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The intent of the Combined Arms Sufficiency Study as originally conducted, was to obtain a snapshot of the status of Combined Arms instruction at the time and provide commandants comparative data with which they could make an educated estimate of the effectiveness of their combined arms instruction. The original intent is still applicable. The purpose of the current update is to build on the original study, refine the Combined Arms Sufficiency data, and through a systematic process, identify courses of action to continue to enhance Combined Arms instruction in company level professional development courses. This update is intended to develop Combined Arms Sufficiency data to a credible confidence level so that decisions can be made on tradeoffs and accommodations, with a clear understanding of what the costs are in terms of specialty and Combined Arms understanding. The objectives of the present Combined Arms Sufficiency update are to: identify all Combined Arms subjects and develop an updated list; identify Combined Arms subjects which should be taught in Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and to what level of sufficiency; enhance Combined Arms instruction by better defining personnel and other resource requirements; and facilitate the infusion of Combined Arms subjects into the OJTA process.
Combined Arms training is at the core of an officer's education. The Combined Arms Sufficiency Study was initiated to determine in a systematic fashion which subjects should be identified as combined arms subjects and what constitutes a sufficient level of proficiency in these combined arms subjects for lieutenants and captains in the U.S. Army. For the purposes of this study combined arms sufficiency was defined as the knowledge required by the combat, combat support, and combat service support officer that enables him to work effectively with his fellow officers on the modern battlefield. The study was conducted between May and August 1981 at the direction of the Commander, Combined Arms Center. Participants are listed-at Annex A. Methodology is described at Annex F. The study was designed to systematically assess the status of combined arms training at TRADOC schools by obtaining the collective judgment of the branch school commandants on what subjects should be on a combined arms subject list and what constitutes a sufficient level of instruction for each subject. This approach did not allow the use of rigorous statistical techniques for data analysis; nevertheless, the use of a few simple statistical methods and close inspection of the results allowed us to make several useful, if somewhat subjective, observations about the current state of combined arms training. The data collected are consolidated at Annex B, with the exception of those concerning pre-commissioning. The responses on pre-commissioning are discussed in Annex H.
This thesis addresses the problem of whether cost-benefit analysis would assist the manager in decisionmaking regarding combat developments studies within the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA) and develops a basis for improved decisionmaking techniques. The case study determined that CACDA is a professional and competent organization capable of developing recommendations, alternatives, or solutions to many critical problems facing the Army; however, this capability has been degraded because CACDA has been tasked to undertake more combat developments studies than it has the capability to conduct. As a result of this excessive work load, significant delays in the planned completion of studies were experienced, and the desired validation of other studies may not have been possible. This situation resulted because the present system and management tools do not provide sufficient criteria for identifying the more critical studies and reducing the scope or eliminating the others. The study concludes that: (1) CACDA managers need an analytical tool to assist them in decisionmaking and developing recommendations to higher headquarters regarding whether a study should be conducted as proposed, (2) managers consider costs in decisionmaking although costs are not as significant as other considerations, (3) managers can assign a relative value to a study proposal, (4) a form of cost-benefit analysis would provide a valuable analytical tool to assist the managers in developing recommendations pertaining to a study proposal. (Author).
Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?
The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
This study presents a foundation for the comparative analysis of the various combined arms teaming in a simulated environment. The study consists of three stages. First, a discrete-event combat-simulation model of two opposing generic combined arms teams is developed. This model is used to study the relationships between six key attributes of combined arms teams: communication; detection; lethality; mobility; protection; and sustainment. Second, a genetic algorithm is embedded within the combat-simulator to evolve strategies for combined arms teams against a static opposing force. Finally, a two-population genetic algorithm is used to coevolve two opposing forces against each other. Games theory is used to analyse the results and to provide advice on the impact of adding, removing and replacing assets or capabilities within the teams. We conclude that diversity and specialisation within combined arms teams is essential to the Land force. Furthermore, no single combined arms team is sufficient to ensure a tactical victory on the battlefield against all potential opponents. A range of different options for constructing combined arms teams is required.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
The thirty-six chapters reflect changes in the military art. Each chapter deals with one case drawn from recent military history that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional soldier may have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed.