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This is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Originally published in 1985 and now re-issued with a new preface, this study assesses the two major moral theories of ethical consequentialism and common-sense morality by means of mutual comparison and an attempt to elicit the implications and tendencies of each theory individually. The author shows that criticisms and defences of common-sense morality and of consequentialism give inadequate characterizations of the dispute between them and thus at best provide incomplete rationales for either of these influential moral views. Both theories face inherent difficulties, some familiar but others mentioned for the first time in this work. The argument proceeds by reference to historical figures like Bentham, Ross and Sidgwick and to contemporary thinkers such as Williams, Nagel, Hare and Sen.
Consequentialism is a focal point of moral philosophy. Recently, new wave consequentialists have presented theories which proved extremely flexible and powerful in meeting influential objections. The volume explores new directions within this project, raises fundamental problems for it, and gives a balanced assessment of its scope in commonsense moral practice.
This volume presents papers discussing arguments on both sides of the consequentialist debate. The distinguished contributors include John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, among others.
Begins by explaining and arguing for certain criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then argues that these criteria lead to a rule-consequentialist moral theory.
The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible basis for this view, that Kant's own arguments actually entail a consequentialist conclusion. But this new form of consequentialism which follows from Kant's theories has a distinctly Kantian tone. The capacity of rational action is prior to the value of happiness; thus providing justification for the view that rational nature is more important than mere pleasures and pains.
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.
Inclusive Ethics brings together two ideas which are part of our everyday morality, namely that we have a moral reason to benefit or do good to other beings, and that justice requires these benefits to be distributed equally. Ingmar Persson explores the difficulties of accepting a morality which combines both of these principles.
Paul Hurley sets out a radical challenge to consequentialism, the theory which might seem to be the default option in contemporary moral philosophy. There is an unresolved tension within the theory: if consequentialists are right about the content of morality, then morality cannot have the rational authority that even they take it to have.