or that it may be manifestly against the public interest. This book offers a comparative study of the approaches towards injunctive relief taken by a number of leading jurisdictions, including the United States, the European Union (EU), selected EU Member States (Germany, France, The Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Poland), and China, India, Japan and South Korea. Responding to the growing need to provide a comprehensive and flexible framework for the application of injunctive relief, twelve patent law experts, both academics and well-known practitioners familiar with practice in their particular jurisdictions, offer analyses of such elements of patent law injunctions as the following: • access to standard-essential patents; • operations of patent assertion entities; • trolls and patent privateers; • equitable nature of injunctive relief as a source of flexibility; • abuse of right and competition law defences to injunctive relief as sources of flexibility; • analysis of EU instruments that could be used in the interpretation of Member State implementing laws; • conditions for the application of tools such as equity, competition law or general doctrines such as abuse of rights; • circumstances when injunctions should be denied to patentees even though a valid patent was infringed; • complex products cases where patents protect minor parts of the technologies; and • deficiencies and advantages of various approaches to injunctive relief. A proposal for an optimal model of granting injunctions is also included. Given that there is a growing consensus as to the circumstances when injunctions should be available to the patentees and the circumstances when injunctions should be denied, a comprehensive analysis of the various legal doctrines that justify a more flexible approach towards injunctive relief is warranted. This book will give patent law practitioners and in-house counsel the opportunity to draw from the experience of other jurisdictions where courts faced similar problems. Policymakers, patent office officials, academics and researchers in intellectual property law will also welcome this approach.
Explains how the tailoring of injunctions in patent law works in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Israel.
The strength of the patent system is waning. The Supreme Court recently opened the door for dramatic change by rejecting the long- standing presumption that a permanent injunction should issue upon the adjudication of a valid and infringed patent. Federal courts have since refashioned patent remedies to favor monetary liability for patent infringement, resulting in the restructuring of substantive rights for certain classes of patent holders. In particular, some patent holders have nearly lost their right to require consent prior to the use of their patented technology. This is a troubling development. If a patent holder is unable to enforce its right to exclude, there is little preventing an interested user from acting unilaterally. Simply, the interested user will take what it wants without first seeking permission from the patent holder. In this Article, I argue that patent law should look to the law of trespass to regain the strength of its property roots as well as a predict- able framework for the occasions that merit a switch from a property rule to a liability rule. Under the proposed framework, the vast majority of patent holders will reestablish their right to exclude infringers. However, in the event that a patent holder abuses its monopolistic leverage to unreasonably cause harm to the public, an incomplete privilege will extend to the infringer. This incomplete privilege will function the same way a defense of necessity does in trespass, allowing the infringer access to the patented technology without the ordinary threat of a penalty. Permitting the infringer a limited amount of time to design around the patented technology or come up with alternative technology will further innovation, as well as refocus courts on how the public is affected by the gain or loss of the patented technology. This recognition of the public's interest while still valuing a patent holder's right to exclude will reinvigorate the current patent system.