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Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) shook the mathematical world in 1931 by a result that has become an icon of 20th century science: The search for rigour in proving mathematical theorems had led to the formalization of mathematical proofs, to the extent that such proving could be reduced to the application of a few mechanical rules. Gödel showed that whenever the part of mathematics under formalization contains elementary arithmetic, there will be arithmetical statements that should be formally provable but aren’t. The result is known as Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, so called because there is a second incompleteness result, embodied in his answer to the question "Can mathematics be proved consistent?" This book offers the first examination of Gödel’s preserved notebooks from 1930, written in a long-forgotten German shorthand, that show his way to the results: his first ideas, how they evolved, and how the jewel-like final presentation in his famous publication On formally undecidable propositions was composed.The book also contains the original version of Gödel’s incompleteness article, as handed in for publication with no mentioning of the second incompleteness theorem, as well as six contemporary lectures and seminars Gödel gave between 1931 and 1934 in Austria, Germany, and the United States. The lectures are masterpieces of accessible presentations of deep scientific results, readable even for those without special mathematical training, and published here for the first time.
Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) shook the mathematical world in 1931 by a result that has become an icon of 20th century science: The search for rigour in proving mathematical theorems had led to the formalization of mathematical proofs, to the extent that such proving could be reduced to the application of a few mechanical rules. Gödel showed that whenever the part of mathematics under formalization contains elementary arithmetic, there will be arithmetical statements that should be formally provable but aren’t. The result is known as Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, so called because there is a second incompleteness result, embodied in his answer to the question "Can mathematics be proved consistent?" This book offers the first examination of Gödel’s preserved notebooks from 1930, written in a long-forgotten German shorthand, that show his way to the results: his first ideas, how they evolved, and how the jewel-like final presentation in his famous publication On formally undecidable propositions was composed.The book also contains the original version of Gödel’s incompleteness article, as handed in for publication with no mentioning of the second incompleteness theorem, as well as six contemporary lectures and seminars Gödel gave between 1931 and 1934 in Austria, Germany, and the United States. The lectures are masterpieces of accessible presentations of deep scientific results, readable even for those without special mathematical training, and published here for the first time.
In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel published a revolutionary paper that challenged certain basic assumptions underpinning mathematics and logic. A colleague of Albert Einstein, his theorem proved that mathematics was partly based on propositions not provable within the mathematical system and had radical implications that have echoed throughout many fields. A gripping combination of science and accessibility, Godel’s Proofby Nagel and Newman is for both mathematicians and the idly curious, offering those with a taste for logic and philosophy the chance to satisfy their intellectual curiosity.
"An introduction to the life and thought of Kurt Gödel, who transformed our conception of math forever"--Provided by publisher.
This volume commemorates the life, work and foundational views of Kurt Gödel (1906–78), most famous for his hallmark works on the completeness of first-order logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency - with the other widely accepted axioms of set theory - of the axiom of choice and of the generalized continuum hypothesis. It explores current research, advances and ideas for future directions not only in the foundations of mathematics and logic, but also in the fields of computer science, artificial intelligence, physics, cosmology, philosophy, theology and the history of science. The discussion is supplemented by personal reflections from several scholars who knew Gödel personally, providing some interesting insights into his life. By putting his ideas and life's work into the context of current thinking and perceptions, this book will extend the impact of Gödel's fundamental work in mathematics, logic, philosophy and other disciplines for future generations of researchers.
Priest advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a perspective that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristole and remains at the centre of philosophical debate. This edition contains the author's reflections on developments since 1987.
"Among the many expositions of Gödel's incompleteness theorems written for non-specialists, this book stands apart. With exceptional clarity, Franzén gives careful, non-technical explanations both of what those theorems say and, more importantly, what they do not. No other book aims, as his does, to address in detail the misunderstandings and abuses of the incompleteness theorems that are so rife in popular discussions of their significance. As an antidote to the many spurious appeals to incompleteness in theological, anti-mechanist and post-modernist debates, it is a valuable addition to the literature." --- John W. Dawson, author of Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel
Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.
In 1931, the young Kurt Gödel published his First Incompleteness Theorem, which tells us that, for any sufficiently rich theory of arithmetic, there are some arithmetical truths the theory cannot prove. This remarkable result is among the most intriguing (and most misunderstood) in logic. Gödel also outlined an equally significant Second Incompleteness Theorem. How are these Theorems established, and why do they matter? Peter Smith answers these questions by presenting an unusual variety of proofs for the First Theorem, showing how to prove the Second Theorem, and exploring a family of related results (including some not easily available elsewhere). The formal explanations are interwoven with discussions of the wider significance of the two Theorems. This book will be accessible to philosophy students with a limited formal background. It is equally suitable for mathematics students taking a first course in mathematical logic.