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This manual addresses problem bank resolution from the time a bank is identified as being in financial trouble through intervention to liquidation. It comes with an interactive CD-Rom from which users can download and tailor documents to use in their own closing processes. The book draws on the author’s lengthy career as a bank liquidator for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Resolution Trust Corporation and his worldwide consulting experience with the IMF and other international organizations.
A leading finance expert explains how and why big banks fail—and what can be done to prevent it Dealer banks—that is, large banks that deal in securities and derivatives, such as J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs—are of a size and complexity that sharply distinguish them from typical commercial banks. When they fail, as we saw in the global financial crisis, they pose significant risks to our financial system and the world economy. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It examines how these banks collapse and how we can prevent the need to bail them out. In sharp, clinical detail, Darrell Duffie walks readers step-by-step through the mechanics of large-bank failures. He identifies where the cracks first appear when a dealer bank is weakened by severe trading losses, and demonstrates how the bank's relationships with its customers and business partners abruptly change when its solvency is threatened. As others seek to reduce their exposure to the dealer bank, the bank is forced to signal its strength by using up its slim stock of remaining liquid capital. Duffie shows how the key mechanisms in a dealer bank's collapse—such as Lehman Brothers' failure in 2008—derive from special institutional frameworks and regulations that influence the flight of short-term secured creditors, hedge-fund clients, derivatives counterparties, and most devastatingly, the loss of clearing and settlement services. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It reveals why today's regulatory and institutional frameworks for mitigating large-bank failures don't address the special risks to our financial system that are posed by dealer banks, and outlines the improvements in regulations and market institutions that are needed to address these systemic risks.
We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.
Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.
Closures have been used to resolve problem banks in many countries in a wide range of economic circumstances, yet banking supervisors frequently defer intervention and closure. Avoiding the costs of disruption is the principal argument in favor of extraordinary measures, such as the use of public funds for recapitalization or forbearance, as alternatives to closing insolvent banks. Well-planned and implemented closure options can preserve essential functions performed by failing banks, mitigating disruption. Extraordinary measures to avoid closure should generally be avoided, but may be used in a systemic crisis to preserve some portion of a widely insolvent banking sector.
There is a fundamental reason, the authors of this book contend, why national financial systems falter and collapse: the failure of central banks and other supervisory authorities to deal promptly and decisively with insolvent banks. In Preventing Financial Chaos, Ramsey and Head, both well-known to the international banking community for their restructuring services in developing and transitional economies, take a no-nonsense attitude and show exactly how to usher a problem bank out of the financial system in any country. Their clearly defined rules and procedures build disciplined, competent action that activates political will and successfully curtails systemic chaos. With this nuts-and-bolts guide, policymakers, legislators, central bank officials, and representatives of international financial institutions will be able to achieve the following: recognize, monitor and resolve bank failures; conduct timely and orderly closing of problem banks; and develop national legislation to prevent the spread of bank insolvency. The authors' firmly-held convictions about which choices should be made and why is sure to launch an important debate among lawyers, bankers and academics--a debate which will inevitably focus much-needed attention on one of the most urgent problems in today's interdependent world economic order.
Deals with the result of a study conducted by the FDIC on banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. Examines the evolution of the processes used by FDIC and RTC to resolve banking problems, protect depositors and dispose of the assets of the failed institutions.