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The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
Combined Arms Warfare in Ancient Greece examines the timelines of military developments that led from the hoplite-based armies of the ancient Greeks to the hugely successful and multi-faceted armies of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and his Successors. It concentrates on the introduction and development of individual units and their tactical coordination and use in battle in what is termed "combined arms": the effective integration of different unit types into one cohesive battle plan and army allowing each unit to focus on its strengths without having to worry about its weaknesses. This volume traces the development, and argues for the vital importance, of the use of combined arms in Greek warfare from the Archaic period onwards, especially concerning the Macedonian hegemony, through to its developmental completion in the form of fully "integrated warfare" at the battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE. It argues crucially that warfare should never be viewed in isolation in individual states, regions, conflicts or periods but taken as a collective whole tracing the mutual influence of other cultures and the successful innovations that always result. Wrightson analyses Greek and Macedonian warfare through the lens of modern military theoretical terminology, making this study accessible to those with a general interest in military history as well as those studying this specific period.
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
First published over thirty years ago, War in European History is a brilliantly written survey of the changing ways that war has been waged in Europe, from the Norse invasions to the present day. Far more than a simple military history, the book serves as a succinct and enlightening overview of the development of European society as a whole over the last millennium. From the Norsemen and the world of the medieval knights, through to the industrialized mass warfare of the twentieth century, Michael Howard illuminates the way in which warfare has shaped the history of the Continent, its effect on social and political institutions, and the ways in which technological and social change have in turn shaped the way in which wars are fought. This new edition includes a fully updated further reading and a new final chapter bringing the story into the twenty-first century, including the invasion of Iraq and the so-called 'War against Terror'.
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s.
When Germany launched its blitzkrieg invasion of France in 1940, it forever changed the way the world waged war. Although the Wehrmacht ultimately succumbed to superior Allied firepower in a two-front war, its stunning operational achievement left a lasting impression on military commanders throughout the world, even if their own operations were rarely executed as effectively. Robert Citino analyzes military campaigns from the second half of the twentieth century to further demonstrate the difficulty of achieving decisive results at the operational level. Offering detailed operational analyses of actual campaigns, Citino describes how UN forces in Korea enjoyed technological and air superiority but found the enemy unbeatable; provides analyses of Israeli operational victories in successive wars until the Arab states finally grasped the realities of operational-level warfare in 1973; and tells how the Vietnam debacle continued to shape U.S. doctrine in surprising ways. Looking beyond major-power conflicts, he also reveals the lessons of India's blitzkrieg-like drive into Pakistan in 1971 and of the senseless bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War. Citino especially considers the evolution of U.S. doctrine and assesses the success of Desert Storm in dismantling an entrenched defending force with virtually no friendly casualties. He also provides one of the first scholarly analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom, showing that its plan was curiously divorced from the realities of military history, grounded instead on nebulous theories about expected enemy behavior. Throughout Citino points to the importance of mobility—especially mobilized armor—in modern operational warfare and assesses the respective roles of firepower, training, doctrine, and command and control mechanisms. Brimming with new insights, Citino's study shows why technical superiority is no guarantee of victory and why a thorough grounding in the history of past campaigns is essential to anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm provides that grounding as it addresses the future of operational-level warfare in the post-9/11 era.