Download Free Case Studies In The Development Of Close Air Support Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Case Studies In The Development Of Close Air Support and write the review.

The introduction of airplanes to warfare led almost from the first to their application in close support of ground forces. The earliest attempts at influencing the outcome of a ground battle from the air were limited by the fragility of the craft engaged and the lack of coherent ideas on the most effective use of what was still a novelty. What began as an expedient, however, has become over nearly ten decades an essential role for air power. Taken virtually for granted by troops and aviators today, the employment of air power in this way has been controversial from the first instance in which bombs were dropped on ground combatants during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912. Ground and air commanders have differed over the proper use of aviation; preferences and assumptions on doctrine have evolved in both the ground and air communities; technology has changed air systems and defensive ground weaponry; and with time different systems or techniques have developed in various military establishments for the command and control of ground and air forces operating in concert, for liaison and communications, and for delivering aerial firepower in support of land forces locked in combat with an enemy. In December 1982, Maj. Gen. Perry McCoy Smith, then the Air Force Director of Plans, asked the Office of Air Force History to prepare a number of case-study volumes on various aspects of air warfare. Col. John A. Warden III, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, provided funds from the Air Force's Project Warrior Program. With further generous assistance of Dr. Andrew Marshall, then Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force History Program approached some of the foremost historians in the field of military aviation to record their assessments as a resource for planning within the Air Force and the Army for several years to come. Each author was asked to produce an original case study on a defined period or subject. The essays were to be based on all relevant published literature and on the key archival documents containing the record of how various air forces actually developed and applied their systems of close air support to ground combat. Each author was also asked to cover certain basic topics: initial doctrine, organization of forces, background and courses of the air-ground campaigns, communications systems, command and control arrangements, weaponry and technology, and the decisions and people that determined the course of action and shaped its outcome. A concluding retrospect draws generalizations from the experiences presented. The Office of Air Force History believes that this volume will be of substantial value not only to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army, but should also appeal to a wider audience interested in all aspects of military history and contribute to informing the American public about the characteristics and the use of air power in all of its aspects.
This unique USAF publication provides fascinating original case studies about close air support. The introduction of airplanes to warfare led almost from the first to their application in close support of ground forces. The earliest attempts at influencing the outcome of a ground battle from the air were limited by the fragility of the craft engaged and the lack of coherent ideas on the most effective use of what was still a novelty. What began as an expedient, however, has become over nearly ten decades an essential role for air power. Taken virtually for granted by troops and aviators today, the employment of air power in this way has been controversial from the first instance in which bombs were dropped on ground combatants during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912. Ground and air commanders have differed over the proper use of aviation; preferences and assumptions on doctrine have evolved in both the ground and air communities; technology has changed air systems and defensive ground weaponry; and with time different systems or techniques have developed in various military establishments for the command and control of ground and air forces operating in concert, for liaison and communications, and for delivering aerial firepower in support of land forces locked in combat with an enemy. In December 1982, Maj. Gen. Perry McCoy Smith, then the Air Force Director of Plans, asked the Office of Air Force History to prepare a number of case-study volumes on various aspects of air warfare. Col. John A. Warden III, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, provided funds from the Air Force's Project Warrior Program. With further generous assistance of Dr. Andrew Marshall, then Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force History Program approached some of the foremost historians in the field of military aviation to record their assessments as a resource for planning within the Air Force and the Army for several years to come. Each author was asked to produce an original case study on a defined period or subject. The essays were to be based on all relevant published literature and on the key archival documents containing the record of how various air forces actually developed and applied their systems of close air support to ground combat. Each author was also asked to cover certain basic topics: initial doctrine, organization of forces, background and courses of the air-ground campaigns, communications systems, command and control arrangements, weaponry and technology, and the decisions and people that determined the course of action and shaped its outcome. A concluding retrospect draws generalizations from the experiences presented. The Office of Air Force History believes that this volume will be of substantial value not only to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army, but should also appeal to a wider audience interested in all aspects of military history and contribute to informing the American public about the characteristics and the use of air power in all of its aspects. Chapter 1 - Developments to 1939 * Lee Kennett * Chapter 2 - The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939-1941 * Williamson Murray * Chapter 3 - Soviet Air-Ground Coordination, 1941-1945 * Kenneth R. Whiting * Chapter 4 - The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 * David Syrett * Chapter 5 - Allied Cooperation in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945 * Alan F. Wilt * Chapter 6 - The Battle for France, 1944 * Will A. Jacobs * Chapter 7 - American Experience in the Southwest Pacific * Joe Gray Taylor * Chapter 8 - Korea, 1950-1953 * Allan R. Millett * Chapter 9 - Southeast Asia * John J. Sbrega * Chapter 10 - The Israeli Experience * Brereton Greenhous * Chapter 11 - A Retrospect on Close Air Support * I. B. Holley, Jr.
