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In the normal course of things it is modern commentators that critique their predecessors. In the following pages I will turn this idea on its head by critically reviewing the strategic thought of Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) using the strategist thought of Carl von Clausewitz (1710-1831) as the basis for my critique . Specifically, I propose to compare their thought using four major criteria as a framework. These criteria include what is war; why employ military power; when, or under what conditions should military power by employed; and how should military power be used. To put this effort in proper perspective it is necessary first to say a few words about the lives and times of these two military thinkers. Clausewitz lived his life over a hundred years before the advent of nuclear weapons. he was a professional military officer for most of his life. He knew war at first hand. Brodie, by contrast, was an academic. He never wore a uniform nor did he know from direct personnel experience about the horrors of war. He was, however, associated throughout his life with military institutions. He was, in fact, a member of the faculty that opened the National War College in 1946.
Steiner analyzes how and why Brodie's understanding of weapons of unparalleled explosive force led him to posit the need for revolutionary strategic thinking in broadminded analytic method and in the focus upon cities as nuclear targets. He shows the tremendous effect Brodie's work had on the intellectual climate in which policy is determined, particularly in his frequent combatting of conventional wisdom.
"With a forward by Peter R. Lavoy"--Cover.
Reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, and considers new problems and new approaches. The study was undertaken by the Rand Corporation as a part of its research program for the United States Air Force.
Think about strategy and sharpen judgment in an unpredictable environment Carl von Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as one of the most important of the major strategic theorists; he's been read by Eisenhower, Kissinger, Patton, Chairman Mao, and numerous other leaders. In Clausewitz on Strategy, the Boston Consulting Group's Strategy Institute has excerpted those passages most relevant to business strategy from Clausewitz's classic text On War, the most general, applicable, and enduring work of strategy in the modern West and a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This book offers Clausewitz's framework for self-education--a way to train the reader's thinking. Clausewitz speaks the mind of the executive, revealing logic that those interested in strategic thinking and practice will find invaluable. He presents unique ideas, such as the idea that friction--unexpected interference--is an intrinsic part of strategy. The Boston Consulting Group is one of the world's leading management consulting firms whose clients include many of the world's industry leaders. Tiha von Ghyczy (Charlottesville, VA) has been a faculty member and Director of Business Projects at the Darden School of Business since 1996. While with The Boston Consulting Group, he assumed responsibility for the practice groups in manufacturing/time-based competition and high technology. He has published numerous articles and books on vision and strategy. Bolko von Oetinger (Munich, Germany) is a Senior Vice President of BCG. Christopher Bassford (Washington, DC) is presently a Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC, and the author of several books, including Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.
Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is the first-ever volume devoted to the influence and interpretation of Clausewitz' On War to be published in the English language. Among all the better-known works on military theory in Western civilization, it is Carl von Clausewitz' magnum opus that has been able to withstand every kind of political, social, economic, and technological change since it first appeared in 1832 and will always remain of more than purely historical interest. This collection of essays, first presented at an international conference on Clausewitz at the US Army War College in April 1985, spans every possible aspect of Clausewitz' influence. It is grouped into three parts. The first addresses the issue of whether an early nineteenth-century book on war is still pertinent today in an era when war - more than any other human activity - has been revolutionized by modern technology. In the second part, analyses are made of selected theoretical concepts and other specific subjects discussed by Clausewitz, ranging from chance and uncertainty, space and time, and intelligence in war to guerrilla warfare. The final part takes a critical look at Clausewitz' influence on the development of strategic doctrines in several European countries, as well as the degree to which his theories were not only understood but misunderstood by various military thinkers. In many instances, Clausewitz' readers interpreted his ideas out of context and selectively employed his theories to match their own preconceived notions. Like many other works on political theory and philosophy, On War is not always easy to read and understand. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy provides an excellent introduction to the complex world of Clauswitzian thought, offering a better overall understanding of Clausewitz' key concepts, his system of thinking, and his influence on the study of modern war. It is indispensable reading for all students, military historians, strategic analysts and thinkers.
This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq. Carl von Clausewitz's thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, American policy makers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilizing military force to fulfil a clear political objective. The US armed forces bridged the operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfil a political objective. With the end of the Cold War, and an increasing predilection for technological solutions, American policy makers and the military moved away from Clausewitz. It was only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his intrinsic value. However, while many aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the conflict in Iraq can be accommodated within the Clausewitzian paradigm, the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam. Clausewitz and America will be of great interest to students of strategy, military history, international security and US politics.
This book deals with the very foundations of contemporary strategic studies, in that it examines the ideas of nine leading strategic thinkers over the past four decades within the context of current debates on nuclear strategy.
This essay presents the presumed thoughts and ruminations of Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian military strategist, on an article by Bernard Brodie entitled "On Nuclear Weapons: Utility in Nonuse." Clausewitz comments on each of four points made by Brodie in his article. The first point is that nuclear weapons deter war between the great powers simply because they exist. Clausewitz agrees with Brodie, but says his rationale is flawed. The key to why the statement is true is that the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, subscribe to two points that Clausewitz makes in his famous book, "On War": (1) the best strategy is always to be very strong, and (2) the decisive importance of relative strength increases the closer one approaches a state of balance in all factors. The second of Brodie's points is that if war between the great powers is to occur, nuclear weapons make it far more likely that the war will be a limited war and not, as Clausewitz has called it, an absolute war. Clausewitz says his thoughts are aligned with Brodie's on this point, and that recent events in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan would lead one to believe that the intellect of those in charge at the time resulted in a decision to avoid direct confrontation with the other great power, or "war is the realm of uncertainty dominated by the power of the intellect." Brodie's third point is that military men are incapable of making objective decisions regarding the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy because their training has made them insensitive to the issues involved. Clausewitz says he does not claim that major military developments should be a matter for purely military opinion, rather that policy makers and military officials should maintain counsel with each other. Brodie's fourth point is that the use of nuclear weapons is a political issue, not a military issue. Clausewitz concurs, saying that "without a political end, war becomes pointless."