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Following a scarcity of dollar funding available internationally to banks and financial institutions, in Dec. 2007 the Federal Reserve began to establish or expand Temporary Reciprocal Currency Arrangements with 14 foreign central banks. These central banks had the capacity to use these swap facilities to provide dollar liquidity to institutions in their jurisdictions. This paper presents the developments in the dollar swap facilities through the end of 2009. The facilities were a response to dollar funding shortages outside the U.S. during a period of market dysfunction. The dollar swap lines among central banks were effective at reducing the dollar funding pressures abroad and stresses in money markets. Charts and tables.
Following a scarcity of dollar funding available internationally to banks and financial institutions, starting in December 2007 the Federal Reserve established or expanded Temporary Reciprocal Currency Arrangements with fourteen foreign central banks. These central banks had the capacity to use these swap facilities to provide dollar liquidity to institutions in their jurisdictions. This paper presents the developments in the dollar swap facilities through the end of 2009. The facilities were a response to dollar funding shortages outside the United States during a period of market dysfunction. Formal research, as well as more descriptive accounts, suggests that the dollar swap lines among central banks were effective at reducing the dollar funding pressures abroad and stresses in money markets. The central bank dollar swap facilities are an important part of a toolbox for dealing with systemic liquidity disruptions -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Following a scarcity of dollar funding available internationally to banks and financial institutions, through 2008 the Federal Reserve expanded or established Temporary Reciprocal Currency Arrangements (Swap Lines) with fourteen foreign central banks. These central banks would have the capacity to use funds accessed through the swaps to provide dollar liquidity to institutions in their constituencies. In this paper, we focus on the elements of the dollar funding shortages that arose in 2007 and continued into 2009. In particular, we detail the market forces that contributed to the changing availability of dollars, with some focus on disruptions associated with money market funds and interbank lending activity. We also detail the forces behind the demand for dollars by globally-oriented banks. The paper then turns to the contribution of foreign exchange swap lines among central banks to reducing dollar funding pressures and limiting stresses in money markets, using for this purpose an analysis of high frequency data on funding costs in different currencies and tenors.
For about three decades until the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Covered Interest Parity (CIP) appeared to hold quite closely—even as a broad macroeconomic relationship applying to daily or weekly data. Not only have CIP deviations significantly increased since the GFC, but potential macrofinancial drivers of the variation in CIP deviations have also become significant. The variation in CIP deviations seems to be associated with multiple factors, not only regulatory changes. Most of these do not display a uniform importance across currency pairs and time, and some are associated with possible temporary considerations (such as asynchronous monetary policy cycles).
This paper makes contributions to the study of bilateral swap lines (BSLs). First, this paper fills a BSL information gap by constructing a comprehensive database of BSLs based on publicly available information, including after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, the paper provides the results of regression analysis exploring several empirical questions that were not covered in previous studies. The paper documents the evolution of BSLs into an important part of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), with some helping to stabilize financial market during both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysis suggests that countries on the recipient side of BSLs are more likely to sign and renew BSLs designed to alleviate balance of payments needs as their external position weakens. U.S. Federal Reserve BSLs appear to have been effective at stabilizing financial market conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The accumulation of large foreign asset positions by many central banks through sustained foreign exchange (FX) intervention has raised questions about its associated fiscal costs. This paper clarifies conceptual issues regarding how to measure these costs both from an ex-post and an ex-ante (relevant for decision making) perspective, and estimates both marginal and total costs for 73 countries over the period 2002-13. We find ex-ante marginal costs for the median emerging market economy (EME) in the inter-quartile range of 2-5.5 percent per year; while ex-ante total costs (of sustaining FX positions) in the range of 0.2-0.7 percent of GDP per year for light interveners and 0.3-1.2 percent of GDP per year for heavy interveners. These estimates indicate that fiscal costs of sustained FX intervention (via expanding central bank balance sheets) are not negligible.
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems’ resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.
This update of the guidelines published in 2001 sets forth the underlying framework for the Reserves Data Template and provides operational advice for its use. The updated version also includes three new appendices aimed at assisting member countries in reporting the required data.