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n this extremely comprehensive overview of airlift and air mobility, Colonel Miller shows how the worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free-world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Airlift is the movement of goods and people to where they are needed, when they are needed there. Since the 1920s there has been an evolving awareness and articulation of how to best organize, train, and equip airlift forces for that mission. The worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Colonel Miller's study traces these many interrelationships to discover what critical airlift decisions were made, why they were made, and what they may mean in the future. Airlift is the backbone of deterrence. A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy. How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process.
The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.
The C-17 is being developed and produced by McDonnell Douglas. The Congress has authorized procurement of 40 C-17 aircraft through fiscal year 1996. As of October 1,1995, McDonnell Douglas had delivered 22 production aircraft to the Air Force. In November 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced plans to buy an additional 80 C-17 aircraft. In addition to procuring the aircraft, the Air Force is purchasing spare parts to support the C-17. The Air Force estimates the total cost for initial spares-the quantity of parts needed to support and maintain a weapon system for the initial period of operation-for the first 40 C-17s to be about $888 million. In January 1994, we reported that the Air Force had frequently ordered C-17 spare parts prematurely. We noted that premature ordering occurred because the Air Force used inaccurate and outdated information, bought higher quantities than justified, or did not follow regulations governing the process. As a result, DOD revised its guidance to limit the initial procurement of spares, and the Air Force canceled orders for millions of dollars of C-17 parts. Initial spares for the C-17 are being procured under two contracts. Some are being provided under the C-17 development contract through interim contractor support. That support, which started in mid-1993, involves providing spares and technical support for two C-17 squadrons through June 1996. As of May 31, 1995, the Air Force had spent about $198 million for interim contractor support. The remaining initial spares are being procured under contract F33657-81-C-2109 (referred to in this report as contract-2109). Under this contract, the Air Force, as of May 31, 1995, had obligated $120 million for initial spares, but negotiated prices for only about $29 million of the spares.
This is the story of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) from its inception to 1991. In suggesting such a reserve airlift fleet in 1947, Admiral E. S. Land, President of the Air Transport Association, drew on the organization's experience with mobilization planning in the mid- to late-1930s and on the airlines' experience in the early months of World War II. "As I see it," he said, "we would have to face it along the same general lines as we did then, omitting as many of the mistakes as possible, of course. At the beginning of the last war, the air transport system had a detailed war plan. Given the necessary information from the military services as to their needs, we can develop this one." The Civil Reserve Air Fleet concept was formally approved on December 15, 1951-by a memorandum of understanding between the Departments of Commerce and Defense. It began to take shape in 1952, when it was allocated some 300 four-engine, airline aircraft for use in case of war or a national emergency. Planning for the use of these assets began almost immediately and interim arrangements were in place by mid-1953. Still, it was not until 1958 that a formal wartime organization was agreed to, and not until 1959 that the first major carrier signed the standby contract that obligated it to provide crews and aircraft in case of a major war or national emergency. Two factors clearly shape the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The first, the nation's military strategies, dictated the airlift resources CRAF was asked to supply. As it happened, evolving strategies entailed an ever growing requirement for CRAF airlift. By the late 1950s, U.S. military strategy promised the ability to respond across the spectrum of aggression, and then, two decades later, it committed the nation to an increasingly rapid deployment of forces to NATO. The second factor was economic, the economics of the air transportation marketplace. Despite the efforts of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and, its successor, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to influence the make-up of airline fleets-in particular attempts to encourage the airlines to increase their cargo capability-it was the circumstances of the commercial marketplace that drove the decisions. When the air freight business failed to grow as expected, and when the lower-lobe capacity of the airlines' widebody jets proved capable of handling what air freight there was, the scheduled airlines began to divest themselves of their freighter aircraft. MAC's efforts to halt or even to slow this process proved ineffectual. It was not until the development of the air express parcel business, that the industry began once again to add cargo aircraft. Again, it was the economic forces that intervened, not MAC. This is the story of the evolution of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet-from its roots in the pre-World War II planning of the ATA and the Army Air Corps Staff, through its creation in 1951 and its evolution over the years, to a seemingly troubled existence in 1987.
Following World War II, the Soviet Union drew an Iron Curtain across Europe, crowning its efforts with a blockade of West Berlin in a desperate effort to prevent the creation of an independent, democratic West Germany. The United States and Great Britain, aided by France, responded with a daring air logistical operation that in fifteen months delivered almost three million tons of coal, food, and other necessities to the people of Berlin. Now, drawing on rare U.S. Air Force files, recently declassified documents from the National Archives, records released since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the memories of airlift veterans themselves, Roger G. Miller provides an original study of the Berlin Airlift. The Berlin Airlift was an enterprise of epic proportions that demonstrated the power of air logistics as a political instrument. What began as a hastily organized operation by a small number of warweary cargo airplanes evolved into an intricate bridge of aircraft that flowed in and out of Berlin through narrow air corridors. Hour after hour, day after day, week after week, a stream of airplanes delivered everything from food and medicine to coal and candy in defiance of breakdowns, inclement weather, and Soviet hostility. And beyond the airlift itself, a complex system of transportation, maintenance, and supply stretching around the world sustained operations. Historians, veterans, and general readers will welcome this history of the first Western victory of the Cold War. Maps, diagrams, and more than forty photographs illustrate the mechanical inner workings and the human faces that made that triumph possible.
This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.
Proceedings of a symposium co-sponsored by the Air Force Historical Foundation and the Air Force History and Museums Program. The symposium covered relevant Air Force technologies ranging from the turbo-jet revolution of the 1930s to the stealth revolution of the 1990s. Illustrations.