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A comprehensive thematic analysis of capital flight from Africa, it covers the role of safe havens, offshore financial centres, and banking secrecy in facilitating illicit financial flows and provides rich insights to policy makers interested in designing strategies to address the problems of capital flight and illicit financial flows.
The risks of large capital losses on the domestic assets of developing countries resulting from expropriation, inflation, or devaluations are identified as the major causes of capital flight. The combination of large foreign loans and capital flight from developing countries during the 1970s and early 1980s reflected different perceptions of domestic residents and foreign lenders regarding the risks of holding domestic assets. However, the debt crisis reduced these differences in perceived risks, and resulted in a decline of foreign loans coupled with continuation of capital flight. If sound macroeconomic and structural policies can reduce those risks, they can also stem capital flight.
This thesis explores three important factors that have been central to the pursuit of economic development in developing countries, particularly those in Africa. These are capital flows, economic integration and financial crises. Chapter 1 examines the causes and consequences of capital flight in African countries. Building on standard portfolio choice model, the study links the phenomenon of capital flight to the domestic investment climate (broadly defined) and shows that African agents move their portfolios abroad as a result of a deteriorating domestic investment climate where the risk-adjusted rate of return is unfavourable. The results presented suggest that economic risk, policy distortions and the poor profitability of African investments explain the variation in capital flight. In addition, employing a PVAR and its corresponding impulse responses, the chapter shows that capital flight shocks worsen economic performance. Chapter 2 explores the (independent) effects of crises and openness on a large sample of African countries using dynamic panel techniques. Focusing on sudden stops, currency, twin and sovereign debt crises, the chapter shows that economic crises are associated with growth collapses in Africa. In contrast, economic openness is found to be beneficial to growth. More importantly, we find that, consistent with standard Mundell-Flemming type models and sticky-price open economy models, greater openness to trade and financial flows mitigates the adverse effects of crises. In the final chapter, we examine whether capital flows such as FDI, foreign aid and migrant remittances crowd-in or crowd-out domestic investment in developing countries. Applying recently developed panel cointegration techniques which can handle cross-sectional heterogeneity, serial correlation and endogeneity, we find that FDI and remittances have a positive and significant effect on domestic investment in the long-run while aid tends to act as a substitute for investment. We also conduct panel Granger causality analysis and find that the effect of FDI on investment is both transitory as well as permanent. That is, it tends to crowd-in domestic investment both in the short-run and in the long-run. We do not find any causal links between foreign aid and investment. The results show that, while remittances do not have causal effects on investment in the short-run, there is a bidirectional (causal) relationship between the two in the long-run.
June 1995 After being excluded from world capital markets during the debt crisis, many developing countries have experienced large capital inflows in the past five years. The challenges these inflows pose for domestice policy have generated a substantial literature. The authors review and extend that literature. They characterize the new inflows, assess their causes and the likelihood of sustainability, analyze the policy issues they raise, and evaluate the possible policy responses. Their conclusions tie desirable policy responses to characteristics of both the flows themselves and to those of the recipient economy. Regarding the forces driving the current episode, they conclude that generally, the role of foreign interest rates as a push factor driving capital inflows and determining their magnitude has been well-established. On the other hand, country creditworthiness has helped determine both the timing and destination of the new capital flows. Even if creditworthiness is maintained, the early level of inflows is unlikely to be sustained. The pace of reduction in flows to countries that have been receiving them since the early 1990s depends on the path of foreign interest rates and the role of stock adjustment. But a loss of creditworthiness caused by a deterioration in domestic policy would stop inflows quickly and, depending on the circumstances, inflows may be replaced by substantial outflows and an outright balance of payments crisis. What are the implications for policy in recipient countries? Briefly, the receipt of capital inflows may strengthen the case for removing macroeconomic distortions, either because such inflows aggravate the cost of such distortions or because they ease the constraints that originally motivated their adoption. While direct intervention may not be feasible (because controls may be easily evaded), controls may sometimes be a second-best policy. To the extent that capital inflows are permitted to materialize, the desirability of foreign exhcange intervention depends on what is required for macroeconomic stability. Sterilized foreign exchange intervention to prevent overstimulation of demand with a fixed exchange rate may not be feasible or effective. A commensurate reduction in the money multiplier, achieved by increasing reserve requirements, may also have limited effects. The effectiveness of both measures depends on the structure of the domestic financial system. If domestic monetary expansion is not avoided, or if an expansionary financial stimulus is transmitted outside the banking system, the stabilization of total demand will require fiscal contraction.