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Featuring essays by prominent experts in international security, this volume surveys the status and prospects for progress in every major area of arms control under active negotiation: strategic and conventional force reductions, a chemical weapons ban, and the vitality of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime. Also included is a fascinating account of the implementation of the INF Treaty through on-site inspections to verify missile destruction by the director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, Brigadier General Roland Lajoie. Roald Sagdeev, a prominent Soviet scientist and expert on security matters, offers his views of the Soviet Union's restructuring of its approach to national and international security. Also featured are essays by Wolfgang Panofsky, R. James Woolsey, Paul Doty, Matthew Meselson, Spurgeon Keeny, and Marvin Goldberger.
This book tells the tale of how international inspectors beat incredible odds to unveil Iraq's covert bioweapons program, draws lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, places the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and makes recommendations to reduce those perils.
Organized by SIPRI, the Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda considered how arms control contributes to a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. This book documents the proceedings, including comprehensive discussions of new elements of the post-Cold War global security system and objectives and limitations of arms control within that evolving system. Special attention is given to the changing roles and responsibilities of the major powers in arms control efforts.
"If peace breaks out, can arms control be far behind?" According to Colin S. Gray, this sardonic motto describes events of the 1990s just as well as it did those of the 1920s. Gray offers a provocative history of twentieth-century attempts at arms limitation, as he challenges the fundamental assumptions of arms control theory. Arms control has never worked, he concludes, because it never can. Existing approaches to arms control appeal to common sense, but they are logically unsound and inherently impractical, Gray argues, because they fail to take political realities into account. He outlines their inadequacies in what he calls the Arms Control Paradox: the more motivated nations are to fight one another, the less interested they will be in supporting significant arms limitations. Under these conditions, arms control agreements must be, to echo a phrase of George Will's, either impossible or unimportant. Documenting the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s and the initiatives to limit strategic nuclear arms from 1969 to the present, Gray seeks to demonstrate that the fortunes of negotiated arms limitation have merely reflected the temperature of international relations, rather than influencing those relations. National security analysts, students and scholars of international relations, and others interested in arms control issues will want to read House of Cards and debate its conclusions.
Even though impacts generated by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons have not reached a magnitude sufficient to radically reorder contemporary world affairs, awareness of the nature and extent of these impacts has compelled some international actors to take decisive action. Damien Rogers examines how the international community has responded to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons since the early 1990s. Using a postinternationalist analytic framework, he specifically focuses on the maturing relationships between particular actors of world affairs and the nascent interconnectivity between their strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling these weapons. Furthermore, the book identifies ways in which the captains of small arms industry, arms brokers and chief users of these weapons are able to mitigate, resist or elude the intended effects of those responses.
International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, 'new agenda' or critical.
"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb,' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes."—from Living Weapons Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare. Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments. Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.
The decade of the 1990s offers a chance to build a new and better international order. What policy choices will this decade pose for the United States? This wide-ranging volume of essays imaginatively addresses these crucial issues. The peaceful revolutions of 1989-1990 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have swept away the foundations of the Cold War. The Eastern European nations are free; Europe is no longer divided; Germany is united. The Soviet threat to Western Europe is ending with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawals and asymmetrical cuts of Soviet forces. And U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World is giving way to cooperation in handling conflicts, as in Iraq and elsewhere. Much, of course, remains uncertain and unsettled. What sort of Soviet Union will emerge from the ongoing turmoil, with what political and economic system and what state structure? How far and how soon will the Eastern Euro pean states succeed in developing pluralist democracies and market economies? Are the changes irreversible? Certainly there will be turmoil, backsliding, and failures, but a return to the Cold War hardly seems likely.
"Efforts to create or maintain rules to contain the risks stemming from an unrestrained multilateral arms race are at the core of a world order based on consensual norms rather than on a pure balance of power. Whereas security cooperation is conventionally considered to be motivated primarily by interest- and security-based factors, studies have shown that all actors use moral arguments and are deeply embedded in the normative patterns surrounding their realm of action. Norm Dynamics in Multilateral ArmsControl, based on research conducted by a large PRIF team led by Harald M