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This book is the second of two volumes devoted to the work of Theo Kuipers, a leading Dutch philosopher of science. Philosophers and scientists from all over the world, thirty seven in all, comment on Kuipers’ philosophy, and each of their commentaries is followed by a reply from Kuipers. The present volume is devoted to Kuipers’ neo-classical philosophy of science, as laid down in his Structures in Science (Kluwer, 2001). Kuipers defends a dialectical interaction between science and philosophy in that he views philosophy of science as a meta-science which formulates cognitive structures that provide heuristic patterns for actual scientific research, including design research. In addition, Kuipers pays considerable attention to the computational approaches to philosophy of science as well as to the ethics of doing research. Thomas Nickles, David Atkinson, Jean-Paul van Bendegem, Maarten Franssen, Anne Ruth Mackor, Arno Wouters, Erik Weber & Helena de Preester, Eric Scerri, Adam Grobler & Andrzej Wisniewski, Alexander van den Bosch, Gerard Vreeswijk, Jaap Kamps, Paul Thagard, Emma Ruttkamp, Robert Causey, Henk Zandvoort comment on these ideas of Kuipers, and many present their own account. The present book also contains a synopsis of Structures in Science. It can be read independently of the first volume of Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, which is devoted to Kuipers’ From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000).
Thagard examines scientific development from the interdisciplinary perspective of cognitive science. Cognitive science combines insights from: philosophers analyze historical cases, psychologists carry out behavioral experiments, neuroscientists perform brain scans, and computer modelers write programs that simulate thought processes.
Although there is an abundance of highly specialized monographs, learned collections and general introductions to the philosophy of science, only a few 25 years. synthetic monographs and advanced textbooks have appeared in the last The philosophy of science seems to have lost its self-confidence. The main reason for such a loss is that the traditional analytical, logical-empiricist approaches to the philosophy of science had to make a number of concessions, especially in response to the work of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. With Structures in Science I intend to present both a synthetic mono graph and an advanced textbook that accommodates and integrates the insight of these philosophers, in what I like to call a neo-classical approach. The resulting monograph elaborates several important topics from one or more perspectives, by distinguishing various kinds of research programs, and various ways of explaining and reducing laws and concepts, and by summarizing an integrated explication (presented in From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, ICR) of the notions of confirmation, empirical progress and truth approximation.
This volume attempts to provide a new articulation of issues surrounding scientific realism, scientific rationality, the epistemology of non-classical physics, the type of revolutionary changes in the development of science, the naturalization of epistemology within frameworks of cognitive science and structural linguistics, models of the information technology revolution, and reconstructions of early modern logical systems.
Education is a hot topic. From the stage of presidential debates to tonight's dinner table, it is an issue that most Americans are deeply concerned about. While there are many strategies for improving the educational process, we need a way to find out what works and what doesn't work as well. Educational assessment seeks to determine just how well students are learning and is an integral part of our quest for improved education. The nation is pinning greater expectations on educational assessment than ever before. We look to these assessment tools when documenting whether students and institutions are truly meeting education goals. But we must stop and ask a crucial question: What kind of assessment is most effective? At a time when traditional testing is subject to increasing criticism, research suggests that new, exciting approaches to assessment may be on the horizon. Advances in the sciences of how people learn and how to measure such learning offer the hope of developing new kinds of assessments-assessments that help students succeed in school by making as clear as possible the nature of their accomplishments and the progress of their learning. Knowing What Students Know essentially explains how expanding knowledge in the scientific fields of human learning and educational measurement can form the foundations of an improved approach to assessment. These advances suggest ways that the targets of assessment-what students know and how well they know it-as well as the methods used to make inferences about student learning can be made more valid and instructionally useful. Principles for designing and using these new kinds of assessments are presented, and examples are used to illustrate the principles. Implications for policy, practice, and research are also explored. With the promise of a productive research-based approach to assessment of student learning, Knowing What Students Know will be important to education administrators, assessment designers, teachers and teacher educators, and education advocates.
An account that analyzes the dynamic reasoning processes implicated in a fundamental problem of creativity in science: how does genuine novelty emerge from existing representations? How do novel scientific concepts arise? In Creating Scientific Concepts, Nancy Nersessian seeks to answer this central but virtually unasked question in the problem of conceptual change. She argues that the popular image of novel concepts and profound insight bursting forth in a blinding flash of inspiration is mistaken. Instead, novel concepts are shown to arise out of the interplay of three factors: an attempt to solve specific problems; the use of conceptual, analytical, and material resources provided by the cognitive-social-cultural context of the problem; and dynamic processes of reasoning that extend ordinary cognition. Focusing on the third factor, Nersessian draws on cognitive science research and historical accounts of scientific practices to show how scientific and ordinary cognition lie on a continuum, and how problem-solving practices in one illuminate practices in the other. Her investigations of scientific practices show conceptual change as deriving from the use of analogies, imagistic representations, and thought experiments, integrated with experimental investigations and mathematical analyses. She presents a view of constructed models as hybrid objects, serving as intermediaries between targets and analogical sources in bootstrapping processes. Extending these results, she argues that these complex cognitive operations and structures are not mere aids to discovery, but that together they constitute a powerful form of reasoning—model-based reasoning—that generates novelty. This new approach to mental modeling and analogy, together with Nersessian's cognitive-historical approach, make Creating Scientific Concepts equally valuable to cognitive science and philosophy of science.
The year 2012 marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Up until recently, the book’s philosophical reception has been shaped, for the most part, by the debates and the climate in philosophy of science in the 1960s and 1970s; this new collection of essays takes a renewed look at this work. This volume concentrates on particular issues addressed or raised in light of recent scholarship and without the pressure of the immediate concerns scholars had at the time of the Structure’s publication. There has been extensive research on all of the major issues concerning the development of science which are discussed in Structure, work in which the scholars contributing to this volume have all been actively involved. In recent years they have pursued novel research on a number of topics relevant to Structure’s concerns, such as the nature and function of concepts, the complexity of logical positivism and its legacy, the relation of history to philosophy of science, the character of scientific progress and rationality, and scientific realism, all of which are brought together and given new light in this text. In this way, our book makes new connections and undertakes new approaches in an effort to understand the Structure’s significance in the canon of philosophy of science.
What are scientific inquiry practices like today? How should schools approach inquiry in science education? Teaching Science Inquiry presents the scholarly papers and practical conversations that emerged from the exchanges at a two-day conference of distinctive North American ‘science studies’ and ‘learning science’scholars.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)—the idea of knowledge as property—and its role in human society is being increasingly discussed across nations and borders. Involving legal, political, cultural, and ethical issues, debates on IPRs continue to be complex and wide-ranging. This book analyses the basic assumptions and premises of the notion of intellectual property as a right. It goes on to show how IPRs prevent those who do not own it from accessing and exercising their own diverse rights. Thus, in a way, IPRs violate the very idea of individual autonomy on which it bases its claims. Highlighting the inherent propensity of IPRs to conflict with'other rights of other peoples' this volume examines three important rights: health rights, indigenous peoples' knowledge rights, and farmers' rights. Do IPRs derive any legitimacy from its ability to support or conjoin with these rights? Do IPRs fit within a framework of rights, which unites welfare, well being, and equal access to advantage and autonomy? These are questions which arise out of the varied contestations that have emerged in the face of IPRs and which have been probed in this book. The analyses also moves beyond to explore some of the broader challenges that liberal theory of rights faces from collective claims to knowledge rights and practices.