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This study investigates the relationship between dividends and ownership structure for a panel of 330 large quoted UK firms. Controlling for unobserved firm-specific effects, results indicate a negative relationship between dividends and ownership concentration. Ownership composition also matters, with a positive relationship observed for shareholding by insurance companies, and a negative one for individuals. These results are consistent with agency models in which dividends substitute for poor monitoring by a firm's shareholders but can also be explained by the presence of powerful principals who are able to impose their preferred payout policy upon firms.
Dividends are not only a signal about a firm's prospects under asymmetric information, but they can also act as a corporate governance device to align the management's interests with those of the shareholders. Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance is the first comprehensive volume on the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance, and examines in detail empirical studies and current theories. Reviewing the interactions between dividend policy and other corporate governance mechanisms, it compares results for the UK and the US with those for other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, and provides new empirical evidence on corporate governance in continental Europe and its impact on dividends. Focusing on one of the main representatives of this system, Germany, it highlights major differences between the dividend policies of German firms and those of UK or US firms. Conventional wisdom states that German dividends are lower than UK or US dividends, yet on a published-profits basis the exact converse is true. In addition, the authors demonstrate a link between corporate control structures and dividend payouts, report evidence that the existence of a loss is an additional determinant of dividend changes, and demonstrate that the tax status of the controlling shareholder and the firm's dividend payout are not linked. The conclusions reached in this book have important implications for the current debate on corporate governance, making it invaluable for academics, finance professionals, regulators, and legal advisors.
This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on dividend policies of listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2011. The results show that firms with higher ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership are more likely to pay dividends. However, the probability of paying dividends decreases when institutions hold more shares. It is also found that the magnitude of dividend payouts has a positive relationship with the ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership but a negative relationship with the ownership by institutions and foreign investors.
Dividends And Dividend Policy As part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, Dividends and Dividend Policy aims to be the essential guide to dividends and their impact on shareholder value. Issues concerning dividends and dividend policy have always posed challenges to both academics and professionals. While all the pieces to the dividend puzzle may not be in place yet, the information found here can help you gain a firm understanding of this dynamic discipline. Comprising twenty-eight chapters—contributed by both top academics and financial experts in the field—this well-rounded resource discusses everything from corporate dividend decisions to the role behavioral finance plays in dividend policy. Along the way, you'll gain valuable insights into the history, trends, and determinants of dividends and dividend policy, and discover the different approaches firms are taking when it comes to dividends. Whether you're a seasoned financial professional or just beginning your journey in the world of finance, having a firm understanding of the issues surrounding dividends and dividend policy is now more important than ever. With this book as your guide, you'll be prepared to make the most informed dividend-related decisions possible—even in the most challenging economic conditions. The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance is an unparalleled source of information dedicated to the most important issues in modern finance. Each book focuses on a specific topic in the field of finance and contains contributed chapters from both respected academics and experienced financial professionals.
Over the past decades extensive research has been carried out regarding the relative importance of the factors determining corporate dividend policy. The large amount of net earnings distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends trouble researchers since in free and competitive markets dividends should, affect fundamentally market values. Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that in many countries dividends are taxed more heavily than retained earnings decisions to adopt liberal dividend policies appears to be a puzzle.The dividend puzzle has been attributed to the existence of capital market imperfections such as the presence of information asymmetries between managers and shareholders.There is ample evidence that corporate dividend policy is used by management for informational reasons and is functioning effectively as a signal for the firm's future prospects.The paper examines the explanatory power of three alternative models of dividend policy, the full adjustment and partial adjustment models and the earnings trend model modified in order to incorporate factors representing ownership by institutional investors and managers.The sample considered of 55 Greek firms the shares of which were quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange which were observed for a number of years. A number of assumptions were made regarding the properties of time-series and cross-section unobservable effects and using appropriate estimating techniques.The empirical finding appear to be in accordance with the efficient monitoring hypothesis but reject the hypothesis of strategic alignments.
In this paper, using 3,994 observations of China listed firms between the years 1995 and 2001 as a sample, we find that there is a significantly positive correlation between the state ownership and cash dividends, and a significantly negative correlation between the public ownership and stock dividends. In particular, we find that the relation between dividends policy and ownership structure is nonlinear. The higher the state ownership, the higher cash dividends rates. The higher the public ownership, the higher stock dividends rates. We conclude that the managers of China listed companies are likely to cater for the preference of different shareholders.
How do managers of a firm choose between alternative finan cial policies? Can the choice of a particular financial policy affect the value of the firm? Since the early 1960s, the debate on these questions has been lively and interesting as economists have inves tigated the effect on the value of the firm of relaxing the various assumptions in the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theory. Further more, even if we stick to the MM-assumptions (that is, we assume perfect and complete capital markets, no taxes and symmetric information), and we therefore know that only optimally chosen investments determine firm's value, another interesting question arises: How does the structure of ownership affect investment de cisions (and, in turn, values)? This research monograph attempts to analyze some of the issues involved in this debate. It belongs to the area of mathematical economics and is intended to appeal to mathematical economists as well as economists and mathemati cians. It is meant to deal with economically relevant problems in a mathematically adequate way. To decide whether or not it succeeds in this task, it is up to the reader. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Margaret Bray for her supervi sion of my PhD thesis in Economics at the London School of Eco nomics from which this book resulted. She helped me as friend and adviser through many struggles in the last three years and invested a great amount of work in this thesis.
This paper examines the possible association between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm's dividend payout policy. It is also one of the very first examples, which tries to detect any potential association in ownership structure, corporate governance and well-established dividend payout models in context of an emerging market (India). The present study examines the payout behavior of dividends and the association of ownership structure for Indian corporate firms over the period 1994-2000 and attempts to explain the observed behavior with the help of well established dividend models of Linter (1956), Waud (1966), and Fama and Babiak (1968). The results consistently support the potential association between ownership structure and dividend payout policy. Though the relationship differs across different group of owners and at different level of shareholding.Furthermore, we suggest a more generalized model to explain the dividend payout intensity, incorporating firm's financial structure and investments opportunities along with dividends and earnings trend and ownership structure, after controlling for firm's unobserved heterogeneity. We also find evidence of dividends dependence on past dividends after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that a positive association exists between dividends and earnings trend. Debt equity is found to be negative and associated, whereas past investment opportunities are positive and associated with dividends in some cases. Corporate and directors ownership is positive and related in level, and corporate ownership is negative and related in square. Institutional ownership has inverse effects on dividends in comparison to corporate ownership in levels, as well as in its squares. We find no evidence in favor of association between foreign ownership and divided payout growth.
Cash dividend is among the most important sources of cash flow for the shareholders through which they gauge firm's performance. Corporate managers also use dividends to signal company's financial strength to attract potential investors. Empirical findings on determinants of dividend policy provide mixed and inconclusive results which has made the whole issue a “puzzle” as described by Black (1976), whose pieces do not fit together. Allen et. al. (2000) argued the dividend problem as one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate finance. The present study investigates the relationship between managers' ownership and dividend policy in emerging economies of South Asia. The data of listed non-financial companies is collected from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and analyzed with least square and Tobit regression models during the period 2006-2010. It is found that managers' ownership is significantly and positively related with dividend payout in Bangladesh and India but negatively related in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.