Throughout the history of close air support (CAS) there exists a consistent theme of friction and interservice rivalry. There are periods where close coordination and cooperation led to extremely effective CAS. Experiences in North Africa during World War II proved to be a harbinger of CAS throughout the twentieth century. The ineptness of the initial air-to-ground integration evolved by wars end into a synchronized, lethal form of combined arms operations. The troubled relationship between the Army and the Air Force over CAS directly impacts four major areas needed to accomplish effective CAS. Those areas are training, doctrine, trust and dialogue. Because of the troubles experienced in CAS during recent military operations in Afghanistan the Army is once again finding fault with current CAS capabilities. The Air Force admitted that there are problems. They also stress, with much justification, that there is plenty of fault to go around. The conclusion of the thesis is that CAS will continue to be an integral part of joint military operations. The Army and the Air Force must focus on improving training, doctrine, and most importantly, trust before any improvements are realized. The lives of US soldiers may well depend upon the effectiveness of CAS.Among military men, it is commonplace that inter-allied and interservice operations inescapably pose grave difficulties in execution. Differences in equipment, in doctrine, in attitude and outlook stemming from contrasting past experience all inhibit and complicate harmonious interaction. Past successes, however, have shown that these difficulties can be overcome where determination is present and effective procedures have been devised and applied by properly trained troops. Experience also shows that armed forces, not only of the United States but of other nations, have been slow to hammer out the necessary procedures. Often corrective steps have been achieved only after many failures in battle. In no area of interservice operations has this phenomenon been more pronounced than in the matter of CAS.The worth of close air support (CAS) as an effective tactical instrument of warfare is one of the most, if not the most, divisive issue between the US Army and Air Force. Prior to the Second World War the Air Service was a growing branch within the Army. To most army generals the value of an effective air corps lay in its ability to support ground troops, adjust field artillery, and conduct aerial reconnaissance. However, the airpower advocates within the Air Service believed that a properly equipped air force could wage war on a completely different scale than ever thought of before. Massive bomber formations could conduct strategic bombing on political, economic, and military targets, forcing the enemy to surrender. To these officers it was a sheer waste of energy and resources to build an air force to support ground operations when true airpower could render ground combat irrelevant.
Military historians have thoroughly documented the longstanding debate between American airmen and ground forces over Close Air Support (CAS). Discord between services, particularly during inter-war periods, has repeatedly resulted in poor CAS preparation and therefore poor performance in the early stages of America's conflicts. Measuring this CAS relationship both before and through conflict in terms of doctrine, training, and personal relationships reveals an additional trend. During World War II, the Korean War, and Operation Enduring Freedom, personal relationships improved and shared objectives emerged as a result of daily interaction between airmen and ground forces. The changes enabled those involved to rebuild the CAS relationship and improve performance in the later years of these conflicts. Regrettably, subsequent declines in the CAS relationship during interwar periods have created a consistent cycle of ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Both services must break this cycle of ebb and flow so that the U.S. military arrives at its next conflict with a properly maintained CAS relationship. CAS performance is inextricably linked to integration, making relationships the essential foundation of combat results. Restoring the CAS relationship can be as simple as airmen and ground forces occupying the same mess tent, in training as well as in combat. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. World War II 3. The Korean War 4. Vietnam and the Gulf War 5. The War in Afghanistan 6. Cross Case Analysis 7. Conclusion From World War I to the present day, American ground forces and airmen have argued over the ideal employment of scarce resources in training, equipment, and sorties. Their debate has often centered on one particularly contentious issue: Close Air Support (CAS). A series of formal agreements and doctrine revisions tells a familiar narrative of begrudging compromise between airmen searching for the most effective use of airpower across a range of mission types and troops who needed fixed wing CAS to maneuver-or even survive. Most commentators echo Major Patrick Gallogy's sentiment that "This rancorous debate and discourse regarding CAS has pervaded most of its history." However, on closer examination, a definable ebb and flow emerged in the CAS relationship that exists between airmen and the ground troops that they support from the sky. American airmen and ground forces made great strides in CAS capability in World War II, only to forget these lessons until they struggled to relearn them during the Korean War. Similar CAS struggles at the start of the Vietnam War and Operation Enduring freedom reveal the cyclical nature of this recurring fluctuation. During times of war, troops in contact with the enemy required CAS, and both parties sought to improve the CAS relationship as they strove toward common goals. Close personal relationships between air and ground leaders often spurred this improvement in the CAS relationship. Between wars, however, resource constraints, internal service concerns, complacency, and physical separation caused the priorities of airmen and ground forces to diverge. They planned separately with their own worst-case scenarios and service priorities for an uncertain future. This usually resulted in a lack of teamwork and low prioritization by Army and Air Force leaders for joint endeavors like CAS; evidenced by failures in doctrine, training, and personal relationships. As a result, the CAS relationship between airmen and ground troops fractured, forcing and both parties to waste time, money, and lives rebuilding that relationship during the next conflict. Unfortunately, that cycle persists today.
Drawing together original case studies this book explores air support for ground forces from the introduction of the aircraft to the battlefield, through to Close Air Support in contemporary conflicts. Exploring the opportunities, challenges and realties, this book establishes how Close Air Support became an essential role of air power and a critical feature of modern warfare. Using historical and contemporary perspectives to understand the evolution of Close Air Support doctrine, concepts and capabilities each author's contribution provides an enriched understanding of an Air Power capability whose application has often been contentious and fractious. The authors provide a range of perspectives on Close Air Support, from Air Power scholars and practitioners to Literature and Defence Studies analyses. In doing so, the book provides an in depth understanding of Close Air Support on the battlefield.
Proper doctrine for close support of American ground forces by airpower has been a tumultuous issue since the first days of combat aircraft. Air and ground leaders struggled with interservice rivalry, parochialism, employment paradigms, and technological roadblocks while seeking the optimum balance of missions given the unique speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft. Neither ground force concepts of airpower as self-defense and extended organic artillery, nor air force theories focused on command of the air and strategic attack fit the middle ground of close air support (CAS), leaving a doctrinal void prior to American combat in World War II. This thesis focuses on the critical period from September 1939 through the doctrinal and practical crucible of North Africa, which eventually produced a resoundingly successful system. Theoretical and practical changes in organization and command, airpower roles, and the tactical air control system are examined, with subarea focus on cooperation and communications technology. Upon examination, discerning leadership, able to transcend earlier compromises and failures, emerges as the essential element for CAS success during the war. While many airpower concepts proved valid, air-ground cooperation through liaison proved indispensable, a lesson repeated even today.