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This report finds that China's strategic-deterrence concepts are evolving in response to a changing assessment of its external security environment and a growing emphasis on protecting its emerging interests in space and cyberspace.
Drawing on a wide range of sources, including Chinese-language publications, this report finds that China's strategic-deterrence concepts are evolving in response to a changing assessment of its external security environment and a growing emphasis on protecting its emerging interests in space and cyberspace. At the same time, China is rapidly closing what was once a substantial gap between the People's Liberation Army's strategic weapons capabilities and its strategic-deterrence concepts. Chinese military publications indicate that China has a broad concept of strategic deterrence, one in which a multidimensional set of military and nonmilitary capabilities combine to constitute the "integrated strategic deterrence" posture required to protect Chinese interests. For China, powerful military capabilities of several types - including nuclear capabilities, conventional capabilities, space capabilities, and cyberwarfare forces - are all essential components of a credible strategic deterrent. Chinese military publications indicate that nonmilitary aspects of national power - most notably diplomatic, economic, and scientific and technological strength - also contribute to strategic deterrence alongside military capabilities.
China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China’s strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.
"For over two decades, the People's Republic of China has been engaged in a grand project to transform its military into a modernized fighting force capable of defeating the world's most powerful militaries through asymmetric means. However, despite the considerable attention that has been devoted to cataloguing Chinese advances in weapons and hardware, much less is known about China's strategic thinking" --
This study describes China's national and security strategies and its approach to war and escalation control; summarizes its military capabilities developments; and reviews its concepts for deterrence in strategic (nuclear, space, and cyber) and conventional domains. The study concludes with implications for U.S. policymakers and warfighters.
Kinas nukleare strategi analyseres på baggrund af kinesiske strategiske traditioner. Hensigten er at give en forståelse af Kinas særlige nukleare forestillinger som verdens trediestørste nuklearmagt.
?Provides cutting-edge empirical research on a difficult strategic question, while also situating the issue within a nuanced discussion of recent Chinese history and intellectual traditions. China?s Nuclear Future contributes much to a new understanding of China?s nuclear policy past, present, and future.? ?Andrew Oros, Washington CollegeIn the face of significant changes in the contemporary geopolitical environment, China?s longstanding policy of maintaining a minimal nuclear stockpile may also be shifting. China?s Nuclear Future provides a comprehensive overview of both the evolution of China?s nuclear policy and the strategic implications of current developments.The authors examine a full range of issues, from China?s rising economic fortunes to the impact of the U.S.-led war on terror. Their assessment of the drivers and constraints that are transforming China?s nuclear posture is key to understanding not only the country?s possible nuclear futures, but also the broader issue of its role in world politics.Paul J. Bolt is professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Albert S. Willner, Colonel, U.S. Army, taught in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy in 2000-2004; at present, he is pending assignment as the Chief of the Liaison Affairs Section at the American Institute in Taiwan. Contents: China?s Nuclear Future in a Changing Environment?the Editors. Culture, Strategy, and Security?C.A. Cleary. Evolving Nuclear Doctrine?E.S. Medeiros. Strategic Force Modernization?P.C. Saunders and J. Yuan. Beijing?s Perceptions of U.S. Intentions?R.N. Montaperto. The Potential Flashpoint: Taiwan?T. Wai. Alternative Futures?B. Roberts.
"China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear weapons capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization, and both international and domestic factors are likely to drive faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are concerned by strategic developments in the United States, especially the deployment of missile defenses. Within the region, Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security dynamics that now include several nuclear states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of China's neighbors, especially India, are a growing concern for Beijing. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With few, if any, firewalls between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, new technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the latter, a trend that will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments (although not wholesale changes) to policy"--Publisher's description.
Much recent writing about international politics understandably highlights the many changes that have followed from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This book, by contrast, analyzes an important continuity that, the author argues, will characterize international strategic affairs well into the new century: nuclear deterrence will remain at the core of the security policies of the world's great powers and will continue to be an attractive option for many less powerful states worried about adversaries whose capabilities they cannot match. The central role of nuclear deterrence persists despite the advent of a new international system in which serious military threats are no longer obvious, the use of force is judged irrelevant to resolving most international disputes, and states' interests are increasingly defined in economic rather than military terms. Indeed, the author suggests why these changes may increase the appeal of nuclear deterrence in the coming decades. Beginning with a reconsideration of nuclear deterrence theory, the book takes issue with the usual emphasis on the need for invulnerable retaliatory forces and threats that leaders can rationally choose to carry out. The author explains why states, including badly outgunned states, can rely on nuclear deterrent strategies despite the difficulty they may face in deploying invulnerable forces and despite the implausibility of rationally carrying out their threats of retaliation. In the subsequent empirical analysis that examines the security policies of China, Britain, and France and taps recently declassified documents, the author suggests that the misleading standard view of what is oftentermed rational deterrence theory may well reflect the experience, or at least aspirations, of the Cold War superpowers more than the logic of deterrence itself. Case studies assessing the nuclear deterrent policies of China, B