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A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
What is algorithmic collusion? This evaluative book provides an insight into tackling this important question for competition law, with contrasting critical perspectives, including theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal – the latter frequently from a comparative perspective. Bringing together scholarly discussion on algorithmic collusion, the book questions whether competition law is adeptly equipped to deal with its various facets.
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
This incisive Research Handbook identifies and assesses the emerging trends in competition enforcement, investigating how such changes impact the enforcement approach of competition authorities and the behaviour of companies in an ever-evolving business and regulatory environment.
This book provides a comparative overview of the rules of EU, US, and Japanese law on com-petition. After an overview of their history and the underlying economic issues, it compares perspectives on cartels and other agreements restraining competition (ancillary agreements, R&D/specialization agreements, distribution agreements); single-firm conduct (abuse of dom-inant market power/monopolization); general procedural law and merger control, and state measures such as regulation and subsidies. In each case, the presentation of the legal system is supplemented by examples from the case law. With a focus on the protection of competition in digital markets, new regulatory approaches (e.g., the EU Digital Markets Act and comparable US regulatory initiatives) are evaluated and current legal developments in other jurisdictions are addressed.
Information Exchange Between Competitors in EU Competition Law Martin Gassler Competing firms often exchange information in order to make more informed market decisions which can help to overcome market inefficiencies. However, an abundance of legal and economic research as well as case law has shown that information exchange may also enable firms to engage in collusion more readily and sustain it longer. This book is the first to concentrate on this challenging topic of EU competition law in such depth. It focuses on ‘pure’ information exchanges – exchanges that are not ancillary to a wider pro-competitive or anticompetitive conduct – and thoroughly explains the characteristics of such information exchanges, their pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects and discusses all the relevant legal aspects for their assessment. The author provides a robust analytical framework for assessing information exchanges under Article 101 TFEU, focusing on the risk of collusive outcomes and what types of information exchange are particularly harmful. With detailed attention to the leading cases on information exchange, the analysis examines the most important aspects for assessing information exchange between competitors, in particular: the concept of a concerted practice; the concepts of a restriction by object and effect, including their similarities and differences; the importance of evidentiary issues; the issue of signalling via advance public announcements; factors that facilitate collusion; efficiencies of information exchange, including market transparency; the legal challenges of tackling mere parallel conduct; facilitative practices in the Commission Guidelines, including the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines; and safe harbours for certain types of information exchange. The book offers clear guidance on how to identify and thus distinguish information exchange that restricts competition by its object and information exchange that restricts competition (only) by its effects. It offers practical solutions to some of the perceived issues when assessing information exchanges. With its wealth of analysis not available from other sources, this concise yet comprehensive review of a much-debated topic in competition law offers clear guidance for practitioners in assessing the issues surrounding information exchange. The book will also be welcomed by competition law academics, competition lawyers and competition authority officials throughout Europe.